A Keynesian reformulation of the WS-PS model: Keynesian unemployment and Classical unemployment

The orthodox theory of wage negotiations considers that the trade union monopoly causes a rigidity of real wages which is, itself, the cause of unemployment. The model of this negotiation ("Nash bargaining") only considers situations where negotiations between union and firm succeed. In this article, we attempt to read the WS-PS model from a Keynesian point of view. Our model reflects the fact that successful negotiation is only one case among other situations, including failure where the union expresses a claim that is not necessarily satisfied. Although, in situations close to full employment, there is a bargaining mechanism by which unions and firms reach an agreement, this is not the case in times of massive unemployment. In the latter situation, employment is unilaterally determined by firms, on the basis of previous demand.

Bargaining Mechanism in Islamic Economic System

This article discusses the concept of bargaining position in the Islamic economic system. By using a literature study, this article finds a narrative that bargaining positions occur in goods or services. The conclusion are: bargaining must be carried out by more than one person. So, there are at least two people who transact (sellers and buyers). If there is only one person, the bargaining position certainly cannot happen. Examples of the many bargaining that occur are on the market. In a sale and purchase, those with higher bargaining rights are buyers. Whereas the seller will compensate the buyer for positive bargaining. Bidding is goods or services offered at a certain amount and price level and under certain conditions. There is also an offer in the Islamic economy that distinguishes it from conventional offers, that the goods or services offered must be transparent and specified in their specifications, how the condition of the goods, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the goods. The offer made does not harm the party submitting the request; and vice versa.

The Norwegian Petroleum Administration

This chapter establishes the broad parameters for oil management. It considers the threat of the Resource Curse, and what can be done to address the challenges of corruption, and the imbalance of power between states, international oil companies, and domestic interests (including national oil companies). In particular, the chapter begins by discussing the relationship between politics and economics and between states and firms (including the Obsolescing Bargaining Mechanism), and the utility of separating responsibility for policymaking, regulation, and operational or commercial activities. The latter part of the chapter introduces Norway’s unique institutional solutions to these challenges, that is, the three-part division of administrative responsibility that is central to the Norwegian model, and the institutions where they reside (e.g., the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, and Statoil).

Strategic Learning in Multiple Equilibria for Double Bargaining Mechanism by PSO

The learning behaviours of buyers and sellers with the assumption of bounded rationality were studied in the double sealed-bid bargaining mechanism. A multi-agent simulation trading system was constructed to observe the process of equilibrium approach when exist the multiple equilibria. The bidding choices of the agents were modelled by particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm. In our proposed model, two populations of buyers and sellers were randomly matched to deal repeatedly until the iteration stop, and each agent would update his bidding strategy in each round by imitating the successful member in his population and by private experience. Results show that the final biddings of the agents in both populations commonly approach a Nash equilibrium which is reasonable for the market principle.