Correctional “Free Lunch”? Cost Neglect Increases Punishment in Prosecutors

Prosecutors can influence judges’ sentencing decisions by the sentencing recommendations they make—but prosecutors are insulated from the costs of those sentences, which critics have described as a correctional “free lunch.” In a nationally distributed survey experiment, we show that when a sample of (n=178) professional prosecutors were insulated from sentencing cost information, their prison sentence recommendations were nearly one-third lengthier than sentences rendered following exposure to direct cost information. Exposure to a fiscally equivalent benefit of incarceration did not impact sentencing recommendations, as predicted. This pattern suggests that prosecutors implicitly value incorporating sentencing costs but selectively neglect them unless they are made explicit. These findings highlight a likely but previously unrecognized contributor to mass incarceration and identify a potential way to remediate it.

Combined Anchoring: Prosecution and defense sentencing recommendations as sequential anchors in the courtroom

Purpose: When making judgments under uncertainty not only lay people but also professional judges often rely on heuristics like a numerical anchor (e.g., a numerical sentencing demand) to generate a numerical response. As the prosecution has the privilege to present its demand first, some scholars have speculated about an anchoring-based unfair disadvantage for the defence (who has the last albeit less effective word in court). Despite the plausibility of this reasoning, it is based on a hitherto untested assumption that the first of two sequential anchors exerts a greater influence on a later judgment (a primacy effect). We argue that it is also conceivable that the last word in court has a recency advantage (a recency effect) or that order does not matter as both demands even each other out (a combined anchor). Methods: We report a pre-registered experiment with German law students (N=475) who were randomly assigned to six experimental conditions in a study on legal decision-making order to test these three possibilities. Results: Results indicate an influence of both the prosecution and the defence recommendation, but no effect of order. Conclusion: This provides strong support for combined anchoring even for knowledgeable participants and rich case material. Specifically, the data are best compatible with the notion that both anchors exert an influence but each on different individuals. The implications of this finding for theory and legal decision-making are discussed.

Neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom: a review

The use of neuroscience in the courtroom can be traced back to the early twentieth century. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal proceedings has increased significantly over the last two decades. This rapid increase has raised questions, among the media as well as the legal and scientific communities, regarding the effects that such evidence could have on legal decision makers. In this article, we first outline the history of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms and then we provide a review of recent research investigating the effects of neuroscientific evidence on decision-making broadly, and on legal decisions specifically. In the latter case, we review studies that measure the effect of neuroscientific evidence (both imaging and nonimaging) on verdicts, sentencing recommendations, and beliefs of mock jurors and judges presented with a criminal case. Overall, the reviewed studies suggest mitigating effects of neuroscientific evidence on some legal decisions (e.g., the death penalty). Furthermore, factors such as mental disorder diagnoses and perceived dangerousness might moderate the mitigating effect of such evidence. Importantly, neuroscientific evidence that includes images of the brain does not appear to have an especially persuasive effect (compared with other neuroscientific evidence that does not include an image). Future directions for research are discussed, with a specific call for studies that vary defendant characteristics, the nature of the crime, and a juror’s perception of the defendant, in order to better understand the roles of moderating factors and cognitive mediators of persuasion.

Biological Evidence Regarding Psychopathy Does Not Affect Mock Jury Sentencing

Research on the biological factors influencing criminal behavior is increasingly being introduced into court, necessitating research on how such evidence is perceived and influences decision makers. Research on how this evidence influences sentencing recommendations is inconclusive. In this study, we focus on biological evidence related to psychopathy, a construct commonly associated with criminal behavior. Approximately 800 community members were presented with a case vignette detailing an individual who is described as having a high level of psychopathic traits. Participants received either psychological information about psychopathy (i.e., no biological evidence), evidence the defendant had genetic risk factors for psychopathy, or written neuroimaging evidence the defendant had brain deficits associated with psychopathy. Participants then recommended a sentence. Overall, recommended sentence lengths did not differ between evidence conditions. These findings add to a growing body of research suggesting that biological evidence may not have as much of an influence on jurors as previously thought.

Investigating the impact of jury sentencing recommendations using procedural justice theory

Public confidence in the criminal justice system is critical for the system to function effectively. Two studies investigated the impact of jury sentencing recommendations on public confidence using procedural justice theory. The first study (N = 80) manipulated the presence of jury involvement in sentencing (voice present versus voice absent) and the punitiveness of the minimum nonparole period (more punitive versus less punitive) to examine whether giving juries a "voice" - a key element of procedural justice - would increase public confidence in the courts, as well as perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. Contrary to predictions, results revealed that a more punitive sentence led to increased perceptions of legitimacy, which was associated with higher confidence. The second study (N = 60) examined whether manipulating the Judge's agreement with the jury's recommendation - as well as the Judge's reason for disagreement - would elicit the "frustration effect," leading to a decrease in confidence and perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. There was no evidence to suggest that the frustration effect was present. Results of both studies could suggest that jury sentencing recommendations may not effectively increase public confidence and perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in the courts, however alternate explanations are discussed.