Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the twenty essays compiled for the XIII conference of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia, which was held in Bogota in January of 2019. The collection is divided into three thematic parts which illustrate five subjects at the spotlight of comparative constitutional law, in light of the growing circulation and intensification of the idea of constitutionalism. The first part examines the evolving and leading role of constitutional courts in constitutional democracies. The second part allows constitutional experiences speak for themselves and discusses tensions and debates in three topics: (A) the growing trend to judicially enforce 'constitutional unamendability' under the doctrine of 'unconstitutional constitutional amendments'; (B) the idea of 'transformative constitutionalism' in the area of social rights enforcement; and (C) the models of transitional justice and their implementation in the Colombian case. Finally, the third part analyses vertical and horizontal movements of constitutional law doctrines and decisions.

The Resilient Constitution

This chapter evaluates the so called 'transitional constitution' of South Africa and the 'permanent constitution' of Colombia. Through a comparative approach, it contends that constitutions are better understood in terms of their resilience rather than either being transitional or permanent, and that a 'resilient constitution' is the one capable of springing back even after being subjected to extreme pressure, as long as leaders maintain their commitment to governing within the limits of the law. In this sense, the differences between the Colombian transitional justice and the South African case do not stem primarily from the 'permanence' of its Constitution, but rather from the difficulties and tensions inherent to any transitional justice process, because it derives from some of the very rights it is designed to promote. The chapter then details how the jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court on transitional matters can be understood as having moved from an understanding of the Constitution as permanent, to one of resilience that does not represent a new power grabbed by the Court. Rather than that, it signals an understanding of the role of the Court in maintaining a constitutional order even in the face of existential threats to it.

Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and Democracy

This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.

The Machinery of International Law and Democratic Backsliding

This chapter focuses on the abuse of international rights to political participation so as to facilitate a leader's remaining in office beyond the constitutionally mandated term. This involves not only the abuse of the interpretation of rights, but also the abuse of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, which has spread around the world in recent years. How does this happen and what, if anything, can international law do about it? After introducing a motivating case — the famous decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the second re-election decision, in which courts stood for the protection of democracy — the chapter examines recent 'bad' cases in which rights and constitutional amendments are abused to extend leaders' terms. It surveys recent developments in the law of term limits, and briefly proposes a normative interpretation of the right to political participation which ought to be consistent with the emerging doctrine. The chapter suggests that there is an emerging consensus, at least in some regions of the world, that there are limits in states' ability to modify term limits unconditionally.

The Transitional Justice Model in Colombia vis-à-vis the Inter-American Human Rights SystemAmidst the Conventionality Control and the National Margin of Appreciation

This chapter assesses the international consequences of the transitional justice model in Colombia. It demonstrates that the Colombian transitional justice model, and particularly the integrated system for truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition, are likely to successfully withstand the 'conventionality control' by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICtHR). The chapter then presents a model to be used by the Inter-American organs when analysing the Colombian transitional justice model. In seeking to accommodate the needs of the transitional process with the demands for justice, the model proposes a harmonizing technique between the notions of 'conventionality control', developed by the Inter-American Court since 2006, and the 'national margin of appreciation' doctrine, developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This harmonizing approach would allow States to implement the most adequate mechanisms for the consolidation of a lasting peace scenario.

Constitutional Rights without the Notion of OptimizationLimiting Judicial Activism in the Realm of Social and Economic Rights

This chapter argues that apex courts should not take the place of the legislative or the executive branch. It takes a critical stance towards the notion of optimization that legal principles entail. Optimization results in judicial activism that, in turn, shifts the power from politics to courts. The chapter then looks at some decisions by the German Federal Constitutional Court considered 'activist decisions' in the realm of socio-economic rights, and compares their follow-up with the Colombian experience. It suggests that judges must play a rather modest role and limit themselves to a case-by-case rationale even if social rights are systematically under-enforced. The chapter also calls the courts' attention to be aware of the financial restrictions of their countries. Finally, it asks courts to create incentives for the legislatures and executive branch to commit with social and economic rights, and insists that follow-up measures should not be taken by apex courts, but rather by the political branches.

Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights?

This chapter highlights one of the classical and most disputed debates in transitional literature: the ethical justification of the transitional justice measures, as opposed to its legal dimensions. By employing a conceptual analysis to spell out the 'retributive' and 'holistic' conceptions of justice, it argues that both views fail to fully tailor their normative framework to the empirical conditions in which such institutions are implemented (e.g. large-scale wrongdoings and institutional weakness). In this sense, the chapter draws out a proposal that synthesizes the motivating concerns behind both positions, and attempts to overcome the diagnosed flaws, by drawing a conceptual bridge between the two opposing views. Rather than advocating for one position or the other, it tries to articulate the crucial insights of both views in light of the victims' right to justice. It suggests that transitional justice measures should be oriented towards creating appropriate conditions to enable and legitimize the future exercise of standardized procedures for redress.

The Colombian Model of Structural Socio-economic Rights Remedies

This chapter offers an empirical analysis of the Colombian Constitutional Court's experience with structural injunctions, which is one of its greatest and most distinctive achievements. It argues that the approach towards socio-economic rights adjudication should be assertive, while avoiding the complete encroachment on the legislative and executive branches. The influence of political context and cost highlights a key point: the Colombian model should best be viewed as an invitation for further development and guided experimentation, rather than as a fixed formula for success. The chapter then argues that the Colombian Court should seek ways to develop different types of monitoring mechanisms that are less expensive and that respond to variations in political context. Constitutional experimentalism is the key to this approach. Economic and institutional constraints should be considered when deciding how courts should intervene to secure socio-economic rights.

International and Foreign Law in Domestic Constitutional Law

This chapter illustrates the role of international and foreign law in domestic constitutional law. Through the case analysis of South Africa (a post conflict state) and the United States (often seen as a country that is not too friendly to international and foreign legal systems), it discusses the role of international and foreign law in reconciling the regional development of the rule of law in a country, by working closely together with domestic constitutional law. The domestic courts both in the United States and South Africa, whenever they deem it appropriate, do consider international and foreign law in the resolution of disputes before them. The conditions under which each jurisdiction may resort to foreign or international law, as well as the criteria used for taking them into consideration, vary. However, most importantly, this practice should be encouraged as it promotes the uniform interpretation of international law and the progressive advancement of norms world-wide, which are aspects that are especially important in the field of human rights.

The Misconceived Quest for the Elusive Right Answer or Dedication to a Process, Not a Result

This chapter assesses whether the exercise of judicial discretion in answering pivotal legal questions is necessarily illegitimate in a constitutional democracy. It argues that legitimacy does not necessitate existing right answers and a rejection of judicial discretion. This argument rests on two factors: first, the difficulty of determining, in any particular case, whether there is a right answer and what that might be; and second, the fact that judicial discretion does not consist in unbridled choice on the part of one who exercises it. The answer to the interpretative concerns over constitutional judges should not be overcome by relying on the idea of a unique correct answer, but rather by a dedication to the decision-making process. The chapter then considers the idea of the 'Community Constitutional Morality', under which each legal system instantiate a set of moral values embedded in its constitution, from which judges should not depart. It is the constitution and the local social practice that determines such 'constitutional morality', and not an ideal set of external objective morality. This idea mitigates the 'counter-majoritarian' objection, as judicial review would reflect the commitments deeply held by the society where it is being exercised.