DINAMIKA KONFLIK DAN UPAYA KONSENSUS PALESTINA-ISRAEL (Studi Kasus Perjanjian Perdamaian Oslo (Oslo Agreement ) Tahun 1993)

Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan prospek penyelesaian (konsensus) konflik Palestina – Israel studi kasus Perjanjian Damai Oslo 1993, dengan melihat latar belakang dan implikasinya bagi Rakyat Palestian). Penelitian ini membahas Sejauhmana prospek penyelesaian konflik Palestina–Israel dan implikasinya bagi rakyat Palestina di masa datang. Metode penelitian adalah kualitatif dengan jenis studi Pustaka, yang merupakan kajian teoritis, referensi serta literatur ilmiah lainnya yang berkaitan dengan budaya, nilai dan norma yang berkembang pada situai sosial di wilayah tersebut. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa perjanjian damai Oslo 1993 (Oslo Agreement) tidak dapat diimplementasikan, bahkan menambah intensitas serta kompleksitas konflik Palestina – Israel. Disamping itu, perjanjian damai Oslo 1993 tidak memberikan kontribusi yang berarti bagi proses terjadinya konsensus dalam konflik, bahkan intensitas konflik meningkat seiring dengan munculnya perjanjian-perjanjian baru yang bernasib hampir sama dengan perjanjian Oslo 1993. Maka, dapat dikatakan harapan rakyat Palestina untuk hidup berdampingan secara damai dengan bangsa Israel dan saling menghormati hak-hak kemanusiaan sebagaimana dikehendaki Piagam PBB makin jauh dari harapan jalan damai.

12. The Arab–Israeli Conflict

This chapter discusses different aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict over time — military, political, and economic. The first two decades of the Arab–Israeli conflict, often marked by armed hostilities, were notable for Arab refusal to recognize Israel's existence. Since the 1967 war, Arab states, specifically Syria and Saudi Arabia, have displayed willingness to recognize Israel, and two, Egypt and Jordan, have signed peace treaties; Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in the 1993 Oslo agreement. In this regard, most Arab states have adopted a realist approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict, seeking coexistence based in part on acceptance of Israel's military supremacy. In contrast, Israel appears to insist on security through regional domination, coupled with retention of the West Bank as Greater Israel.

Israel's 1993 Decision to Make Peace with the PLO or How Political Losers (this Time) Became Winners

Political losers' theory claims that political losers can move to a winning position if they turn the tables and change the situation completely. Our analysis shows that political losers can become winners by maintaining their favored option on the agenda. If the alternatives promoted by the political winners collapse and the losers have access to the winners' agenda, then there can be a situation in which the losers' favored alternative might be adopted. The 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrates this. We show how a team of political losers facilitated an alternative that the political winner – Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin – eventually had to adopt when his more favored options for negotiations became irrelevant. Thus, this narrative offers a complementary explanation to existing explanations of the Oslo Agreement, applies political losers' theory and provides further insight into the influence of domestic politics on international negotiations.