THE INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS: STILL STANDING

ABSTRACT In two recent papers, Mark McBride has attacked the interest theory of rights, both introducing new arguments and claiming that interest theorists have not successfully deflected Gopal Sreenivasan's earlier arguments. This essay replies to all of McBride's criticisms, showing them to be mistaken.

Sobre el minimalismo anti-conflictivista y liberal: un análisis desde la perspectiva de la interest theory y del enfoque dinámico

El artículo describe dos enfoques minimalistas en materia de reconocimiento y protección de los derechos: las variantes anti-conflictivista y liberal. En ello, se reconstruyen sus fundamentos histórico-culturales y se destacan los principa­les elementos de su insostenibilidad teórica. Para este fin, se utilizan algunas herramientas teóricas derivadas de la combinación de la interest theory con un enfoque dinámico

Legal Analysis of Covid-19 Vaccination Obligations and Sanctions: Interest Theory Perspective

This paper will answer two questions related to whether there is a need for sanctions for those who refuse to be vaccinated, what sanctions are appropriate from the perspective of interest theory, and what is the legal basis for imposing sanctions for those who refuse to be vaccinated in Indonesia. This study uses a sociolegal approach from the perspective of interest theory, it is found that sanctions can not only be given but must be given to those who refuse to be vaccinated. According to this perspective, the appropriate sanction is not fines or imprisonment, but deprivation of the right to socialize. The legal basis for imposing sanctions for those who refuse to be vaccinated is Article 5 of Law 4/1984 and PerPres12/2021. The sanctions referred to are administrative in nature in the form of termination of social security or social assistance, postponement or termination of government administration services, and fines. These sanctions do not contribute to stopping the spread of the Covid-19 virus, so it is recommended that amendments to these provisions are necessary.

How can Rights be Individuated?

This chapter focuses on how courts should individuate social and economic rights. Although all rights can be judicially enforced, judges must have a different approach to each right; there are substantial differences even among social and economic rights themselves. Analysing the recent Dladdla case of the South African Court, the chapter argues that it is not possible to confine human interests regarding housing to bare survival, but other dimensions of the right to housing come into play. In this sense, it seems to take the stance of the 'interest theory' of rights, according to which despite their canonical formulations, rights have a dynamic character due to ever-evolving interest and duties that rights are there to protect and impose. This dynamism is even clearer in pluralist societies, where disagreement on those interest and duties flourishes. The chapter then calls the attention on how courts should do their job in regards to the interpretation and enforcement of socio-economic rights; it suggests taking an 'integrated' approach, which acknowledges the interconnection of the various rights.

ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH

O artigo descreve duas abordagens minimalistas diferentes em matéria de reconhecimento e proteção de direitos: as variantes anti-conflitivista e liberal. Nele, se reconstroem seus fundamentos histórico-culturais e se destacam os principais elementos de sua insustentabilidade teórica.Metodologia: Para esse efeito, utilizam-se algumas ferramentas teóricas derivadas da combinação da interest theory contemporânea com uma abordagem dinâmica.Objetivo: Um dos objetivos mais relevantes da pesquisa consiste em demonstrar a insustentabilidade teórica daquelas reconstruções que atribuem à sucessão histórica das diferentes categorias de direitos uma clara distinção estrutural entre direitos negativos, entendidos como “autoexecutivos”, e direitos positivos a prestações públicas.Resultado: A conjunção dessas duas abordagens (teoria dinâmica e interest theory) fornece uma base conceitual adecuada para o reconhecimento dos direitos sociais em um nível de paridade em relação com os direitos tradicionais de liberdade; por outro lado, esta posição conduz diretamente à rejeição do minimalismo: as liberdades civis clássicas, da mesma forma que as condições materiais necessárias para uma existência digna, constituem bens ou interesses protegidos dos sujeitos que exigem prestações para serem garantidos. Contribuições: A análise realiza uma investigação filosófica sobre os fundamentos teóricos dos direitos sociais em relação aos direitos liberais clássicos da primeira geração. Nesse sentido, produz-se um desenvolvimento doutrinal das suas bases conceituais com o objetivo de acabar definitivamente com a concepção canônica que defende a superioridade axiológica dos direitos da tradição liberal.

Preserving the ‘Essence’ of Fundamental Rights under Article 52(1) of the Charter: A Sisyphean Task?

Essence of fundamental rights – Article 52(1) of the Charter – Court of Justice of the EU – Methodology for determination of interference with essence – EU values – Proportionality – Balancing – Absolute and relative theory – Absolute rights – Interest theory of rights – Choice theory of rights – Hohfeld’s theory of rights – ‘Newtonian’ conception of rights – Case law on Article 52(1) of the Charter.