The security analysis of the BB84 protocol in the case of Calderbank–Shor–Steane code leakage

Author(s):  
Ming Fang ◽  
Ya-Ping Li ◽  
Li Fei

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows authenticated parties to share secure keys. Its security comes from quantum physics rather than computational complexity. The previous work has been able to demonstrate the security of the BB84 protocol based on the uncertainty principle, entanglement purification and information theory. In the security proof method based on entanglement purification, it is assumed that the information of Calderbank–Shor–Steane (CSS) error correction code cannot be leaked, otherwise, it is insecure. However, there is no quantitative analysis of the relationship between the parameter of CSS code and the amount of information leaked. In the attack and defense strategy of the actual quantum key distribution system, especially in the application of the device that is easy to lose or out of control, it is necessary to assess the impact of the parameter leakage. In this paper, we derive the relationship between the leaked parameter of CSS code and the amount of the final key leakage based on the BB84 protocol. Based on this formula, we simulated the impact of different CSS code parameter leaks on the final key amount. Through the analysis of simulation results, the security of the BB84 protocol is inversely proportional to the value of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the case of the CSS code leak.

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (3&4) ◽  
pp. 203-214
Author(s):  
Xiongfeng Ma ◽  
Norbert Lutkenhaus

Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) often require post-processing schemes to simplify the data structure, and hence the security proof. We show a generic method to improve resulting secure key rates by partially reversing the simplifying post-processing for error correction purposes. We apply our method to the security analysis of device-independent QKD schemes and of detection-device-independent QKD schemes, where in both cases one is typically required to assign binary values even to lost signals. In the device-independent case, the loss tolerance threshold is cut down by our method from 92.4% to 90.9%. The lowest tolerable transmittance of the detection-device-independent scheme can be improved from 78.0% to 65.9%


Quantum ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Tomamichel ◽  
Anthony Leverrier

In this work we present a security analysis for quantum key distribution, establishing a rigorous tradeoff between various protocol and security parameters for a class of entanglement-based and prepare-and-measure protocols. The goal of this paper is twofold: 1) to review and clarify the stateof-the-art security analysis based on entropic uncertainty relations, and 2) to provide an accessible resource for researchers interested in a security analysis of quantum cryptographic protocols that takes into account finite resource effects. For this purpose we collect and clarify several arguments spread in the literature on the subject with the goal of making this treatment largely self-contained. More precisely, we focus on a class of prepare-and-measure protocols based on the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) protocol as well as a class of entanglement-based protocols similar to the Bennett-Brassard-Mermin (BBM92) protocol. We carefully formalize the different steps in these protocols, including randomization, measurement, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification, allowing us to be mathematically precise throughout the security analysis. We start from an operational definition of what it means for a quantum key distribution protocol to be secure and derive simple conditions that serve as sufficient condition for secrecy and correctness. We then derive and eventually discuss tradeoff relations between the block length of the classical computation, the noise tolerance, the secret key length and the security parameters for our protocols. Our results significantly improve upon previously reported tradeoffs.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1&2) ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
L. Lydersen ◽  
J. Skaar

We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in the presence of bit and basis dependent detector flaws. We suggest a powerful attack that can be used in systems with detector efficiency mismatch, even if the detector assignments are chosen randomly by Bob. A security proof is provided, valid for any basis dependent, possibly lossy, linear optical imperfections in the channel/receiver/detectors. The proof does not assume the so-called squashing detector model.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (9&10) ◽  
pp. 827-832
Author(s):  
Zhen-Qiang Yin ◽  
Wei Chen ◽  
Shuang Wang ◽  
Hong-Wei Li ◽  
Guang-Can Guo ◽  
...  

For the past few years, the security of practical quantum key distribution systems has attracted a lot of attention. Device-independent quantum key distribution was proposed to design a real-life secure quantum key distribution system with imperfect and untrusted quantum devices. In this paper, we analyzed the security of BB84 protocol in a device-independent scenario based on the entanglement distillation method. Since most of the reported loopholes are in receivers of quantum key distribution systems, we focus on condition that the transmitter of the system is perfectly coincident with the requirement of the BB84 protocol, while the receiver can be controlled by eavesdropper. Finally, the lower bound of the final secret-key rate was proposed and we explained why the secure-key rate is similar to the well-known result for the original entanglement distillation protocol.


Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has been developed over the last decade; QKD addresses the challenge of a securely exchanging cryptographic key between two parties over an insecure channel where there are two parties that simultaneously generate and share a secret key using the polarization of quantum states of light by applying the phenomena of quantum physics. The integration of QKD protocol with public key cryptography for securely exchanging the encryption/decryption keys is proposed and simulated, the simulation results evaluate the work of the existing and proposed protocol taking into account different measures. Finally, a short security analysis is given to show the difference between the proposed protocol and its counterparts.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (9&10) ◽  
pp. 771-779
Author(s):  
Hong-Wei Li ◽  
Zheng-Qiang Yin ◽  
Zheng-Fu Han ◽  
Wan-Su Bao ◽  
Guang-Can Guo

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a lot of attentions in recent years. Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol, which usually use Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) as the information encoder and decoder. However, the long arm and short arm of UMZI will introduce different loss in practical experimental realizations, the state emitted by Alice's side is nolonger perfect BB84 states correspondingly. In this paper, we will give the security analysis in this situation. Counterintuitively, active compensation for this different loss will only lower the secret key bit rate.


Author(s):  
Douglas D Hodson ◽  
Michael R Grimaila ◽  
Logan O Mailloux ◽  
Colin V McLaughlin ◽  
Gerald Baumgartner

This article presents the background, development, and implementation of a simulation framework used to model the quantum exchange aspects of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. The presentation of our simulation framework is novel from several perspectives, one of which is the lack of published information in this area. QKD is an innovative technology which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute unconditionally secure cryptographic keys. While QKD offers the promise of unconditionally secure key distribution, real world systems are built from non-ideal components which necessitates the need to understand the impact these non-idealities have on system performance and security. To study these non-idealities we present the development of a quantum communications modeling and simulation capability. This required a suitable mathematical representation of quantum optical pulses and optical component transforms. Furthermore, we discuss how these models are implemented within our Discrete Event Simulation-based framework and show how it is used to study a variety of QKD implementations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document