Review and Implementation Analysis of Safety Management Systems in Aviation Design

Author(s):  
Heidi C. Kim

In January of 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released an 80-page document outlining Safety Management Systems (SMS) for Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers. This advisory circular provides a description of regulatory requirements, methods of development, and implementation of an SMS (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). The release of this document began a race to implement SMS across aviation. An all-encompassing Safety Management System currently does not apply to the manufacturing of airplane parts. This research will examine current safety management processes in place for applicants and holders of supplemental type certificates (STC). Upon review of current procedures, a model for an SMS will be created specific to supplemental type certificate applicants and holders. This SMS process created for STC holders will ultimately improve aviation safety. The FAA should mandate this framework for all applicants pursuing and holding a supplemental type certificate.

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gráinne Murphy ◽  
Marina Efthymiou

Safety is at the heart of the aviation system, accident rates are on a steady downward trend with 2.1 accidents per million departures in 2016, representing the lowest annual aviation accident rate. It is predicted that globally the airline industry will grow, expecting 7.2 billion passengers to travel in 2035 (IATA, 2016). The airport domain is a complex socio technical environment where an airline receives a range of services and is the focal point for the convergence of ground activities, part of its role is creating the ‘safety picture’ and a ‘safety space’ for its industry customers to provide these services to aircraft operators. All operators (excluding ground-handling service providers) at European Union (EU) airports are regulated by European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations and now all have Safety Management Systems in place. Using Dublin Airport as a case study, the paper explores safety culture and safety challenges amongst operators in the multi stakeholder context of Dublin airport’s airside operations. In particular, the paper argues that (i) the attitudes of airport stakeholders on the effectiveness of Safety Management Systems were positive with good indicators of an engaged safety culture, (ii) operators strive for safe airport operations as well as achieving compliance operations and (iii) attitudes towards multi stakeholder safety management depend on the primary relationship held by each party. Finally, the paper recommends strategies to be adopted to enhance and improve multi stakeholder safety culture at Dublin Airport.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Yeun ◽  
Paul Bates ◽  
Patrick Murray

2019 ◽  
Vol 273 ◽  
pp. 02005
Author(s):  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Alistair Vardy ◽  
Steffen Kaspers

In the frame of an on-going 4-years research project, the Aviation Academy Safety Management Systems (AVAC-SMS) metric for the self-assessment of aviation Safety Management Systems (SMS) was designed based on the Safety Management Manual of the International Civil Aviation Organization and in cooperation with knowledge experts and aviation companies. The particular metric evaluates three areas, namely (1) the degree of institutionalisation of SMS (design and implementation of processes), (2) the extent of managers' capability to deliver the SMS processes, and (3) the employees' perceived effectiveness of the SMS-related deliverables. The metric concludes with a score per area and per SMS component/element assessed, and it is scalable to the size and complexity of each organisation. Results of a survey at 18 aviation companies did not show statistically significant differences in their SMS scores across all three assessment areas but revealed a distance between the area of Institutionalization and the areas of Capability and Effectiveness. Also, differences were detected regarding the scores per SMS component and element within and across companies and assessment areas. The various assessment options offered for the AVAC-SMS metric accommodates the resources each SME and large company can invest in the application of the metric. Even the lowest level of resolution of the SMS metric can trigger companies to investigate further their weaker areas and foster their SMS-related activities. Therefore, the AVAC-SMS metric is deemed useful to organisations that want to self-assess their SMS and proceed to comparisons amongst various functions and levels and/or over time.


AUP Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-57
Author(s):  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Selma Piric ◽  
Robert Jan de Boer ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Steffen Kaspers ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Kaspers ◽  
Nektarios Karanikas ◽  
Alfred Roelen ◽  
Selma Piric ◽  
Robbert van Aalst ◽  
...  

<p>A literature review, which was conducted during the research project “Measuring Safety in Aviation – Developing Metrics for Safety Management Systems”, identified several problems and challenges regarding safety performance metrics in aviation. The findings from this review were used to create a framework for interviewing 13 companies in order to explore how safety performance is measured in the industry. The results from the surveys showed a wide variety of approaches for assessing the level of safety. The companies encounter and/or recognise problematic areas in practice when implementing their safety management. The findings from the literature review are partially confirmed and it seems that the current ways of measuring safety performance are not as straight forward as it might be assumed. Further research is recommended to explore alternative methods for measuring aviation safety performance.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-42
Author(s):  
Lisa Whittaker

Improving safety was the goal when Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) was first introduced for the Boeing 747 in 1968. The goal was to develop a system of evaluation for scheduled maintenance by using decision logic. This was MSG-1. As theory evolved, MSG-2 brought process orientation and failure modes analysis. Then in 1978, United Airlines, commissioned by the Department of Defense, developed a methodology based on tested and proven airline practices. With that MSG-3 was born. MSG-3 is the current standard for risk management in aviation (McLoughlin, 2006). In 2006, ICAO released a new initiative known as Safety Management Systems (ICAO, SMM, 2006). All domains within aviation will be required to implement a safety management system that complies with ICAO’s guidelines set forth by member states within their own regulations. This is the SSP or State Safety Program. The goal is to provide support for continued evolution of a proactive strategy to improve safety performance (ICAO Safety Management, n.d.). Aviation safety is key, but it is certainly not a new goal. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two programs, MSG-3 and SMS. The study reveals similarities and differences of organizational structures and procedures required to carry out the programs. By identifying growth areas for expertise and personnel, this analysis may be of interest to those starting the journey into SMS.


Author(s):  
Stacie L. Fain

Several governmental entities: the Secretary of Transportation; the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and industry, aligned their resources to develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new approach to safety at airports in the United States (U.S.). NextGen places the responsibility for safety within airport management and changing the FAA's role from testing, inspecting, and certifying to approval and periodic audits of the Safety Management Systems (SMS) programs at U.S. airports. The purpose of the research was to determine, through a comprehensive literature review and evaluation, whether SMS will be used as the framework for U.S. airports to move safely into the year 2025. The researcher concluded that the vision for SMS implementation was well defined and the requirements fairly clear, but guidance and support for SMS implementation at U.S. airports are lacking.


2018 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-196
Author(s):  
Anna V. Chatzi

Purpose Most military aviation organisations today have not evolved their safety management approach towards harmonising with civil aviation. Safety culture is the base for any civil aviation organisation, enabling employees to communicate effectively and be fully aware and extrovert on safety. Just culture and reporting culture both are related to safety culture. Both are parts of the awareness process, enhancing safety promotion. These distinct elements and the safety management systems (SMS) can serve well the military aviation. This paper aims to present and discuss the SMS philosophy, structure and elements as a solution for military aviation organisations. Design/methodology/approach The feature of civil aviation SMSs are presented and discussed, with reference to the applicable frameworks and regulations governing the SMS operation. A discussion on the challenges faced within the military aviation organisations, with a brief examination of a European Union military aviation organisation, is presented. Findings The European Military Airworthiness Requirements, which are based on the European Aviation Safety Agency set of rules, can act the basis for establishing military aviation SMSs. A civil-based approach, blended, as necessary, with military culture is workable, as this is the case for many defence forces that have adopted such aviation safety systems. Originality/value This viewpoint paper discusses the opportunities and challenges associated with the adoption of SMS by military aviation organisations. This is the first time that this issue is openly discussed and presented to the wider aviation community, outside military aviation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toni Wäfler ◽  
Rahel Gugerli ◽  
Giulio Nisoli

We all aim for safe processes. However, providing safety is a complex endeavour. What is it that makes a process safe? And what is the contribution of humans? It is very common to consider humans a risk factor prone to errors. Therefore, we implement sophisticated safety management systems (SMS) in order to prevent potential "human failure". These SMS provide an impressive increase of safety. In safety science this approach is labelled "Safety-I", and it starts to be questioned because humans do not show failures only. On the contrary, they often actively contribute to safety, sometimes even by deviating from a procedure. This "Safety-II" perspective considers humans to be a "safety factor" as well because of their ability to adjust behaviour to the given situation. However, adaptability requires scope of action and this is where Safety-I and Safety-II contradict each other. While the former restricts freedom of action, the latter requires room for manoeuvring. Thus, the task of integrating the Safety-II perspective into SMS, which are traditionally Safety-I based, is difficult. This challenge was the main objective of our project. We discovered two methods that contribute to the quality of SMS by integrating Safety-II into SMS without jeopardizing the Safety-I approach.


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