Adulthood and the Right to Education

This chapter argues that holding personal autonomy as a political ideal entails a right to education over a full life, not just childhood. The first section reviews the terms under which autonomy is commonly held to be basic to liberal citizenship and how this justifies an individual right to a basic compulsory education in childhood. The second section argues that the tendency to see this right as applying to childhood only is due to an unduly narrow view of autonomy as a political ideal. Finally, it defends an expanded view of autonomy that justifies a role for education in a good life in media res. This role is held to be sufficiently important enough to warrant extending citizens’ educational rights to include post-compulsory provision.

Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking

Is Kantian ethics guilty of utopian thinking? Good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal, and three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (and counterparts in common moral discourse) are examined briefly with special attention on the kingdom of ends formulation. Following summary of previous development of this central idea, several objections suggesting that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to consequentialism.

Is Atlantis related to the green Sahara?

Most scholars take Atlantis as Plato’s invention to promote his political ideal articulated in his masterwork The Republic. This paper points out that the green Sahara period encompasses the time of Atlantis according to Plato’s records. The transitions between the green Sahara and desert Sahara were controlled by the water cycle stability in the Atlas Basin, an area fitting all the features of the Atlas Empire as described in Plato’s Timaeus and Critias. The historical account of Atlantis by Plato is compared with the newly identified site, the timelines of climate changes, a likely hydrological process, and the geographical profiles in the Atlas Basin.

Resisting Political Minimalism

In light of the challenges to inclusive public discourse discussed in Chapters 5 to 7, one might lose patience with this ideal. On this line of thought, we would do better, for the time being, to pursue a more minimalistic political ideal, which jettisons diverse and large-scale public discourse. The present chapter demonstrates that this is a mistake. Even if widespread political ignorance, together with the mutual ill will, dogmatism, and fragmentation that sustain it, are problematic for inclusive public discourse, they are just as problematic for the political models that are touted as alternatives. Accordingly, departing from the ideal of inclusive discourse because of these difficulties is misguided. Far from being the source of the problem, inclusive democratic speech is best understood as an attempted solution to these difficulties. The chapter concludes that, given that these difficulties are ubiquitous, and given the promise of speech-based innovations, we must try to make this solution work.

Democratic leadership as a political weapon: competition between fictions and practices

PurposeThis article aims to analyze possible interpretations of democratic leadership by revealing the implicit leadership theory (ILT) of a moral, a material and a political ideal of democracy, namely deliberative–participatory democracy (DPD), aggregative–pluralist democracy (APD) and leader democracy (LD). As special “filters,” ILT helps the author to organize and compare conflicting premises and assumptions democratic theories hold about exemplary leadership and followership.Design/methodology/approachIn order to reconstruct the possible meanings of ideal leadership (challenges and political knowledge) and the ideal followership (power relations, interactions and roles) portrayed by theories, the article sets a specific template for conceptual analysis.FindingsThe author argues that there is a contest over the meaning of democratic leadership. Political leaders use leadership fictions as political weapons to mobilize possible followers, legitimize their actions and discredit opponents. The article creates a heuristic typology providing a “plural” or nonessentialist reading of actual political situations and democratic practices.Originality/valueThe literature usually aims to find an absolute moral understanding of leadership fitted in democracy or to reconcile the idea of leadership with democracy. Extending J. Thomas Wren's approach, this article examines competing fictions of democratic leadership by blending leadership and democracy theories.

A counter-hegemonic rule of law?

We are sympathetic to the research aims of the two books examined by this symposium and their desire to understand law's role in generating and contesting social injustice. We are also intrigued by the proposal in the Introduction to this symposium, notably to expand the normative reach of the rule-of-law ideal to private actors, in order to transform it into an ally of counter-hegemonic action. In our research, we share a similar research focus (development projects), methodology (case-studies) and concerns (harmful effects of development interventions) with the authors of the two books. Accordingly, in this contribution, we want to think together with the editors of the symposium – by examining the case-study of the Hidroituango project in Colombia (hereinafter, ‘Hidroituango’) – whether the rule of law can indeed be reimagined to limit the arbitrary exercise of power by private actors, and what benefits this might create for dealing with social injustice. However, since neither Bhatt nor Lander advances an explicit account of rule of law in their books, our critique in this piece is addressed not at them, but rather at the theorists and advocates of rule of law as a political ideal.

The rule of law and the role of courts

What role do courts play in advancing or upholding the political ideal that we call ‘the rule of law’? Does the rule of law require that courts should have authority over all other branches of government, including the legislature? And does it impose constraints on the sort of reasoning and decision-making that courts engage in? This article explores an array of possible answers to these questions, and considers the possibility that the ascendancy of courts in a constitution may represent a form of judicial supremacy that looks remarkably like the uncontrolled rule of men, which the rule of law is supposed to prevent. To preclude that possibility, it is particularly important for courts to recognize that their authority is limited in scope and that they should not be guided by any overall political program other than the program of seeing that constitutional constraints on government are upheld.

Democracy in Lebanon – Challenges and Prospects

Democracy refers to the rule of the people. It is a system of representational government wherein people have the right to determine their social, economic and political course. Over the past centuries and decades, as the world has been embracing democracy, as a political ideal, some parts of the globe lag behind. Middle East, with its unique history and geographic importance being one among them; remains the center of discussion. Within the Middle East itself, Lebanon enjoys a very special position; not only for geo-political and economic reasons, but more so for its peculiar demographics. Divided among 18 recognized confessions, Lebanon offers a rich blend of fracture and unity. It is this mix of a small yet diverse society, limping its way towards an inclusive and successful polity that has been put to light in this paper. With its internal nuances and external flavors; Lebanon offers a test for the metal of democracy. The challenges it has and is still facing, and the prospects it enjoys for the future have been delved in this essay.

Law and Ayn Rand: Objectivism from the Perspective of Legal Philosophy

Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, subordinates legal concepts to radical capitalism as a political ideal. Such concepts, however, play an important role in her political thought. Scrutiny of those writings where Ayn Rand deals with these concepts shows a middle ground between Natural Law, Positivist and Legal Realist perspectives. According to Objectivism, objectivity becomes the essential feature of Law in the stricter sense. In this respect, Rand’s approach moves away from the philosophical influences of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas, and proclaims the incompatibility of the minimal state with uncertainty and any kind of discretionary powers in the legal field. The contrast with Hayek’s later legal-philosophical contribution points to the feasibility of an integration into what could constitute the basis for a Libertarian legal science. Keywords: Ayn Rand, Objectivism, political philosophy, philosophy of Law, Law. JEL Classification: K10, K20, K21, K30. Resumen: En el objetivismo, la filosofía de Ayn Rand, el tratamiento de los conceptos jurídicos se subordina al capitalismo radical como ideal político. Dichos conceptos, sin embargo, juegan un papel importante en esta teorización. El examen de los textos donde Rand los aborda revela un posicionamiento intermedio entre las perspectivas iusnaturalista, positivista y realista. Lo determinante en la configuración del Derecho, para el objetivismo, será la objetividad de la ley. En la materia, Rand se distancia de Aristóteles y Santo Tomás como únicas influencias filosóficas reconocidas y proclama la incompatibilidad del Estado mínimo con cualquier indeterminación o discrecionalidad en el ámbito de lo legal. El contraste con los sucesivos planteamientos iusfilosóficos de Hayek apunta a la posibilidad de una integración en lo que podría ser el fundamento de una ciencia jurídica libertaria. Palabras clave: Ayn Rand, objetivismo, filosofía política, filosofía jurídica, Derecho. Clasificación JEL: K10, K20, K21, K30.