enterprise reforms
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2022 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-34
Author(s):  
Malcolm Thompson

Abstract This article argues that the origins of the one-child policy beginning in 1980 in China, and its development into the current system of “comprehensive population management,” are to be found not in any unfolding of a statist or authoritarian logic, or within the parameters of a nominally “socialist” project, but rather in a return to a properly capitalist set of concerns and governmental techniques, the first iteration of which can be traced to the 1920s and 1930s. With regard to the broad set of economic reforms launched in the period 1979–81, it is argued that the one-child policy is absolutely continuous with other reforms across economic sectors (agricultural responsibility systems and urban enterprise reforms) and discontinuous with anything we might understand as population management in the period 1949–76. The “law of value debate” in 1979, which “resolved” a long-standing set of issues concerning national accounting, planning, and accumulation, is found to be—despite its apparently Marxist character, derivation, and vocabulary—the passage through which a capitalist developmental logic was reintroduced into Chinese governing, with significant consequences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 86-89
Author(s):  
Xiaobin Lin ◽  
Wenjing Ruan ◽  
Guowei Gao ◽  
Hanxiong Xiao

"Competitive neutrality" rules are becoming the focus of attention of the new generation of international economic and trade rules. "Competitive neutrality" rules hinder state-owned enterprises from opening up international markets. It also will weaken the domestic competitive advantage of state-owned enterprises, and the public service capabilities of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, China needs to implement state-owned enterprise reforms to better respond to this trend.


2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Guriev

Chris Miller’s book is a historian’s account of Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to save the Soviet economy. Miller focuses on the question of why Gorbachev did not follow Deng Xiaoping and did not manage to reform the economy. Miller argues that it was not for the lack of understanding (Gorbachev did invest in learning China’s approach to reform and did understand it well), nor for the lack of trying. In fact, Gorbachev did try to implement Deng’s agricultural and industrial enterprise reforms. However, Gorbachev’s reforms were blocked by powerful vested interests. An inability to tackle the agricultural and industrial lobbies eventually resulted in the bankruptcy and collapse of the Soviet Union. While I generally agree with the political economy argument, I discuss a number of alternative explanations. I also discuss sources of Gorbachev’s weak state capacity and offer an evaluation of Gorbachev’s and post-Gorbachev reform efforts and mistakes based on the political economy research carried out in the last twenty-five years. ( JEL D72, O57, P21, P23, P24, P26)


Subject Communist Party control over private businesses. Significance The Chinese Communist Party sees itself as a 'vanguard party'. That is, it governs by leading other social groups, including the government and private enterprise. Reforms over the years have withdrawn the government from direct control of many industries, but the Party is reasserting control behind the scenes. Impacts In the business sector, control by the state is being replaced with control by the Party; enterprise is not an independent sector. Large private sector firms such as China's ICT giants are subject to the influence and occasional control of Party groups. Party infrastructure in foreign companies is growing, and the Party may take a closer look at business decisions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 1750015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Molnar

With persisting slower growth worldwide and in China, over-capacity in some heavy industry sectors, declining profitability, and intensifying competition from other, lower-cost emerging economies, corporate behavior in China needs to change and focus more on efficiency and sustainability. A larger proportion of firms, including state-owned enterprises, should improve corporate governance practices. To this end, fraudulent corporate practices must be halted and State assets need to be better managed. Reforms are under way or envisaged that will help improve corporate performance and, more broadly, deliver more resilient and environmentally sustainable growth and continuing progress in living standards.


2016 ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Wu Jinglian ◽  
Ma Guochuan ◽  
Xiaofeng Hua ◽  
Nancy Hearst

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