Disparity and Diversion: Domestic Economic Inequality and MID Initiation

Scholarship has demonstrated that domestic economic inequality is related to a number of forms of intrastate conflict, such as civil wars and rebellions. There are good reasons to believe that it also has an impact on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes for diversionary reasons. Such use of external force may refocus popular attention and may reinforce the strong nationalist sentiment that tends to prevail in societies with substantial economic inequality. Our empirical results support this contention in democracies but, as expected, not in autocracies. At a time when domestic economic inequality is rising across the world, our findings may be timely.

A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence

How have understandings of fundamental norms of international society changed over time? How does this relate to the decline of interstate violence since 1945? Previous explanations have focused on regime type, domestic institutions, economic interdependence, relative power, and nuclear weapons, I argue that a crucial and underexplored part of the puzzle is the change in understanding of sovereignty over the same period. In this article, I propose a novel means of examining change in these norms between 1970 and 2014 by analyzing the content of UN Security Council resolutions. This analysis is then utilized in quantitative analysis of the level of violence dispute participants resorted to in all Militarized Interstate Disputes in the period. I find that as liberal understandings of fundamental norms have increased, that the average level of violence used has decreased. This points to a crucial missing component in the existing literature: that institutions can only constrain when political actors share the right norms.

Training Foreign Militaries for Peace – U.S. IMET and Militarized Interstate Disputes 1976-2007

How do U.S. International Military Education and Training programs affect the recipient states` behavior in militarized interstate disputes? While the relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID involvement has been studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the same phenomena has been largely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this gap. This paper proposes that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, and the cost of war. These military personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of both MID initiation and escalation. To test this argument the analysis employs a merged dataset from the Correlates of War Projects and the most prominent U.S. IMET and coups data. Using logistic regression analysis this study finds that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs. The analysis also finds that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to escalate ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.

Spying from Space: Reconnaissance Satellites and Interstate Disputes

Despite considerable interest and debate, it has proven surprisingly difficult to demonstrate a systematic link between technological change and patterns of war and peace. At least part of the challenge may reside in finding the right place to “look” for such relationships. Technological change alters what nations can do to one another (capabilities), but in ways that are typically reflected by deals (diplomatic bargains) rather than actions. We theorize that reconnaissance satellites have revolutionized the use of information gleaned from spying in ways that discourage states from engaging in serious conflicts with one another. We analyze the impact of reconnaissance satellites on high-casualty militarized interstate disputes (MIDS) between dyads from 1950 to 2010. We find that when either the potential aggressor or target in a dyad possess reconnaissance satellites, they are significantly less likely to become involved in serious MIDs. This effect is especially powerful when both states possess reconnaissance satellites.

Ideology, Institutions, Power, and Militarized Disputes

This chapter examines if and how intergovernmental organization (IGO) memberships shape participation in militarized interstate disputes. Theorists have argued that IGOs solve informational problems, socialize states, or constitute democratic communities that prevent a resort to violence. The distributive ideological approach suggests that IGOs institutionalize ideologically cohesive coalitions that ameliorate conflicts with insiders but can exacerbate conflict with outsiders. The effect of IGOs on militarized disputes should be present only if the distributional stakes have global ideological implications as opposed to when disputes are purely over particularistic stakes, such as territory. Regression analyses support this insight. Both ideological differences and IGO membership patterns affect dispute participation in dyads that include a major power but not among neighboring states or states involved in a territorial dispute. One implication is that IGO memberships affect the distribution of militarized disputes, but it is unclear whether IGOs in the aggregate reduce militarized conflict.

Where do hawks and doves fly when shots are fired?

This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) on the votes shares of hawkish, right-wing and dovish, left-wing incumbents, respectively. More specifically, I propose that deploying troops electorally harms doves and benefits hawks. I test this hypothesis via two studies. Study-1 presents a macro-level analysis of an incumbent’s electoral performance in a dataset covering 389 elections in 27 democratic countries between 1950 and 2010. With the objective of capturing heterogeneity of individual voting behavior at the appropriate level, Study-2 scrutinizes cross-national survey results from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) covering 19 elections in 6 democracies. Multilevel models across both studies concur that in times of conflict, voters become significantly less supportive of dovish, left-wing incumbents and slightly more so of hawkish, right-wing ones compared to times of peace. The results also suggest that doves lose particularly substantial support from their co-partisans and ideologically left leaners.

Modelling militarized interstate disputes using data mining techniques: Prevention and prediction of conflicts

The use of modern data mining techniques on large datasets has become a recent phenomenon across a broad range of applications. One of the most frequent tasks is to build statistical models using historical data and utilize them to predict new, so far unclassified, cases. This article examines the problem of predicting a military interstate dispute between two states (dyad) by employing selected data mining techniques. Suitable methods are identified and applied to the existing dataset of politically relevant dyads. The result is the building of statistical models for the classification of potential dyadic conflicts. The overall performance of these models is verified and cost analysis is done based on the different impacts of incorrect classification. The results are compared with those of other published research studies in the field of conflict prediction; the models created by data mining techniques significantly outperform all rival algorithms and approaches. Finally, the last part of the article presents the results of applying data mining techniques to association, i.e. to discovering relationships and dependencies in the data.

Searching for Classic Oil Wars

This chapter examines over six hundred militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in order to determine whether oil ambitions motivate militarized conflict. It provides evidence of classic oil wars, in which severe militarized interstate conflicts are driven largely by participants' desire to obtain petroleum resources. It also points out how MIDs in oil-endowed territories were either very minor or motivated by other issues. The chapter introduces four new categories of conflict: oil spats, red herrings, oil campaigns, and oil gambits. It explains that oil spats are minor confrontations driven by petroleum ambitions, such as China and Vietnam's 2014 confrontation over a drilling rig in the South China Sea. It also describes red herrings, which are not fought for oil, but instead, aggressors are motivated predominantly by aspirations to political independence or regional hegemony.

An interactive model of democratic peace

Democracies do not take up arms against each other. Although this axiom has attained the status of a mantra in the field of international relations, this statement is much more complex than it appears, in part because it is highly contingent on the definitions and operationalizations of both democracy and conflict. This article revisits democratic peace theory, combining both institutional constraints and similarity-based arguments. Interactions between the democratic level of the dyad (the average democratic level of its members) and its democratic spread (difference between the democratic scores of its members) create a dyadic triangle that encompasses all possible combinations of cases, revisiting which dyads are more prone to conflict. The findings partially confirm and partially refute both the institutional constraints and the similarity-based arguments, leading to a nuanced alternative theory: the Interactive Model of Democratic Peace. Akin to democratic peace theory, our evidence shows that the higher a dyad’s level of democracy is, the lower the probability of fatal militarized interstate disputes between that pair of states. However, contrary to democratic peace theory, we find that dissimilar-regime dyads can still be peaceful as long as they have a high mean of democracy. Following the theory of regime similarity, we consider the democratic spread of each dyad, but we find that being similar is not a sufficient condition for peace between the members of a dyad. From the empirical evidence, the article derives three heuristic zones of conflict, filling much of the gray area that has been left unexplained by previous models.