Buckets of steam and left-handed hammers. The fool’s errand as a signal of epistemic and coalitional dominance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radu Umbres

In various professional groups, experts send rookies on absurd tasks as a prank. The fool’s errand appears in factories and hospitals, in elite schools and scout camps, among soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Why are newcomers deceived and humiliated and why are fool’s errands similar in structure despite various contexts and remarkably persistent over time? Here I propose that the cultural success of this social institution and its recurrent features across history and cultures are based on evolved cognitive mechanisms activated by apprenticeship as social learning and group induction. I will show that evolved mechanisms of epistemic vigilance explain how novices are reliably deceived by experts using opaque statements erroneously perceived as pedagogical. Furthermore, evolved capacities for coalition building explain why insiders use the prank as strategic signaling of hierarchies based on epistemic asymmetry. The intersection of cognitive mechanisms and patterns of professional recruitment create a tradition where insiders coordinate to humiliate newcomers to assert epistemic and coalitional dominance.

Author(s):  
Simon Carrignon ◽  
R. Alexander Bentley ◽  
Matthew Silk ◽  
Nina H. Fefferman

1AbstractOngoing efforts to combat the global pandemic of COVID-19 via public health policy have revealed the critical importance of understanding how individuals understand and react to infection risks. We here present a model to explore how both individual observation and social learning are likely to shape behavioral, and therefore epidemiological, dynamics over time. Efforts to delay and reduce infections can compromise their own success, especially in populations with age-structure in both disease risk and social learning —two critical features of the current COVID-19 crisis. Our results concur with anecdotal observations of age-based differences in reactions to public health recommendations. We show how shifting reliance on types of learning affect the course of an outbreak, and could therefore factor into policy-based interventions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 287 (1928) ◽  
pp. 20200090
Author(s):  
Marcel Montrey ◽  
Thomas R. Shultz

A defining feature of human culture is that knowledge and technology continually improve over time. Such cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) probably depends far more heavily on how reliably information is preserved than on how efficiently it is refined. Therefore, one possible reason that CCE appears diminished or absent in other species is that it requires accurate but specialized forms of social learning at which humans are uniquely adept. Here, we develop a Bayesian model to contrast the evolution of high-fidelity social learning, which supports CCE, against low-fidelity social learning, which does not. We find that high-fidelity transmission evolves when (1) social and (2) individual learning are inexpensive, (3) traits are complex, (4) individual learning is abundant, (5) adaptive problems are difficult and (6) behaviour is flexible. Low-fidelity transmission differs in many respects. It not only evolves when (2) individual learning is costly and (4) infrequent but also proves more robust when (3) traits are simple and (5) adaptive problems are easy. If conditions favouring the evolution of high-fidelity transmission are stricter (3 and 5) or harder to meet (2 and 4), this could explain why social learning is common, but CCE is rare.


2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-357
Author(s):  
Rebecca Thomas

Rendell and Whitehead state that marine ecosystems are more variable than terrestrial ecosystems over time scales of months or longer. The marine environment is actually less variable than the terrestrial at these shorter time scales, and probably equally variable over centuries. This issue is important when considering claims that environmental variability affects benefits of social learning versus individual learning and genetics.


2016 ◽  
Vol 283 (1825) ◽  
pp. 20152402 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Reindl ◽  
S. R. Beck ◽  
I. A. Apperly ◽  
C. Tennie

The variety and complexity of human-made tools are unique in the animal kingdom. Research investigating why human tool use is special has focused on the role of social learning: while non-human great apes acquire tool-use behaviours mostly by individual (re-)inventions, modern humans use imitation and teaching to accumulate innovations over time. However, little is known about tool-use behaviours that humans can invent individually, i.e. without cultural knowledge. We presented 2- to 3.5-year-old children with 12 problem-solving tasks based on tool-use behaviours shown by great apes. Spontaneous tool use was observed in 11 tasks. Additionally, tasks which occurred more frequently in wild great apes were also solved more frequently by human children. Our results demonstrate great similarity in the spontaneous tool-use abilities of human children and great apes, indicating that the physical cognition underlying tool use shows large overlaps across the great ape species. This suggests that humans are neither born with special physical cognition skills, nor that these skills have degraded due to our species’ long reliance of social learning in the tool-use domain.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily J. Hudson ◽  
Nicole Creanza

AbstractOscine songbirds have been an important study system for social learning, particularly because their learned songs provide an analog for human languages and music. Here we propose a different analogy; from an evolutionary perspective, could a bird’s song be more like an arrowhead than an aria? We modify an existing model of human tool evolution to accommodate cultural evolution of birdsong: each song learner chooses the most skilled available tutor to emulate, and more likely produces an inferior copy than a superior one. Similarly to human toolx evolution, we show that larger populations foster greater improvements in song over time, even when learners restrict their pool of tutors to a subset of individuals. We also demonstrate that randomly sampling tutors from the population offers no clear benefit over sampling only existing connections in a structured social network, and that by allowing a lower quality trait to be easier to imitate than a higher quality one, simpler songs can be maintained after population bottlenecks. We show that these processes could plausibly generate empirically observed patterns of song evolution, and we make predictions about the types of song elements most likely to be lost when populations shrink. More broadly, we aim to connect the modeling approaches used by researchers studying social learning in human and non-human systems, moving toward a cohesive theoretical framework that accounts for both cognitive and demographic processes.


Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281-2328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mira Frick ◽  
Ryota Iijima ◽  
Yuhta Ishii

We exhibit a natural environment, social learning among heterogeneous agents, where even slight misperceptions can have a large negative impact on long‐run learning outcomes. We consider a population of agents who obtain information about the state of the world both from initial private signals and by observing a random sample of other agents' actions over time, where agents' actions depend not only on their beliefs about the state but also on their idiosyncratic types (e.g., tastes or risk attitudes). When agents are correct about the type distribution in the population, they learn the true state in the long run. By contrast, we show, first, that even arbitrarily small amounts of misperception about the type distribution can generate extreme breakdowns of information aggregation, where in the long run all agents incorrectly assign probability 1 to some fixed state of the world, regardless of the true underlying state. Second, any misperception of the type distribution leads long‐run beliefs and behavior to vary only coarsely with the state, and we provide systematic predictions for how the nature of misperception shapes these coarse long‐run outcomes. Third, we show that how fragile information aggregation is against misperception depends on the richness of agents' payoff‐relevant uncertainty; a design implication is that information aggregation can be improved by simplifying agents' learning environment. The key feature behind our findings is that agents' belief‐updating becomes “decoupled” from the true state over time. We point to other environments where this feature is present and leads to similar fragility results.


2020 ◽  
Vol 287 (1921) ◽  
pp. 20192770
Author(s):  
R. Tucker Gilman ◽  
Fern Johnson ◽  
Marco Smolla

Social learning occurs when animals acquire knowledge or skills by observing or interacting with others and is the fundamental building block of culture. Within populations, some individuals use social learning more frequently than others, but why social learning phenotypes differ among individuals is poorly understood. We modelled the evolution of social learning frequency in a system where foragers compete for resources, and there are many different foraging options to learn about. Social learning phenotypes diverged when some options offered much better rewards than others and expected rewards changed moderately quickly over time. When options offered similar rewards or when rewards changed slowly, a single social learning phenotype evolved. This held for fixed and simple conditional social learning rules. Sufficiently complex conditional social learning rules prevented the divergence of social learning phenotypes under all conditions. Our results explain how competition can promote the divergence of social learning phenotypes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quinn Slobodian

This article shows that the incorporation of right-wing libertarians into the Alt Right coalition was the end result of a schism in the neoliberal intellectual movement in response to the egalitarian challenge of the 1960s. In a symmetry with developments on the post-Marxist Left, one group of Austrian School economists associated with F. A. Hayek took a cultural turn. Performing their own critique of “economism,” they perceived human nature as rooted primarily in culture, adaptable over time through social learning and selective evolution. The other group of Austrian economists, linked to Murray Rothbard and culminating in the racist-libertarian alliance of the Alt Right, saw difference as rooted in biology and race as an immutable hierarchy of group traits and abilities. While many observers have described the Alt Right as a backlash against the excesses of neoliberalism, this shows that an important current of the Alt Right was born within and not against the neoliberal movement.


Author(s):  
Matteo Mameli ◽  
Kim Sterelny

Cultural traits are those phenotypic traits whose development depends on social learning. These include practices, skills, beliefs, desires, values, and artefacts. The distribution of cultural traits in the human species changes over time. But this is not enough to show that culture evolves. That depends on the mechanisms of change. In the cultural realm, one can often observe something similar to biology’s ‘descent with modification’: cultural traits are sometimes modified, their modifications are sometimes retained and passed on to others through social learning, until new modifications are added. In this way, new modifications are piled on top of old modifications, generating cumulative change. But, again, this is not enough to show that culture evolves. For culture to evolve, cumulative change must be the result of hidden-hand mechanisms similar to those that explain cumulative biological change. If cumulative cultural change cannot be explained in these terms, the analogy between cultural change and biological evolution is unhelpful. The best-known biological mechanism is natural selection. There are reasons to think that cultural change is at least sometimes due to natural-selection-like mechanisms. The adaptive fit often found between cultural traits and the environment in many cases has been built gradually and in a way that involves natural selection operating at the cultural level. The parallel with morphological adaptation is compelling. No complete and universally accepted account of natural-selection-like processes operating at the cultural level exists at this stage. But at least three kinds of processes seem possible: - A natural-selection-like process can be generated by culturally heritable differences in fitness between individuals. - A natural-selection-like process can be generated by culturally heritable differences in fitness between groups. - A natural-selection-like process can operate at the level of cultural variants themselves, independently of the effects that cultural variants have on the fitness of individuals or groups. The theory of memes (initially presented by Dawkins and then developed by Dennett) is one possible account of how (iii) might work; but other accounts exist too.


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