Practicing Hope

In this chapter, DeYoung considers how the theological virtue of hope might be practiced. She first explains Thomas Aquinas’s account of this virtue, including its structural relation to the passion of hope, its opposing vices, and its relationship to the friendship of charity. Then, using narrative and character analysis from the film The Shawshank Redemption, she examines a range of hopeful and proto-hopeful practices concerning both the goods one hopes for and the power one relies on to attain those goods. In particular, she shows how the film’s picture of the role friends and friendship play in catalyzing hope is a compelling metaphor for Christian hope’s reliance on God.

Epilogue

The Epilogue picks up on a problem running throughout the earlier chapters, that of the fundamental compatibility of Christianity and tragedy, and the claims of some critics (especially George Steiner) that they are utterly incompatible because of the Christian gospel’s ebullient hope of transcending tragic suffering. Various early Christian theologians, however, being fully aware of pagan philosophy’s largely negative assessment of the moral utility of hope, touted hope as an altogether virtuous emotion if refined by sobriety and realism about the compromised state of human existence. Hope thus qualified not only as a “theological virtue” alongside faith and love but as a tragical emotion in its own right, serving to guard against spiritual or eschatological triumphalism on the one hand, and deep despair over existential tragedy on the other.

Visions and Faces of the Tragic

Despite the pervasive early Christian repudiation of pagan theatrical art, especially prior to Constantine, this monograph demonstrates the increasing attention of late-ancient Christian authors to the genre of tragedy as a basis to explore the complexities of human finitude, suffering, and mortality in relation to the wisdom, justice, and providence of God. The book argues that various Christian writers, particularly in the post-Constantinian era, were keenly devoted to the mimesis, or imaginative re-presentation, of the tragic dimension of creaturely existence more than with simply mimicking the poetics of the classical tragedians. It analyzes a whole array of hermeneutical, literary, and rhetorical manifestations of “tragical mimesis” in early Christian writing, which, capitalizing on the elements of tragedy already perceptible in biblical revelation, aspired to deepen and edify Christian engagement with multiform evil and with the extreme vicissitudes of historical existence. Christian tragical mimetics included not only interpreting (and often amplifying) the Bible’s own tragedies for contemporary audiences, but also developing models of the Christian self as a tragic self, revamping the Christian moral conscience as a tragical conscience, and cultivating a distinctively Christian tragical pathos. The study culminates in an extended consideration of the theological intelligence and accountability of “tragical vision” and tragical mimesis in early Christianity, and the unique role of the theological virtue of hope in its repertoire of tragical emotions.

Why is Love Considered the Greatest of the Theological Virtues?

This paper will, after providing a succinct yet necessary definition of Christian caritas, offer three reasons for why love is considered to be the greatest of the theological virtues. First, upon attainment of eternal beatitude in heaven, caritas is not abandoned like faith and hope, but finds it fulfillment. Secondly, caritas is the only theological virtue which is chiefly concerned with the salvation of one’s neighbour. And thirdly, caritas enables man to live out the commandments of God in their fullness, thereby beginning the process of his divinization.

Hope, or On Theology

Chapter 6 turns to Fénelon’s theology, focusing on his treatment of hope and its significance for his political philosophy. It argues that he regarded hope not just as a key theological virtue, but also as a key virtue of political rulers and political reformers. Its discussion of the political implications of Fénelon’s theology proceeds in three parts. It first examines the role of hope in Telemachus. It then turns to the treatment of hope in Fénelon’s theology, focusing on three particular discussions: the place of hope in love, the relationship of hope to self-interest, and the place of hope in prayer. The final section turns to two aspects of Fénelon’s theology beyond hope which also have significant implications for his political philosophy: his understanding of the relationship of human being to divine being, and his arguments for the existence of God and their implications for universal order.

Hope in Theology

As social, civic, and global anxieties mount, the need to overcome despair has become urgent. This chapter draws on St. Thomas Aquinas and virtue ethics to propose the theological virtue of hope as a powerful source of rejuvenation. It argues for the necessary place of theology in reflection on hope due to the religious origins of hope as a central human aspiration and virtue capable of resilience. The virtue of hope, it is suggested, sustains us from the sloth and despair that threaten amid injustice, tragedy, and death; it provides an ultimate meaning and transcendent purpose to our lives; and it encourages us “on the way” (in via) with the prospect of eternal beatitude. Rather than degrading this life and world, hope ordains earthly goods to our eschatological end, forming us to pursue justice and social tasks with a resilience and vitality that transcend widespread cynicism and disillusionment. While hope ultimately seeks the kingdom of God, it can be concluded that it contributes richly to personal happiness and the common good, even in this life, and that this may be affirmed by those who do not share the theological premises.

Strengthening Hope for the Greatest Things

Aquinas reinterprets Aristotle with a view to showing that it is Jesus Christ who is the perfect exemplar of magnanimity, as of all the virtues. The acquired virtue of magnanimity, which strengthens persons in the hope of obtaining the greatest goods, is to be understood through the infused virtue of hope. Natural reason grasps virtue, rather than honour, as the greatest good, but the theological virtue of hope stretches out to nothing less than God. Just as Christ’s exemplary public benefaction is made possible by his perfect union with God, so ordinary Christian virtue is made possible by receiving a grace that likewise directs Christ’s followers beyond their own good to that of enemies and needy neighbours. Aristotle’s magnanimous man is thereby stretched almost beyond recognition, while remaining unequivocally the one worthy of the greatest honour.

The Risk of Liturgical Mercy

Liturgical mercy is the practice of refusing to exclude from eucharistic sharing those considered to be sinners. This essay argues that liturgical mercy is a practice that is (1) needed for the ongoing conversion of Christian communities while (2) simultaneously posing a risk that threatens the communion of Christian communities. By overcoming the biases that cause communities to exclude sinners, the practice of liturgical mercy facilitates the bodily encounters that are necessary for the self-transcendence of conversion. However, these encounters also threaten the identity of the community. As such, there is an unavoidable risk inherent in liturgical mercy. In the end, sustained by the theological virtue of hope, Christian communities must engage in the risk of liturgical mercy.

Obedience as a Religious Virtue

Summary This essay explores Thomas’ thoughts about the virtue of obedience (based on STh II-II, q.104), which is particularly valued as a link between the moral virtues and the theological virtue of charity (love of God). Obedience generates in the human person the moral disposition required for all the other virtues, a disposition which consists in the readiness of the will to submit itself to the rule of God’s will. Reflecting on the question whether one should be obedient to God in every respect, Thomas is confronted with an objection pointing to the story of how God commands Abraham to kill his innocent son, which is prohibited by natural law. I use the scarce but intriguing remarks Thomas made in response to this objection to propose a meaningful interpretation of obedience as a religious virtue, essentially different from its distorted imitation which consists in an immediate identification of one’s own will with the presumed divine will.