scholarly journals THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC AND EGOLOGY: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECT

Author(s):  
Yu.G. Sedov ◽  

The article substantiates the need to create a pure egology in order to analyze the structures of consciousness. The relevance of egological research is to form the foundation for disparate cognitive sciences. On the basis of the historical and philosophical approach, the idea of transcendental logic is considered and it is concluded that it is essentially correlated with the analysis of consciousness. Transcendental logic takes into account the pure content of human thinking, which is not reduced to an empirical composition. Results. 1. The question of the dual nature of logic was first raised by the ancient Stoics, who included in it a section devoted to the analysis of impressions and the formulation of criteria for knowledge. 2. The idea of transcendental logic is presented in its expanded form in the works of Kant, who divided it into analytics and dialectics. In the analytical section, Kant is confronted with a paradox — with the division of the pure I into two parts: active subject and passive object. The identity of these parts does not give any knowledge of how the pure I exist in itself. As a result of the transcendental analysis, a distinction is introduced between the pure and the empirical subject. 3. Hegel’s critical reinterpretation of the idea of transcendental logic leads to a new division, in which it corresponds to an objective logic that takes into account the content of knowledge and its origin. 4. The connection between logic and egology was found in Husserl’s later works, most systematically in “Formal and Transcendental Logic”. Transcendental logic is a subjectively oriented study that clarifies the constitutive activity of pure consciousness. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the fact that the pure I as a subject of egology contains and produces objective logical formations. Formal logic is concerned with inference and proof, being a demonstrative rather than descriptive discipline. This lack of formal logic can only be eliminated by transcendental logic, which directly addresses the experience of pure consciousness. It should be used to study the subjective structures that underlie theoretical reason. Thanks to the experience of egology, there is a real opportunity in the future to solve the question of reason in its relevance and live performance, in which objective formations find their source.

Ramus ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 110-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Wyke

When a woman writes herself into the genre of Roman love elegy she appears to break the recognised conventions for its production, according to which woman is the passive object of erotic desire not its active subject, the written not the writer. In discussing the elegiac poetry composed by Sulpicia, one means by which critics have expressed her extraordinary achievement has been to engender Roman love elegy. For Nick Lowe, Sulpicia's unique intervention was to compose poetry on the subject of her own erotic experience in ‘an obstinately male genre’. For Amy Richlin, Sulpicia breached a double barrier, both the ‘male job’ of writing and the ‘male genre’ of elegy. With reference to Sulpicia, I also labelled Augustan elegy as ‘male-oriented verse’ that constructs a ‘male narrative perspective’. While it is evidently the case that, with the notable exception of Sulpicia, the biological sex of all the authors of Roman elegy is male, I would now argue that the genre of elegy itself is not unequivocally ‘masculine’ and that to engender elegy unproblematically as ‘male’ fails to do justice to the genre's crucial play with Roman categories of gender.


1989 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 75-91
Author(s):  
Sarah Paul

As the first love sonnet sequence written by a woman in English, Elizabeth Barrett Browning's Sonnets from the Portuguese challenged the conventions of amatory poetry when it was published in 1850. The genre, which had always required its female inhabitants to maintain an aloof and icy silence, was not accustomed to female voices. Certainly a speaker like the narrator of Barrett Browning's sonnets, loudly proclaiming her right to adopt postures of adoration and unworthiness toward a male love object, had never before disturbed its rarefied spaces. The radical nature of the work, however, seems to have been lost on its nineteenth-century audience. Victorian readers saw nothing shocking or immodest about the sonnets and actually admired them a great deal, particularly because they seemed, oddly enough, to uphold an idealized model of devout and reticent femininity. Hall Caine called them “essentially feminine in their hyper-refinement, in their intense tremulous spirituality” (310–11), while Eric Robertson wrote that “no woman's heart indeed was ever laid barer to us, but no heart could have laid itself bare more purely” (281). Twelve years later Edmund Gosse spoke of the cycle's “noble dignity,” “stainless harmony,” and “high ethical level of distinguished utterance” (11, 21). Neither these nor any other nineteenth- or early twentieth-century critic saw anything revolutionary in the sequence. Only in the past dozen years have feminist critics re-evaluating Sonnets from the Portuguese discovered within its self-deprecating stanzas an “enterprise of heroinism” asserting a woman's “right” to be the active subject of both poetry and feeling rather than their passive object.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Semenov

The subject of the research is the dynamics of noesis of pure consciousness and the rules of formal logic. The goal was to establish the foundations for the synthesis of pure consciousness and ordinary reason. The methodological basis was the theory of pure consciousness postulated by E. Husserl in his "Ideas for pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Book one. A general introduction to pure phenomenology". The research also featured I. Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason", in particular his reflections on the "foundations of pure reason" and the formal logic of Aristotle. Results. If we split the emerging experience of pure consciousness into interoceptive and exteroceptive, it means that the pure contemplation of things is not as pure as E. Husserl believed it to be, since the reason with its invariable logical operations is always added to the noesis procedure. This leads us to a less idealized understanding of phenomenology as a philosophical trend, even though Husserl’s work used classical laws of "contemplative intuition". The results can be applied in the field of epistemology and the theory of phenomenological knowledge. Findings. The subject of knowledge, even after the phenomenological reduction is completed, is still connected with rational activity. Such a vision of the phenomenological layer could eliminate the very possibility of the appearance of "pure entities" since we do not completely abandon our everyday "natural setting". However, we believe that in order to encounter anything at all in the "epoch" state, it is necessary to continue to keep in touch with reason, since otherwise there is a risk of falling into somnambulism. Reason, although it enters the layer of pure knowledge, does not lose its formal logical abilities. Logical laws are connected with the operation of noesis, thereby creating a general experience of things of an interoceptive or exteroceptive nature.


Fabula ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 61 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 257-277
Author(s):  
Sara Ann Knutson

AbstractThis article explores new possibilities for the interpretation of myths. It asks how people in the past configured their world and its complex interactions, to which their orally-constructed stories bear witness. It is assumed here that myths contain structures of belief, cognition, and world-making beyond their immediate subject matter. This article focuses specifically on the preservation of material objects in myths throughout their transmission from changing oral narratives to written form. We should not assume that objects in oral traditions simply color the narratives; rather, these representations of materials can provide clues into the mentalities of past peoples and how they understood the complex interaction between humans and materials. As a case study, I examine the Old Norse myths, stories containing materials that reinforced Scandinavian oral traditions and gave the stories traction, memory, and influence. In doing so, this article hopes to help bridge materiality studies, narrative studies, and folklore in a way that does not privilege one particular source type over another. The myths reveal ancient Scandinavian conceptions of what constituted an “object,” which are not necessarily the same as our own twenty-first century expectations. The Scandinavian myths present a world not divided between active Subject, passive Object as the Cartesian model would enforce centuries later, but rather one that recognized distinctive object agencies beyond the realm of human intention.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Gasim Yamani

This article aims to explore the realms of al-Farabi's philosophical thought, by focusing on four problems: Is God unnecessary in the process of creating nature to know, think and even make nature the object of his thought? 2). How to interpret the influence of Imagination that underlies al-Farabi's theory of prophethood? 3). How is al-Farabi's view of the human soul? and 4). What is the ideal state form for al-Farabi? To answer this problem, the method used is library research research, with a philosophical approach. The research results obtained: First, God does not depend on nature as the object of his thought in the process of natural creation. Second, the Prophet, through his strong imaginative abilities, was not only able to deal directly with Mustafad's intellect, but was also able to translate the revelations that were sent down and transferred to us. Third, the soul has two powers, a theoretical power, namely the human thinking power that can distinguish and judge and is able to express different competences, and the practical power is the power that determines what human actions must be done. Fourth, the ideal country is a country whose leader is not only political, but also includes ethical issues.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Voss

Drawing on Deleuze's early works of the 1960s, this article investigates the ways in which Deleuze challenges our traditional linguistic notion of sense and notion of truth. Using Frege's account of sense and truth, this article presents our common understanding of sense and truth as two separate dimensions of the proposition where sense subsists only in a formal relation to the other. It then goes on to examine the Kantian account, which makes sense the superior transcendental condition of possibility of truth. Although both accounts define sense as merely the form of possibility of truth, a huge divide cuts across a simple formal logic of sense and a transcendental logic: transcendental logic discovered a certain genetic productivity of sense, such that a proposition always has the kind of truth that it merits according to its sense. In pursuit of this genetic productivity of sense, Deleuze applies different models of explanation: a Nietzschean genealogical model of the genetic power of sense, and in The Logic of Sense a structural model combined with elements of Stoic philosophy. This article follows Deleuze in setting up a new and very complex notion of sense, which he radically distinguishes from what he terms ‘signification’, that is, an extrinsic, linguistic or logical, condition of possibility. Rather, sense has to be conceived as both the effect and the intrinsic genetic element of an extra-propositional sense-producing machine.


Author(s):  
Shiva Hemmati

This paper examines Charlotte Brontë’s masterpiece Jane Eyre (1848) through Irigaray’s notion of feminine divine in order to argue how Charlotte Brontë’s main characters achieve their autonomous gendered identity by expressing their erotic desire. It discusses the resistance of Charlotte Brontë’s female protagonist, Jane Eyre, to the dichotomies of active subject/passive object, self/other, body/mind, passion/intellect, and the domination/submission through her ethical and intersubjective relationship with Rochester, her counterpart, rather than being an object of his desire. It is argued how Jane challenges these dualities of patriarchal society and the logic of the same by expressing her erotic nature. Where the patriarchal society tries to confine women in the patriarchal culture, Brontë develops Jane within and against those confines and allows her to experience her female desire by exploring the internal and external nature. Jane’s liberation from the dualities can be read through the lens of Irigaray’s feminine divine which focuses on women’s autonomous gendered identity and creates a balance between their passion and reason. Charlotte Brontë indicates how women are able to achieve individuality, social standing, and subjective identity by expressing their female desire.


Author(s):  
Huaping Lu-Adler

This chapter examines Kant’s account of logic in the Critique, analyzing his claim that pure general logic is formal, properly scientific, and complete. It distinguishes three aspects of formality, in virtue of which this logic differs from particular logic, applied logic, and transcendental logic and thereby satisfies one necessary condition of a proper science, namely having a unique subject matter. The chapter then explicates the completeness claim as a philosophical claim about logic qua strict science. Drawing on Kant’s account of what it takes to prove a system of pure concepts of the understanding as complete and his caution against the dialectical illusion of using formal logic as an organon, the chapter argues that, to avoid begging questions, he needs a sort of transcendental critique to establish his logic as complete in content and restrict its use to that of a mere canon for the formal assessment of our cognitions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 175-190

Interpreting Bartleby the scrivener’s formula, “I would prefer not to,” in Herman Melville’s short story is a challenge for many philosophers, and Bartleby’s inaction also hints at a political position. The problem is how to explain this (in)action. It is unclear whether the scrivener is an active subject or a passive object. One potential solution would be to reduce Bartleby’s duality to one of its modes. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri claim the scrivener is a revolutionary subject; the uncertainty of his actions is regarded as a refusal. Hardt and Negri link this refusal with the next stage in the production of a new society and a new subject. Slavoj Žižek is also ambivalent about “Bartleby politics”. Although the Slovenian philosopher criticizes the authors of Empire, he still declares Bartleby a parallax figure combining action and inaction. However, Žižek did not stake out a position on the ontological status of the scrivener: is he a cunning subject and escape artist, or is he a distinction-basis of the system itself? In the contrary direction, Gilles Deleuze and Giorgio Agamben propose a program for the desubjectification of the scrivener from Wall Street. Here Bartleby is not a subject, but a figure of the ontology of a transcendental source which exists before all ontic differences. The essay offers a radically different solution to the Bartleby problem. It rejects the dichotomy between the subject and object and moves toward the object-oriented theory of action and relational ontology as presented in the works of Bruno Latour. In this ontology, any actors (human or non-human) may turn out situationally to be active or inactive, depending on their position in relation to other actors.


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