Profit distribution of IPD projects using fuzzy alliance

PurposeThis paper examines the profit distribution of engineering projects in the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode. IPD is a new delivery method that can ameliorate many of the disadvantages of traditional delivery methods and improve project results. In the implementation of IPD, the profit distribution is key for ensuring the success of IPD projects.Design/methodology/approachThis paper described a new method for characterizing profit distribution in the IPD mode. The payment function and Shapley value of the cooperative fuzzy game of fuzzy alliance were defined by considering the Choquet integral of the fuzzy measure. The participation of each player was considered, and the influence of participation on the profit distribution was discussed. Lastly, changes in the profit distribution of core participants under different alliance combinations were studied.FindingsA case from a report of The American Institute of Architects (AIA) was used to verify the fuzzy alliance model. There was a significant correlation between the degree of participation of the owner, architect and builder and the profit distribution among these three participants.Research limitations/implicationsThe theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, this paper selects a case with only three key participants in order to simplify the research. When there are many core participants, how to establish the alliance in the IPD mode and how to establish the corresponding profit distribution model, further work is certainly required to disentangle these complexities in models. Second, in this case, BIM technology has little impact on the income of the whole project. Therefore, this paper does not consider the impact of BIM technology on the marginal effect of the IPD project. Third, the contract type in the case is a custom tri-party based on IFOA. There is no classified discussion of the impact of different contracts on the profit distribute in the paper.Practical implicationsBased on the in-depth study of cooperative game with alliance structure, this paper promotes the classic cooperative game with alliance structure. The authors define the payoff function of fuzzy cooperative games by Choquet integral of fuzzy measure, and introduce the idea into the field of IPD. It aims at extending the solution to a cooperative game without a core. It can be obtained through a simple calculation. In the IPD alliance, the fuzziness and uncertainty of the participation degree of each participant will affect the profit of the whole project. The authors find that the higher the participation rate of players, the more profit each participant has. The greater the influence weight of the designer on the alliance, the lower the influence weight of the contractor on the alliance, the lower the participation of the contractor and the designer, and the lower the income distribution value of the three core participants. It shows a monotonous decline status.Social implicationsFor any construction enterprise, it can make more profits if it joins the grand alliance. In the IPD alliance, each participant can maximize their own interests, which can also promote the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to participate in the alliance and increase the application of IPD mode in AEC industry. This research method provides a new fast, effective, and more realistic solution method for cooperative countermeasures. It can be further extended to other cooperative game fields and advance a new research perspective and solution for the distribution of cooperative interests.Originality/valueThe contribution of this paper is the development of a fuzzy alliance model that provides a tool for measuring the profit distribution in IPD. This is the first quantitative model to connect the degree of participation with the profit distribution in IPD using fuzzy alliance.

Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategic Alliance Considering the Quality Level of Remanufactured Products and Patent Protection

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer responsible for collecting used products and remanufacturing is constructed. Considering the quality level of remanufactured products, four kinds of closed-loop supply chain alliance structure models are constructed. The optimal equilibrium decisions of these four models are compared and analyzed. The optimal decisions of the models are verified by numerical analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of the quality of remanufactured products and the decision influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance on the remanufacturer’s decision are further analyzed. The results show that remanufactured products are competitive with new products, and the improvement of the remanufactured product quality will reduce the market demand of new products. The equilibrium decision of the closed-loop supply chain is affected by the alliance behavior of members in the closed-loop supply chain and the quality level of remanufactured products. The higher the decision concentration of the closed-loop supply chain is, the more favorable the supply chain is; the higher the remanufacturing quality level is, the more favorable the supply chain is, and the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer is affected by the quality level of remanufactured products and the decision-making influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance structure. We find that the improvement of the concentration degree of closed-loop supply chain decision can benefit the supply chain by improving the remanufacturing quality level, which has direct effect on the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer. In most cases, the choice of the alliance is the dominant decision of the third-party remanufacturer.

Uncertain Dependance on Modern Tools in Multiplexes for Purchasing Household Commodities

This paper involves the study of the reasons why generally people prefer hyper market stores and know the various medias which influences the customers to hypermarket. Illuminating assessment is used in this examination since it will ensure the minimization of reason and expansion of resolute nature of data accumulated. This choice was invited by financial analysts and the business sectors, however caused fights and a change in India's focal government's political alliance structure...

Regional Alliance Structure and International Conflict

Why are some regions more peaceful than others? Some regions are particularly plagued by traditional power politics and political tensions, while the danger of war between major actors has significantly declined in other regions. The conventional literature would answer the question from a dyadic perspective—a region with many states with certain set of traits, such as democracy, should be peaceful. However, it is ultimately an empirical question whether the prevalence of power politics and conflict can be solely explained by the type of states and dyads in a region. I argue that the nature of international interactions is shaped by regional-level environment. Due to local security externalities, dyadic politics and conflict is dependent on conditions in a local neighborhood. More specifically, this study focuses on the role of regional-level alliance structure. A region can be situated in various types of alliance configuration depending on global geopolitical climate. I argue that conflict is unlikely in a region in which a global power establishes hegemonic domination through alliance ties with local states. The presence of an external global power dominating a region provides a local enforcement mechanism and reassurance for local states, which in turn reduces hostile interactions among local states. To examine how the regional-level conditions influence dyadic-level politics among local states, this paper empirically analyzes political events data (Integrated Data for Events Analysis) applying multilevel modeling, aiming at contributing the literature by explicitly modeling the influence of regional-level variables on local politics beyond militarized disputes. Empirical analysis revealed that a regionally shared “patron” can promote peace between local states. However, the effect of regional hierarchy turned out to be indirect. Regional dominance structured by an external global power does not exert an overarching influence over an entire region by shifting the region-specific intercept. Rather, the regional-level global power domination in terms of defense pacts particularly influences powerful states in a region while not quite reducing hostility among “minor” local states. Thus, international conflict and hostility is indirectly constrained in a region under hegemonic domination by a global power. This study has empirically explored an argument that it is fruitful to go beyond a purely dyadic analysis of international conflict. The independent effect of a spatial environment means that even similar dyads may behave differently depending on the conditions surrounding them. It shows a need to reexamine some of the important findings about international conflict from a spatial perspective, taking into account macro-regional contexts within which states operate. Moreover, the introduction of regional contexts potentially bridges a gap between quantitative studies of international conflict and more area-specific studies.

Alliance Politics and NATO Standardisation

This chapter is split into three parts. In the first I develop the main historical trajectory of the equipment standardization debates in NATO and describe how the doctrinal perspectives and battlefield interpretations of a number of Alliance partners started to coincide. In the second part, I show that there are a number of social processes buried within this narrative that help to frame the standardization debate in a particular way. In the third part of the chapter I assess the underlying rationality of the stances being taken by the various actors in NATO. This will then allow us to draw conclusions as to how power works within an alliance structure.