Wealth effects of dividend regulation: Evidence from China

By exploring a natural experiment where the Chinese regulatory body introduced a dividend regulatory change in 2012, this article investigates the wealth effects of dividend regulation which increases firms’ dividends. I find that firms’ share price reacted positively (negatively) to regulatory events increasing (decreasing) investors’ expectation of dividends. The effects are more pronounced for firms with low dividends or domiciled in weak legal environments, robust to different research designs. The findings are consistent with the notion that low dividends in China are a manifestation of implicit contract failure. Dividend regulation provides remedies to low investor protection arising from weak legal environments. JEL Classification: G14, G35, G38, K22

The Perceived Differences: The Sector Stereotype of Social Service Providers

What difference does “nonprofitness” make is a fundamental question for nonprofit research. Although being held as the basic assumption of the contract failure theory, the sector difference perceived by individuals remains as an open question for multiple methodological problems. Here, we present evidence from three experiments for further empirical exploration of the perceived sector difference with improved research design. Our findings suggest a general pattern of sector stereotype: people perceive nonprofits as being warmer and slightly more competent than for-profits. More importantly, we show that such stereotypical understanding mainly results from people’s repugnance against profit-seeking intention instead of preferences toward nonprofits in the social service market. Such pattern differs slightly across three subareas being tested. Finally, we find more relevant information about the organization serves as a potential moderator that weakens the effect of being a nonprofit, which blurs the sector boundary in a given market.

Big Data Technology To Improve The Reliability Of Solutions When Choosing A Contractor

Considering current economic situation, the level of competition among different companies is great. In order to gain a higher position in the ratings, to attract more new customers, to predict the demand for products, and finally to protect themselves from wrong decisions, companies are increasingly turning to big data analytics. In the sphere of construction an opportunity to foresee the probability of contract implementation before its conclusion is always relevant. The higher the probability, the more attractive the contractor and lower the risks of the customer. Developing the topic of applicability of machine learning methods to the problem of determining the probability of successful completion of the contract, the authors are experimenting with a set of analyzed indicators assessing the impact of each of them on the decision on the possibility of contract failure. The article considers in detail the stages of data preparation for modeling, direct modeling and analysis of the results obtained. The authors tested the adequacy of the models on actual data and set the metrics by which it is possible to customize and improve the models for the needs of a particular organization. The prognostic models with a predictive power, based on machine learning algorithms, such as logistic regression, decision tree, random forest, developed by the authors, have the potential for practical use in construction organizations at the stage of contract conclusion.

Accountability in Government Contracts: A Measure of Performance from the Commitment-Making Officials?

Public-private partnership is an alternative defrayal which gives chances for private sectors to get engaged in financing the government’s good and service suppliers through business contract. As contracts commonly made, failure may happen while implementing the contract, known as a tort. Therefore, government contracts are conducted by Commitment-Making Officials (hereinafter, PPK), authorized to make and implement it. Thus, the accountability over the contract failure is inseparable with the authorized PPK. This study aimed to examine the accountability of PPK when failures happen in the implementation of government contract. This paper using legal research method along with statute and conceptual approaches, the finding showed that PPK were accountable both as officials and individual. As officials, their accountability is apparent when they did tort on the provision mentioned in a government contract they had signed and established. As individuals, their accountability is apparent on which they did maladministration.