Invest in Innovation or Not? How Managerial Cognition and Attention Allocation Shape Corporate Responses to Performance Shortfalls

ABSTRACT This study investigates the influence of managerial cognition and attention allocation on firms’ responses to negative performance feedback. We explore how managerial cognition, as shaped by managers’ experiences, connections, positions, and industry environments, affects underperforming firms’ attention allocation and, consequently, their decisions to invest in innovation. Utilizing a longitudinal sample of Chinese high-tech firms from 2009 to 2017, we find that firms increase investment in research and development (R&D) when performance falls below aspiration levels. We also document that underperforming firms are associated with an even larger R&D investment increase when their CEOs have an R&D or engineering background, serve simultaneously as the board chair, or are not politically connected. In addition, we highlight the moderating effects of industry competition and industry norms on the relationship between firm underperformance and R&D intensity. We conclude that managerial cognition affects firms’ allocation of attention to innovation as a solution for closing performance gaps and shapes corporate responses to negative performance feedback.

Performance Shortfalls and R&D Investment Change: Aspirations, Actions, and Expectations

Built on the Behavioral Theory of the Firm, the paper examines how firm response to performance feedback is influenced by firm expectation on the likelihood of an action to close the performance gap. Using firm level change in R&D intensity as a problemistic search behavior, we explore how performance shortfalls relative to social and historical aspirations may prompt underperforming firms to adjust its R&D investment intensity, and how the magnitude of this adjustment is moderated by firm resources, past experience, industry and market conditions. We conduct our analysis using a longitudinal sample of Chinese firms listed on the ChiNext Board between 2009 and 2017. Our results indicate that underperforming firms increase their R&D intensity to a larger degree than their over-performing peers and periods when these firms have substantial cumulated R&D spending, abundant organizational slack, and are competing in more dynamic industries. We also document that these moderating factors influence relationships between social and historical aspirations and R&D investment decisions in a distinct way. We conclude that firm internal resources, capabilities and external industry and market conditions all affect firm expectations, and consequently shape the direction and magnitude of organizational actions in response to performance aspirations.

How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors?

We study changes in independent director behavior and labor-market outcomes after the experience of a forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. We find that independent directors are more willing to fire CEOs of underperforming firms, hire outside CEOs after a firing, and encourage better board-meeting attendance by fellow directors. We also find that the shareholders of poorly performing firms react positively when experienced directors join the board. It does come with a small cost for directors, in terms of additional directorships, although the cost is not as great as that for directors who do not fire the CEO of a poorly performing firm.

The role of entrepreneurial orientation and family control of the firm in the economic recovery of underperforming firms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyse how entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and the family control of the company influence the performance of underachieving firms and how they contribute to economic recovery. Design/methodology/approach The authors test the authors’ predictions on a unique and representative sample of 1,500 Spanish small firms in high and medium technology manufacturing and service industries. Given the nature of the dependent variable, the authors estimate a series of regression models to test the hypotheses. In addition, the authors consider two interaction terms where the underperforming firms’ variable is interacted with family firms and EO. Findings The results of analyses show that both EO and family ownership separately increase subsequent performance for underachieving firms. Originality/value The study contributes to expand the literature on underperforming firms analysing how strategic and structural factors affect the performance of firms that face an economic downturn. It also provides some guidance for practitioners on the decision and contexts that better serve the economic recovery of underperforming firms.

The Effects of the Financing Facilitation Act after the Global Financial Crisis: Has the Easing of Repayment Conditions Revived Underperforming Firms?

After the global financial crisis, the Japanese government enacted the Financing Facilitation Act in 2009 to help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that had fallen into unprofitable conditions. Under this law, when troubled debtors asked financial institutions to ease repayment conditions (e.g., extend repayment periods or bring down interest rates), the institution would have the obligation to meet such needs as best as possible. Afterward, the changing of loan conditions began to be utilized often in Japan as a means for supporting underperforming companies. Although many countries employed various countermeasures against the global financial crisis, the Financing Facilitation Act was unique to Japan. However, there is criticism that it did not become an opportunity for companies to substantially reform their businesses, and that there was a moral hazard on the company’s side. This paper analyses whether the easing of repayment conditions revived underperforming firms and who were likely to recover, by using the “Financial Field Study After the End of the Financing Facilitation Act”, carried out by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) in Oct 2014. We found that the act was successful in that about 60% of companies whose loan conditions were changed recovered their performance after the loan condition changed, and the attitude that financial institutions had towards support was an important factor in whether performance recovered or not. In sum, the act might be effectual when financial institutions properly support firms, although previous studies tend to emphasize its problems.

Institutional Monitoring Of Sticky CEO Compensation

This study examines the monitoring role of institutional investors in both mitigating the degree of downward-sticky CEO compensation and alleviating the undesirable effects of the sticky compensation on shareholder wealth. Particularly, we parallel the literature on “pay for performance” and institutional monitoring role to critically examine the measure of fluctuating pay-for-performance sensitivity, re-characterize the asymmetric compensation-performance link, and then capture managerial rent extraction. We find that sticky CEO compensation is significantly and negatively associated with firm value. Further, we find that institutional ownership decreases the compensation stickiness in underperforming firms and ameliorates its value-deteriorating effect.