CBM-I training and its effect on interpretations of intent, facial expressions, attention and aggressive behavior

There is abundant evidence suggesting that attention and interpretation biases are powerful precursors of aggression. However, little is known how these biases may interact with one another in the development and maintenance of aggression. Using cognitive bias modification of interpretation (CBM-I), the present study examined whether training more pro-social or hostile intent attributions would affect attention bias, interpretation bias of facial expressions, aggression and mood. University students (17–48 years) were assigned to either a positive training (n = 40), negative training (n = 40), or control training (n = 40). Results showed that the positive training successfully changed measures of intent attributions in a pro-social direction compared to the control training. The negative training changed measures of intent attributions in a hostile direction but not more so than the control training. We found no generalization of the training effects to relevant other outcomes. Possible explanations underlying these findings are discussed.

Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent

A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging that the agent made an assertion (assertion attributions), and, at least in some contexts, are not based on attributions of deceptive intent. The finding on assertion attributions is predicted by the standard view, but the finding on intent attributions is not. These results help to further clarify the ordinary concept of lying and shed light on the psychological processes involved in ordinary lie attributions and related judgments.

Reduction in social learning and increased policy uncertainty about harmful intent is associated with pre-existing paranoid beliefs: evidence from modelling a modified serial dictator game.

Current computational models suggest that paranoia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to environments. However, it is unclear whether this applies to social contexts, and whether it is specific to harmful intent attributions, the live expression of paranoia. We sought to fill this gap this by fitting a computational model to data (n = 1754) from a modified serial dictator game, to explore whether pre-existing paranoia could be accounted by specific alterations to cognitive parameters characterising harmful intent attributions. We constructed a ‘Bayesian brain’ model of others’ intent, which we fitted to harmful intent and self-interest attributions made over 18 trials, across three different partners. We found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with greater uncertainty about other’s actions. It moderated the relationship between learning rates and harmful intent attributions, making harmful intent attributions less reliant on prior interactions. Overall, the magnitude of harmful intent attributions was directly related to their uncertainty, and importantly, the opposite was true for self-interest attributions. Our results explain how pre-existing paranoia may be the result of an increased need to attend to immediate experiences in determining intentional threat, at the expense of what is already known, and more broadly, they suggest that environments that induce greater probabilities of harmful intent attributions may also induce states of uncertainty, potentially as an adaptive mechanism to better detect threatening others. Importantly, we suggest that if paranoia were able to be explained exclusively by core domain-general alterations we wouldn’t observe differential parameter estimates underlying harmful-intent and self-interest attributions.

Paranoia, sensitization and social inference: findings from two large-scale, multi-round behavioural experiments

The sensitization model suggests that paranoia is explained by over-sensitivity to social threat. However, this has been difficult to test experimentally. We report two preregistered social interaction studies that tested (i) whether paranoia predicted overall attribution and peak attribution of harmful intent and (ii) whether anxiety, interpersonal sensitivity and worry predicted the attribution of harmful intent. In Study 1, we recruited a large general population sample ( N = 987) who serially interacted with other participants in multi-round dictator games and matched to fair, partially fair or unfair partners. Participants rated attributions of harmful intent and self-interest after each interaction. In Study 2 ( N = 1011), a new sample of participants completed the same procedure and additionally completed measures of anxiety, worry and interpersonal sensitivity. As predicted, prior paranoid ideation was associated with higher and faster overall harmful intent attributions, whereas attributions of self-interest were unaffected, supporting the sensitization model. Contrary to predictions, neither worry, interpersonal sensitivity nor anxiety was associated with harmful intent attributions. In a third exploratory internal meta-analysis, we combined datasets to examine the effect of paranoia on trial-by-trial attributional changes when playing fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia was associated with a greater reduction in harmful intent attributions when playing a fair but not unfair dictator, suggesting that paranoia may also exaggerate the volatility of beliefs about the harmful intent of others.

Paranoia, sensitisation and social inference: findings from two large-scale, multi-round behavioural experiments.

The sensitisation model suggests paranoia is explained by over-sensitivity to perceived threat in social environments. However, this has been difficult to test experimentally. We report two pre-registered studies that tested i) the sensitisation model as an explanation of paranoia, and; ii) the role of purported maintaining factors in supporting social sensitisation. In study one, we recruited a large general population sample (N=987) who serially interacted with other participants in multi-round Dictator games, matched to fair, partially fair, or unfair partners. Participants rated attributions of harmful intent and self-interest after each interaction. In study two (N=1011), a new sample of participants completed the same procedure and additionally completed measures of anxiety, worry and interpersonal sensitivity. As predicted, paranoid ideation predicted higher and faster overall harmful intent attributions, whereas attributions of self-interest were unaffected, supporting the sensitisation model. Contrary to predictions, neither worry nor anxiety predicted harmful intent attributions while interpersonal sensitivity predicted decreased harmful intent attributions. In a third exploratory study we combined data sets to examine the effect of paranoia on trial by trial attributional changes when playing fair and unfair dictators. Paranoia predicted a greater reduction in harmful intent attributions when playing a fair but not unfair dictator, suggesting paranoia may also exaggerate the volatility of beliefs about the harmful intent of others.

Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent

A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging that the agent made an assertion (assertion attributions), and, at least in some contexts, are not based on attributions of deceptive intent. The finding on assertion attributions is predicted by the standard view, but the finding on intent attributions is not. These results help to further clarify the ordinary concept of lying and shed light on the psychological processes involved in ordinary lie attributions and related judgments.