The tacit assumption that individuals differ quantitatively, not qualitatively, with respect to thepsychological structures, processes, and causal factors underlying their overt functioning does aremarkable amount of heavy lifting in social and behavioral sciences research. Remarkable in thesense that it serves as the load-bearing support beam for a scaffolding of corollary assumptions onwhich variable-oriented, sample-based individual differences research strategies and statisticalmodeling approaches to theoretical-causal inferences depend for their logic, coherence,justification, and presumed heuristic value. Psychological homogeneity and its corollaryassumptions are also wrong. They are contradicted by the evidence of our own senses,inconsistent with the basic tenets of virtually all psychological theories, and invalidated by asubstantial body of uncontested scientific knowledge about the unique design plasticity of thehuman brain and its extraordinary capacities for progressive use-dependent and experience-basedstructural modifications and elaborations across individual lifespans. This modifiability translatesinherited dispositions and unique experiences of individuals into qualitative differences in theirpsychological structures and processes. As a consequence of these qualitative differences, thestimulus properties, causal valences and impact potentials of events and experiences also varyqualitatively across individuals. Thus, cross-aggregate inter-individual correlations that areroutinely interpreted as indicators of a presumed unitary psychological causal structure are insteadfar more likely to reflect the causal debris field of multiple heterogeneous causal structures, thenumber and nature of which lie beyond the reach of sample-based methods predicated on thehomogeneity assumption.