Regulating high-cost short-term credit in the UK: is there scope for ‘libertarian paternalism’ based provisions?

The regulatory protection of credit consumers, in general, is paramount due to the considerable use of credit, the imbalanced bargaining positions of the contracting parties and the adverse effect of over-indebtedness on individuals and society alike. These concerning factors are worsened in the case of High-Cost Short-Term Credit (HCSTC) consumers owing to their disadvantaged financial position and other recognised vulnerabilities. In this respect, the paper argues that direct regulatory intervention, despite its importance, is not always a silver bullet. Through the analysis of the overhauling of the UK HCSTC regulatory framework, this paper demonstrates the shortfalls of these regulatory changes. Accordingly, the paper shifts the argument towards improving the decision-making mechanisms of HCSTC consumers, ie the role of ‘libertarian paternalism’-based interventions. By using a bespoke experimental survey, the paper demonstrates the type of behavioural interventions that can assist in this endeavour and which the regulator could possibly mandate.

Similar Negotiations over Childcare? A Comparative Study of Fathers’ Parental Leave Use in Finland and Sweden

Fathers’ leave use is promoted in many countries, but so far with different success. Major explanations of different usage revolve around economic bargaining between parents and economic constraints in the household. By using extensive register data from 1999–2009 in Finland and Sweden, this study asks whether fathers’ use of parental leave in the two countries is determined by the same socioeconomic characteristics on the individual and the household level once we control for sociodemographic factors. Striking similarities in what influences fathers’ use of leave in the two contexts are found, even though leave is used at very different levels and the policy design differs remarkably. Generally, fathers with a similar income level to the mother use leave the most, but in high-income households the mother’s higher income leads to the highest propensity of fathers’ leave take-up. The results indicate that equal bargaining positions are associated with fathers’ leave use but also that mothers’ stronger position often facilitates fathers’ leave. We conclude that the role of gendered bargaining positions should be studied in interaction with the level of resources in the household.

Trade and Strike Activity in the Postwar United States

This paper examines the effect of international trade on strike activity within the United States since World War II. Globalization may influence strike activity through its effects on the bargaining position of labor. Alternatively, if labor and management take their changed bargaining positions into account, the rate of change in openness could create greater uncertainty in negotiations between them and lead to more strikes as a result. Empirical analysis of strike activity in the 50 states over this period supports the argument concerning uncertainty in the bargaining process. Import competition may also indirectly reduce strike activity by decreasing union density.

9. Statutory regulation of contracts

This chapter studies the features of legally binding contracts by examining the manner in which the terms of a contract are regulated through statutory intervention. Such legislative measures have come about as a response to the unequal bargaining positions of consumers as contracting parties in business contracts, and the idea that laissez-faire can be contrary to public policy and fairness, for example with certain exclusion clauses. Some examples include statutes such as the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Sale of Goods Act 1979 that imply terms into contracts, and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 that regulates the parties’ use of exclusion clauses. This protects the weaker party to a contract from exploitation and provides minimum rights that may not be waived.

Commitment and (in) Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment

ABSTRACT In many matching markets, bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what terms. We experimentally investigate allocative efficiency and how subjects’ payoffs depend on their matching opportunities in such markets. We consider three simple markets. There are no information asymmetries, subjects are patient, and a perfectly equitable outcome is both feasible and efficient. Efficient perfect equilibria of the corresponding bargaining game exist, but are increasingly complicated to sustain across the three markets. Consistent with the predictions of simple (Markov perfect) equilibria, we find considerable mismatch in two of the markets. Mismatch is reduced but remains substantial when we change the nature of bargaining by moving from a structured experimental protocol to permitting free-form negotiations, and when we allow players to renege on their agreements. Our results suggest that mismatch is driven by players correctly anticipating that they might lose their strong bargaining positions, and by players in weak bargaining positions demanding equitable payoffs.

TANGGUNG JAWAB DEVELOPER TERHADAP KONSUMEN AKIBAT WANPRESTASI DALAM PENYERAHAN UNIT APARTEMEN PLUIT SEA VIEW BERDASARKAN PERJANJIAN PENGIKATAN JUAL BELI

The procurement of an apartment is strengthened by Sales and Purchase Agreement (PPJB) between the buyer and the developer, but the practice in the field are often found that developers does not handover the physical terms in accordance with the agreed time (default/breach of contract), and resulting in losses for the buyer. This study aims to determine the responsibility of the developer to the buyer due to default/breach pf contract matter and legal protection for the buyer in terms of buying Pluit Sea View apartments based on Sale and Purchase agreement. Research data were analyzed using descriptive-qualitative analysis methods which were tested with legal norms. The result of analysis shows that: 1. PT. Binakarya Bangun Propertindo (as developer) does not fulfill their responsibilities as in agreement of the PPJB regarding the rights of consumers. 2. Weak of Consumer Protection Sarusun Belonging to Pluit View Sea , as consumer do not have bargaining positions.

A duty of care to prevent online exploitation of consumers? Digital dominance and special responsibility in EU competition law

Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union imposes a special responsibility on undertakings with a dominant position. Digital dominance based on data but also on network effects, platforms, and first user advantage can lead to extreme inequality in bargaining positions with regard to online services, which can result in unfair treatment of competitors, suppliers, and consumers—such as exploitation and discrimination. Online consumers are the focus of this article. In order to tackle competition issues regarding online consumers, I propose interpreting the special responsibility of digitally dominant undertakings as a duty of care in their regard. Digitally dominant undertakings may not just be burdened by but also benefit from this approach, which increases predictability and trust in online markets. It resembles treating online undertakings as information fiduciaries as has been proposed in the USA, but is different because privacy is not the driving concern here and the context is that of antitrust. I look at standards for triggering the duty of care and make proposals for the application of this norm, but both remain to be specified further.

Bargaining Mechanism in Islamic Economic System

This article discusses the concept of bargaining position in the Islamic economic system. By using a literature study, this article finds a narrative that bargaining positions occur in goods or services. The conclusion are: bargaining must be carried out by more than one person. So, there are at least two people who transact (sellers and buyers). If there is only one person, the bargaining position certainly cannot happen. Examples of the many bargaining that occur are on the market. In a sale and purchase, those with higher bargaining rights are buyers. Whereas the seller will compensate the buyer for positive bargaining. Bidding is goods or services offered at a certain amount and price level and under certain conditions. There is also an offer in the Islamic economy that distinguishes it from conventional offers, that the goods or services offered must be transparent and specified in their specifications, how the condition of the goods, what are the advantages and disadvantages of the goods. The offer made does not harm the party submitting the request; and vice versa.

How to Effectively Speak for Nature?

Our conclusion strives to reconcile environmentalism as studied via survey responses with environmentalism as studied via social movements. We conclude that these two approaches may seem to yield different results to the question of Who Speaks for Nature? However, we argue, subject to further research, that movement leaders’ abstract and symbolic appeals may help improve bargaining positions to attain the concrete objectives individuals actually care about most. More broadly, we conclude with a summation of extensive evidence presented, that indigenous communities and other victims of some of extractivism’s excesses are best served by polycentric pluralist interest articulation, where individual interests can aggregate into a range of organizations and networks, rather than multiculturalism, where the interests represented are primordial, predictable, and static.