Moral Conscientiousness and the Subjectivism/Objectivism Debate about Moral Wrongness

The Subjectivism/Objectivism debate is a debate about the facts the an action’s moral status is grounded in. Subjectivists maintain that an action’s moral status is grounded in the subjective circumstances of the agent at the time of its performance. Objectivists deny this. This chapter defends the Objectivist view against a recent argument against it by championing a picture of moral conscientiousness which is at odds with a central premise of that argument. The picture of moral conscientiousness defended is one that crucially sees the morally conscientious person’s concern not to act wrongly as degreed and sensitive to the degrees of wrongness of the options facing the morally conscientious agent. After motivating this particular conception of moral conscientiousness and defending Objectivism against the argument against it, the chapter further develops the Objectivist picture of the moral status of actions and explains the Objectivist’s conception of the relation between moral wrongness and what a morally conscientious person ought to do in her choice situation.

Consummation Anyway: A Reformed Proposal

The central claim of a Consummation Anyway (CA) model is that God could bring about eschatological consummation sans the fall—the intended telos of created humanity—apart from the incarnation of Christ. As such, the CA model is an alternative to an Incarnation Anyway (IA) model, according to which Christ’s incarnation is a necessary means by which a state of eschatological glory would be achieved sans the fall. This essay seeks to propose an argument for the CA model by drawing from the covenant theology of the Reformed tradition, and it moves in four steps. Firstly, I shall summarize Marc Cortez’s recent arguments for IA, homing in on the major moves that are most relevant for sketching a CA model. Secondly, I will highlight the challenges Cortez has offered against those interested in defending a CA model. Thirdly, I shall sketch a Reformed account of the CA model that seeks to address Cortez’s objections. Fourthly, then, I’ll consider two potential objections against the sketch I have offered for CA, inspired by a recent argument offered by James T. Turner (2019). Finally, I close with a brief conclusion that summarizes some salient features of the proposed thesis. This paper thus proposes at least one way in which the CA thesis could remain a real and live option within this debate.

(More) On the Precative Qatal in Lamentations 3.56-61: Updating the Argument

The rhetorical movement throughout Lamentations 3 is difficult to describe and scholars disagree on how to characterize the acrostic poem. Much hinges on how we interpret the sequence of qatal verbs throughout 3.56-61. Most scholars understand this section as a Danklied, and so translate the qatal forms in the past tense. Another option is to understand the qatal verbs as precatives, expressing a wish or command. However, this is a contested form in the linguistic study of classical Hebrew. Many Lamentations scholars cite this uncertainty in arguments against a precative reading of Lam. 3.56-61. This article builds a fresh case for understanding the precative qatal as rhetorically and linguistically plausible. After working through the rhetorical arguments that support this reading, special attention is given to a recent argument in favor of the precative hypothesis from linguist Alexander Andrason. Brief comments are also offered on the oral-performative dimension of this interpretation.

God, Moral Requirements, and the Limits of Freedom

This article addresses James Sterba’s recent argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to follow, as well as with respect to the analogy he draws between the obligations of a just state and the obligations of God. Against Sterba’s proposed justified divine policy of constraint on human freedom, I ask: What would motivate a perfect being to create human beings who imagine, intend, and freely begin to carry out horrific actions that bring harm to other human beings, to nonhuman animals, and to the environment? I argue that the rationale is lacking behind the thought that God would only interfere with the completion of the process of human beings’ bringing to fruition their horrifically harmful intended outcomes, rather than creating beings with different psychologies and abilities altogether. I end by giving some friendly proposals that help to support Sterba’s view that God, by nature, would be perfectly morally good.

Grounding, Essence, and Contingentism

According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection from restricted accidental generalisations and maintain a view that grounds necessitates what is grounded.

Global symmetry, Euclidean gravity, and the black hole information problem

In this paper we argue for a close connection between the non-existence of global symmetries in quantum gravity and a unitary resolution of the black hole information problem. In particular we show how the essential ingredients of recent calculations of the Page curve of an evaporating black hole can be used to generalize a recent argument against global symmetries beyond the AdS/CFT correspondence to more realistic theories of quantum gravity. We also give several low-dimensional examples of quantum gravity theories which do not have a unitary resolution of the black hole information problem in the usual sense, and which therefore can and do have global symmetries. Motivated by this discussion, we conjecture that in a certain sense Euclidean quantum gravity is equivalent to holography.

The Communion of the Son with the Father

Chapter 5 proceeds by way of engagement with Keith Ward’s recent argument against any theology that would posit eternal love between the divine persons. What can we say about the relationship of the eternal Son to his Father? Is love shared between the divine persons? Or would that entail polytheism? The prayer of Jesus in John 17 would seem to be relevant to this question, and the interpretation of that prayer is central to this chapter. The chapter first clarifies some aspects of the recent debates over “Social Trinitarianism.” With this background in mind, it then turns to an analysis of Ward’s intriguing proposal, and offers a counter proposal that is grounded in an interpretation of Johannine theology.

Is Catholic faith worth having?

This article defends the claim that firm belief in divine testimony (‘Catholic Faith’) is morally valuable, if the broad claims of Christian orthodoxy hold. I discuss Jonathan Kvanvig's recent argument that Christians should not hold that salvific faith necessarily involves belief in revelation or God's existence, because such faith is not much ‘worth having’, suggesting that this argument is dubious from Catholic and Protestant theological perspectives. I then examine some extant accounts of Catholic Faith's value, conceding that Kvanvig successfully highlights their flaws. I therefore offer a novel explanation of Catholic Faith's value, drawing on Miranda Fricker's account of testimonial justice.

A New and Improved Argument for a Necessary Being

I suggest two improvements to Joshua Rasmussen’s intriguing recent argument that a causally powerful being necessarily exists.