Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategic Alliance Considering the Quality Level of Remanufactured Products and Patent Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050021
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Hui Wu ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Kebing Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Alliance Structure

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer responsible for collecting used products and remanufacturing is constructed. Considering the quality level of remanufactured products, four kinds of closed-loop supply chain alliance structure models are constructed. The optimal equilibrium decisions of these four models are compared and analyzed. The optimal decisions of the models are verified by numerical analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of the quality of remanufactured products and the decision influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance on the remanufacturer’s decision are further analyzed. The results show that remanufactured products are competitive with new products, and the improvement of the remanufactured product quality will reduce the market demand of new products. The equilibrium decision of the closed-loop supply chain is affected by the alliance behavior of members in the closed-loop supply chain and the quality level of remanufactured products. The higher the decision concentration of the closed-loop supply chain is, the more favorable the supply chain is; the higher the remanufacturing quality level is, the more favorable the supply chain is, and the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer is affected by the quality level of remanufactured products and the decision-making influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance structure. We find that the improvement of the concentration degree of closed-loop supply chain decision can benefit the supply chain by improving the remanufacturing quality level, which has direct effect on the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer. In most cases, the choice of the alliance is the dominant decision of the third-party remanufacturer.

scholarly journals Managing Pricing of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Patent Protection

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Leqi Hua ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Yan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Third Party

AbstractThis paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision problem in which the original manufacturer allows the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture under patent protection. In the two cycle mode, the authors discuss the pricing decision problem of the original manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party remanufacturer in centralized and decentralized decision-making cases. The authors obtain the optimal sale price and wholesale price of new products and remanufactured products in two cases, and the optimal recycling rate of used products in centralized decision-making case. Finally, the authors carry out the corresponding numerical simulation of the pricing decision.

scholarly journals The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Wenbin Wang ◽  
Jia Lv ◽  
Ni An ◽  
Jie Guan ◽  
Shiyuan Quan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Buy Back

This paper investigates the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) implemented by the government in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with asymmetric information. The manufacturer produces and sells products to consumers, while the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is delegated to the third-party collector, the one who has private information about the collection effort level. An information screening contract for the manufacturer is put forward to obtain the private information from the third-party collector, which is composed of buy-back price and franchise fee. By utilizing principal-agent theory, two cases are mainly examined including the CLSC without the RPM and the CLSC with the RPM. The results demonstrate that (i) the information screening contract is effective in capturing the collector’s collection effort level, (ii) raising the buy-back price to motivate the third-party collector is confirmed to perform well on enhancing the collection quantity from consumers, (iii) H-type collector collects more WEEEs and earns more profits than L-type collector, and (iv) the RPM improves the collection quantity of the enterprise and reaps more environmental benefits. The numerical results verify the validity of the contract and the feasibility of the RPM.

scholarly journals Consignment stock policy in a closed-loop supply chain

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Chakraborty ◽  
Tarun Maiti ◽  
B. C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Decision Strategy ◽  
Decision Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Stock Policy ◽  
Strategy I

The main feature of sustainable supply Chain Management is reuse of End of Life (EOL) products to reduce the environmental pollution. This paper considers the Consignment Stock (CS) policy for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC). To achieve the economic goal, this study presents a multi-echelon supply chain with a single manufacturer, a single retailer and a third-party service provider. The objective is to optimize this three-level CLSC under a Stackelberg game scenario. The other objective is to identify the environmental impact of remanufacturing EOL products. In this CLSC, the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer, the third party are the followers. Under manufacturer's leadership, the retailer and the third party acquire three different decision strategies - I, II, and III. In decision strategy I, the retailer acts as the leader and the third party acts as a follower, whereas in decision strategy II, they obtain a Nash game strategy. In the decision strategy III, they act as one unit and decide their decisions centrally. Numerical example and sensitivity analysis are used to illustrate optimal results of different decision strategies and also check the behaviour of key model-parameters. The best outcomes are found in decision strategy I. The main findings of our study show that when upper level player has more power then the supply chain gives best outcomes.

System dynamics research of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain dominated by the third party

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shidi Miao ◽  
Tengfei Wang ◽  
Deyun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Waste Recycling ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of the electronic information industry in recent years, electronic products are being updated faster and faster, and e-waste recycling has become a common problem around the world. Firstly, this article contrasts recycling at home and abroad using the predicament of Midea Corp. Based on a closed-loop supply chain with the system dynamics method, a model is constructed and simulated. In this model, the collection point coverage rate is introduced to adjust the e-waste recycling rate dynamically. Aiming at a recycling mode dominated by the third party of the closed-loop supply chain, the article mainly discusses the impact on the sales rate and market share of the recycling model by third-party enterprises and compares the total revenue of all supply chains. Simulation results show that the model is more effective and optimal than the traditional recycling model.

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Collecting and Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmin Xiao ◽  
Zongsheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper investigates the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisted of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, in the presence of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concern of followers. We formulate the stochastic differential game-theoretic models and resolve the feedback Stackelberg equilibriums without and with fairness concern. We also derive the evolutionary paths of the stochastic return rate and the value functions of the supply chain members under the optimal control strategies. We find that the feedback equilibrium exists only under a specific condition, and the expectation and variance of the return rate both approach the stable state for a specific closed-loop supply chain system. We further discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the supply chain system. The manufacturer would shift profit to the retailer by lowering the wholesale price, and the stable expected return rate will be lower in the supply chain with fairness concerns, as the third party will have less incentive to collect used products, considering unfairness. The manufacturer should set a higher transfer subsidy to incentivize the third party to collect when the third party is concerned with fairness.

scholarly journals How Does Licensing Remanufacturing Affect the Supply Chain Considering Customer Environmental Awareness?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1898 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zongbao Zou ◽  
Fan Wang ◽  
Xiaofan Lai ◽  
Jingxian Hong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Technology Licensing ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

As sustainability issues are receiving increasing attention in society, in recent years many manufacturers have been adopting remanufacturing via technology licensing. This paper uses a game theory approach to investigate this strategy of a manufacturer under a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer, and one third-party remanufacturer (TPR), with the consideration of customer environmental awareness. In particular, the supplier supplies the components to the manufacturer and the manufacturer adopts technology licensing remanufacturing via the TPR. We explicitly characterize the reactions between the supplier and the manufacturer as being in equilibrium after adopting the technology licensing. We find that only when remanufacturing is a potential threat to the supplier is the performance of the supply chain improved and the double marginalization effect effectively eliminated. Moreover, remanufacturing by technology licensing only increases the profit of the manufacturer, but decreases the profit of the supplier. Interestingly, contrary to traditional wisdom, the existence of remanufactured products does not reduce the quantity of new products. Furthermore, remanufacturing by technology licensing may not always improve the environment, but customers in the market have environmental awareness that facilitates remanufacturing.

scholarly journals Decision-making in a retailer-led closed-loop supply chain involving a third-party logistics provider

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Xiao-Xu Chen ◽  
◽  
Peng Xu ◽  
Jiao-Jiao Li ◽  
Thomas Walker ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijun Meng ◽  
Qiang Qiang ◽  
Zuqing Huang ◽  
Baoyou Zhang ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Sustainable Manufacturing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
The Government

Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

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