scholarly journals Optimal lobbying pricing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Protopappas
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Symmetric Groups ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Preferential Treatment ◽  
Benchmark Model

AbstractWe study a game with two candidates and two interest groups. The groups offer two kinds of costly contributions to achieve political influence: (a) pre-election campaign contributions to their favourite candidates that increase their probability of winning the election and (b) post-election lobbying contributions to the winning candidate to affect the implemented policy. The candidates are the first to act by strategically choosing the lobbying prices they will charge the groups if they are elected. We characterise the equilibrium values of the lobbying prices set by the candidates as well as the equilibrium levels of the campaign and lobbying contributions chosen by the groups. We show, endogenously, that in the case with symmetric groups and symmetric politicians, a candidate announces to charge the group that supports her in the election a lower lobbying price, justifying this way the preferential treatment to certain groups from the politicians in office. We also consider two extensions (asymmetric groups and politicians who do not commit to the announced prices) and show that the results of the benchmark model hold under specific conditions.

China spy stories undermine trust in Australia’s media

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Influence ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
The Impact

Subject The impact of allegations of covert Chinese interference. Significance Two major media stories have reignited Australia’s intense debates over China’s attempts to exert political influence in the country. The first depicted the defection of a ‘Chinese spy’. The second claimed that an indebted businessman was offered a multi-million-dollar bailout by a Chinese agent to run for a seat in Australia’s parliament. Much about the stories, however, is doubtful or unclear. Impacts There is unlikely to be much impact on Canberra's relations with Beijing, which has shown little interest. Stories of Chinese political interference will exacerbate suspicions of China in other Western countries, regardless of their accuracy. In Taiwan, the reports will help the China-sceptic government’s re-election campaign and attempts to strengthen counter-interference laws.

Sidestepping primary reform: political action in response to institutional change

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Seth J. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Change ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Primary Elections ◽  
Voter Participation ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
American States

Abstract Many believe primary elections distort representation in American legislatures because unrepresentative actors nominate extremist candidates. Advocates have reformed primaries to broaden voter participation and increase representation. Empirical evidence, however, is quite variable on the effects of reform. I argue that when institutional reform narrows one pathway of political influence, aggrieved actors take political action elsewhere to circumvent reform. I use a difference-in-differences design in the American states and find that although changing primary rules increases primary turnout, campaign contributions also increase with reform. Implementing nonpartisan primaries and reforming partisan primaries lead to estimated 9 and 21 percent increases in individual campaign contributions per cycle. This suggests actors substitute action across avenues of political influence to limit effects of institutional reform.

Domestic Politics

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas A. Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycle ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Foreign Markets ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
Presidential Election Campaign

This chapter focuses on the long and politically divisive passage of the Smoot–Hawley tariff through Congress. The popular perception is that Congress enacted a higher tariff because it caved in to the demands of special interest groups. In fact, the tariff did not originate in response to demands by politically powerful industries facing competition from imports, but was offered up by Republican politicians who wanted to appease farmers during the presidential election campaign in 1928. The tariff was initiated near a business cycle peak when business was good, not in the midst of the Depression, and it was poorly suited to help farmers, many of whom depended on exports to foreign markets. Of course, the manner in which Congress handled the tariff gave rise to its association with special interest lobbying and logrolling (vote trading among members of Congress), a perception that is wholly accurate.

Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 219-238
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Lacombe
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Gun Control ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Advocacy Organizations ◽  
National Rifle Association ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
Gun Debate

This chapter looks toward the future of both the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the gun debate more broadly. It discusses potential threats to the NRA's political influence, including its own internal struggles, the rise of more effective gun control advocacy organizations, and the potential downsides of its close relationship with the Republican Party. The chapter also talks about the potential generalizability of the book's findings to other groups and policy areas. It considers the lessons that other groups might learn from the NRA in terms of cultivating and using ideational power. Ultimately, the chapter notes its implications for our understanding of interest groups and political parties, and reflects on the NRA's place in American democracy.

A Direct Line to Legislators and Regulators

2020 ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Leah Cardamore Stokes
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Fossil Fuel ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Direct Link ◽  
Policy Conflict ◽  
Industrial Energy ◽  
Regulatory Bodies ◽  
Fossil Fuel Industry ◽  
Fuel Industry ◽  
Over Time

Chapter 5 concludes the Texas story. Over time, fossil fuel companies and industrial energy consumers came to oppose Texas’s renewable energy policies. Given their political influence over both politicians and regulators, these opponents were able to block reforms from passing in the legislature or being implemented by regulatory bodies. These opponents were successful because they had a direct link to the legislature, with a fossil fuel industry lobbyist reportedly working from a desk in a key senator’s office. This chapter shows how opponents can also use the fog of enactment strategically to resist policy during implementation and how opponent interest groups with sufficient influence can directly undermine policy, even if advocates have previously succeeded in winning policy conflict and initiating positive feedback.

The Increasing Difficulty of Reversing Government Growth: A Prisoners’ Dilemma that Gets Worse with Time

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-165
Author(s):  
Jeff R. Clark ◽  
Dwight R. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Special Interest Groups ◽  
Size Of Government ◽  
Government Growth ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Generalized Limits ◽  
Government Benefits

Abstract Special interest groups possess political influence exceeding their size and influence government’s expansion beyond efficiency limits. T h e prisoners’ dilemma illustrates that although it is in the interest of each group to capture maximum government benefits, when all do, all groups are worse off collectively. T h e result is a government that is too large, with gains to each group worth less than their costs. Further gains could be derived if all groups reduce their demands on government. However, securing agreement on such reform is difficult. Unilaterally reducing demands on government means individuals pay for benefits of others without receiving anything in return. Standard discussions of reducing the size of government by overcoming prisoners’ dilemma incentives understate the degree of difficulty involved. We demonstrate that once groups choose noncooperation, they develop skills, which build up over time, thereby enlarging the payoff to the chosen path. As the damage from political rent seeking increases, the motivation for reform declines. However, beyond some point, even with the skill set that has evolved, individual gains from rent seeking are worth less than the costs of the rent-seeking privileges of others. Thus, the prospect of imposing generalized limits on political privileges improves, even though they impose short-run costs.

scholarly journals Why Groups Are Politically Active: An Incentive-Theoretical Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (12) ◽  
pp. 1628-1660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Bolleyer ◽  
Florian Weiler
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Communication Channels ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Logit Models ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Conflicting Demands ◽  
Voluntary Membership ◽  
Politically Active

Political activity is conventionally considered a constitutive feature of interest groups, underpinning an impressive literature on the strategies groups employ to exercise political influence. Whether and how intensely voluntary membership groups engage in political activities to start with, however, are rarely examined. We present a new incentive-theoretical perspective on group political activity, considering both member demands and leadership constraints. We argue that investments in political activities (one way of generating collective incentives) as a means to prevent member exit are more or less important depending on a group’s composition. Simultaneously, the extent to which leaders are incentivized to cater to members’ demands, when trying to balance these against conflicting demands, depends on communication channels between leaders and members and the importance of membership fees. Applying Bayesian ordered logit models to data from two group surveys supports our perspective and stresses the importance of considering how intraorganizational dynamics steer groups’ external activities.

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