The Use of Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) for Low-visibility Takeoffs in Part 121 Operations

Twelve Part 121 operations commercial-carrier crews completed low-visibility takeoffs at Memphis International Airport using an Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS). A 2x2x2x3 factorial design with runway visual range (RVR; 500 and 700 feet), runway edge lighting (high intensity or medium intensity) and two levels of EFVS (either captain’s head-up display only or with additional first officer’s head-down repeater) was used along with supplemental sample points and several baseline trials representing current-authorization conditions. Tasks included normal takeoffs, EFVS failure (both continue and reject trials), and engine failure (reject). There were no significant main effects of display or infrastructure in the main design (500, 700 RVR), and pilot performances in the experimental trials with EFVS were not markedly different from the baseline (current authorization) trials. All crews were able to stop the aircraft successfully on the runway during rejected takeoffs. Pilots uniformly believed they could successfully complete takeoffs or reject them in lower visibilities with EFVS as compared with using the head-up display without EFVS, which was sup-ported by observed performance.

Review and Implementation Analysis of Safety Management Systems in Aviation Design

In January of 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released an 80-page document outlining Safety Management Systems (SMS) for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers. This advisory circular provides a description of regulatory requirements, methods of development, and implementation of an SMS (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). The release of this document began a race to implement SMS across aviation. An all-encompassing Safety Management System currently does not apply to the manufacturing of airplane parts. This research will examine current safety management processes in place for applicants and holders of supplemental type certificates (STC). Upon review of current procedures, a model for an SMS will be created specific to supplemental type certificate applicants and holders. This SMS process created for STC holders will ultimately improve aviation safety. The FAA should mandate this framework for all applicants pursuing and holding a supplemental type certificate.