scholarly journals The Unanimity Rule and Extremely Asymmetric Committees

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Ben-Yashar ◽  
Leif Danziger
Keyword(s):  
Unanimity Rule

Jury verdicts and the presumption of innocence

Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-158
Author(s):  
G. Maher
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Slippery Slope ◽  
Reasonable Doubt ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Presumption Of Innocence ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Jury Verdicts

In recent years various developments in the system of trial by jury in England and Wales have given rise to comment and concern. One such development was the abolition by s. 13 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 of the rule, said to have existed for over 600 years, that a jury must be unanimous in order to reach a verdict. These provisions are now contained in s. 17 of the Juries Act 1974 which allows for majority verdicts where there are no more than two dissentient voices to be returned under certain circumstances. The change in the unanimity rule has been criticised as striking at the root of the principle of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and has been interpreted by some as being the first step on the slippery slope to jury verdicts by simple majority, a development which would do even more to undermine the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt and might also lead to the complete abolition of trial by jury.

Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH ◽  
TIMOTHY J. FEDDERSEN
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Preference Uncertainty ◽  
Voting Rule

A deliberative committee is a group of at least two individuals who first debate about what alternative to choose prior to these same individuals voting to determine the choice. We argue, first, that uncertainty about individuals' private preferences is necessary for full information sharing and, second, demonstrate in a very general setting that the condition under which unanimity can support full information revelation in debate amounts to it being common knowledge that all committee members invariably share identical preferences over the alternatives. It follows that if ever there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under unanimity rule, there exists an equilibrium with fully revealing debate under any voting rule. Moreover, the converse is not true of majority rule if there is uncertainty about individuals' preferences.

scholarly journals Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dino Gerardi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Correct Decision ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
Jury Verdicts ◽  
Asymptotically Efficient

I develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about jurors' preferences. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that the unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the price of acquitting the guilty.

scholarly journals Unanimity rule on networks

2007 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Renaud Lambiotte ◽  
Stefan Thurner ◽  
Rudolf Hanel
Keyword(s):  
Unanimity Rule

Improving the precision-recall trade-off in undersampling-based binary text categorization using unanimity rule

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (S1) ◽  
pp. 83-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zafer Erenel ◽  
Hakan Altınçay
Keyword(s):  
Text Categorization ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Unanimity Rule

Effects of group decision rules on decisions involving continuous alternatives: The unanimity rule and extreme decisions in mock civil juries

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 320-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Ohtsubo ◽  
Charles E. Miller ◽  
Nahoko Hayashi ◽  
Ayumi Masuchi
Keyword(s):  
Group Decision ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Unanimity Rule

scholarly journals An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Guarnaschelli ◽  
Richard D. McKelvey ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Group Data ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Jury Decision

We present experimental results on groups facing a decision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatment variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vote deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under the unanimity rule: A large fraction of our subjects vote for a decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by the game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contrary to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, in our experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously account for the individual and group data using quantal response equilibrium.

scholarly journals The ${k}$ -Unanimity Rule for Self-Organized Decision-Making in Swarms of Robots

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1175-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Scheidler ◽  
Arne Brutschy ◽  
Eliseo Ferrante ◽  
Marco Dorigo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Self Organized

Market Contractarianism and the Unanimity Rule

1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules L. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Competitive Market ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Market Theory ◽  
Unanimity Rule ◽  
Collective Choice Rule ◽  
Political Association ◽  
The Relationship

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule?

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