scholarly journals A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap

Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Martinez-Saito
Keyword(s):  
Neural Circuits ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Neutral Monism ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Functional States ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

AbstractThe epistemological chasm between how we (implicitly and subjectively) perceive or imagine the actual world and how we (explicitly and “objectively”) think of its underlying entities has motivated perhaps the most disconcerting impasse in human thought: the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical properties of the world. Here, I advocate a combination of philosophical skepticism and simplicity as an informed approach to arbitrate among theories of consciousness. I argue that the explanatory gap is rightly a gap in our understanding, but one that is not surprising; and we being observers biased by our first-person perspective and our existence may both hinder and (the realization we have them) assist our reasoning. Further, I unfold the concept of observer into two distinct notions based on its functional and phenomenal aspects, and exploit this device to elucidate the subject-observer relationship. Then, I proceed to analyze the philosophical zombie dilemma. Lastly, I contend that from a skeptical viewpoint, panpsychism (or neutral monism) is the most parsimonious doctrine accounting for the explanatory gap, and suggest that it would be possible to make headway in the hard problem of consciousness by uncovering non-trivial causal relationships between qualia states and functional states, if routine and controlled manipulation of neural circuits were easily available.

The explanatory gap is still there

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 996-997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Oberauer
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Sensorimotor Contingencies ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

I argue that O'Regan & Noë's (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the “hard problem” of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.

Reduction and Emergence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pascal Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Ontological Pluralism ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
The World ◽  
The Explanatory Gap

How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.

scholarly journals Knowledge as Light

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 85-97
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Kalin
Keyword(s):  
Social Function ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Physical Entity ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Conceptual Thought ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject

The question of knowledge presents itself as one of the most importantissues for human thought and society because it is through knowledge thatwe establish a bond with God, ourselves, other human beings, the world, itsmeaning and purpose. We establish sociopolitical systems and civilizationson the basis of it. Defined as such, no society can dispense with knowledge.Knowledge, however, transcends the limits of social function and revealssomething of the deepest nature of the human being. Our state of being-inthe-world and being-created-by-God is revealed to us in our knowledge ofourselves. More importantly, we do not simply exist but also know that weexist. It is this knowledge that enables us to make sense of the world, conceiveit as an intelligible state of being, and realize our place and role in it.Knowledge, however, is always the knowledge of something. Everymeaningful statement is the affiition or negation of something. In knowinga physical entity, a concept, or a feeling, we affirm or negate the existenceof that “thing” which has become the subject of our knowledge. This“thing” and the “of” of our judgments ultimately hark back to the allencompassingreality of being, because what can be affirmed or negatedcannot be other than being. In this regard, there is no knowledge that precedesbeing. Every cognitive act directed toward ourselves or other thingsthat can be the subject of human knowledge is grounded in the all-inclusiveand penetrating reality of being. This aspect of being has been called inIslamic philosophy the in&@ al-wujud, “expansion of being,” and sometimesal-sarayun al-wujiid, “penetration of being.” In sharp contrast to theepistemologies of subjectivism, one is before one knows. Our existencealways precedes our knowledge of it, even though the latter may effect andmode the former in a myriad of ways. Said differently, the reality of beingis not exhausted in the deliverances of conceptual thought.’ ...

Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

2020 ◽  
pp. 437-457
Author(s):  
Josh Weisberg
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Reductive Explanation ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Order State

Higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness hold that a mental state is conscious when it is appropriately represented by a ‘higher-order’ state, a state about another mental state. The higher-order perception (HOP) theory holds that HO representation is best modeled on perceptual processes, while the higher-order thought (HOT) theory holds that it is best modeled on thought. In addition, some HO theories hold that to be conscious, a state must be actively represented by an HO state, while others maintain that the mere disposition to be represented by an HO state is enough. The HO theory, if successful, offers a reductive explanation of mental state consciousness in terms of nonconscious HO representation. This chapter first spells out the general motivation for the HO view and the differences between HOP and HOT before considering key objections to the approach, as well as possible empirical support. Finally it looks at how the view addresses the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness.

scholarly journals A language for qualia: on verbal influence of the phenomenal

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Kuzeev
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Descriptive Framework ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Pragmatics Of Communication

Despite several decades of intense scrutiny, the problem of the “explanatory gap” remains one of the most topical issues in today’s cognitive sciences. This paper argues that, if re-articulated as the (relative) ineffability of phenomenal properties of sensory experiences, it can become an object of linguistic treatment to a sensible effect. The paper proceeds from discussing the problem of ineffability at large to a brief analysis of the current accounts of phenomenal mental states. It then proposes a tentative descriptive framework for phenomenal judgments, i.e. statements involving reference to the speaker’s qualia. The main argument of the paper consists in relativization of the ineffability thesis and in establishing that phenomenal contents can be communicated verbally via a special type of discursive units––phenomemes––by way of referencing relational properties of the sensory experiences in question. In the concluding section, the paper suggests that phenomemes constitute a narrative dimension and highlights the potential of further research on the subject for the pragmatics of communication, cognitive stylistics, and other areas of the language-related scholarship.

scholarly journals A language for qualia: on verbal influence of the phenomenal

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Kuzeev
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Explanatory Gap ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Phenomenal Properties ◽  
Relational Properties ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Descriptive Framework ◽  
The Explanatory Gap ◽  
Pragmatics Of Communication

Despite several decades of intense scrutiny, the problem of the “explanatory gap” remains one of the most topical issues in today’s cognitive sciences. This paper argues that, if re-articulated as the (relative) ineffability of phenomenal properties of sensory experiences, it can become an object of linguistic treatment to a sensible effect. The paper proceeds from discussing the problem of ineffability at large to a brief analysis of the current accounts of phenomenal mental states. It then proposes a tentative descriptive framework for phenomenal judgments, i.e. statements involving reference to the speaker’s qualia. The main argument of the paper consists in relativization of the ineffability thesis and in establishing that phenomenal contents can be communicated verbally via a special type of discursive units––phenomemes––by way of referencing relational properties of the sensory experiences in question. In the concluding section, the paper suggests that phenomemes constitute a narrative dimension and highlights the potential of further research on the subject for the pragmatics of communication, cognitive stylistics, and other areas of the language-related scholarship.

Experiencing Values in the Flow of Events: A Phenomenological Approach to Relational Values

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Gilliand
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Relational Ontology ◽  
Relational Values ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Full Sense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Phenomenological Point

This paper explores the notion of ‘relational values’ from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, it stresses that in order to make full sense of relational values, we need to approach them through a relational ontology that surpasses dualistic descriptions of the world structured around the subject and the object. With this aim, the paper turns to ecophenomenology’s attempt to apprehend values from a first-person perspective embedded in the lifeworld, where our entanglement with other beings is not a theoretical construction but a palpable reality. Overall, the article’s main purpose is to show that, in our direct and raw experience, values do not appear as subjective judgments or as objective properties but as events in which we participate alongside other human and non-human beings.

Alignment

2016 ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
Pier Giuseppe Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
The World ◽  
Strategic Role ◽  
Education Today ◽  
Current Context ◽  
The Subject

The subject of alignment is not new to the world of education. Today however, it has come to mean different things and to have a heuristic value in education according to research in different areas, not least for neuroscience, and to attention to skills and to the alternation framework.This paper, after looking at the classic references that already attributed an important role to alignment in education processes, looks at the strategic role of alignment in the current context, outlining the shared construction processes and focusing on some of the ways in which this is put into effect.Alignment is part of a participatory, enactive approach that gives a central role to the interaction between teaching and learning, avoiding the limits of behaviourism, which has a greater bias towards teaching, and cognitivism/constructivism, which focus their attention on learning and in any case, on that which separates a teacher preparing the environment and a student working in it.

Jalan Kesempurnaan Menurut Jamaah Insan Al-Kamil di Cijati Desa Cikareo Selatan Sumedang

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Syarifudin Syarifudin
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Method ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Core ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Religious Sect ◽  
Descriptive Qualitative

Each religious sect has its own characteristics, whether fundamental, radical, or religious. One of them is Insan Al-Kamil Congregation, which is in Cijati, South Cikareo Village, Wado District, Sumedang Regency. This congregation is Sufism with the concept of self-purification as the subject of its teachings. So, the purpose of this study is to reveal how the origin of Insan Al-Kamil Congregation, the concept of its purification, and the procedures of achieving its purification. This research uses a descriptive qualitative method with a normative theological approach as the blade of analysis. In addition, the data generated is the result of observation, interviews, and document studies. From the collected data, Jamaah Insan Al-Kamil adheres to the core teachings of Islam and is the tenth regeneration of Islam Teachings, which refers to the Prophet Muhammad SAW. According to this congregation, self-perfection becomes an obligation that must be achieved by human beings in order to remember Allah when life is done. The process of self-purification is done when human beings still live in the world by knowing His God. Therefore, the peak of self-purification is called Insan Kamil. 

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