Assessment Relativism and the Truth-Predicate

The purpose of this paper is to argue that assessment relativism entails the assessment-sensitivity of the sentential truth-predicate, but not of the propositional truth-predicate. The central idea of assessment relativism is that a single token claim evaluated within a single world can have different truth-values when considered in different contexts of assessment. John MacFarlane in Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications (2014) and also Max Kölbel in the article ‘Global relativism and self-refutation’ (2011) have argued that this position leads to relativism about the propositional truth-predicate. I argue that this is not the case—it entails relativism only about the sentential truth-predicate.

No matter who: What makes one a relativist?

As part of her argument that relativism and contextualism are nothing but notational variants of each other, Stojanovic holds that contextualism is flexible enough to achieve whatever relativism might do if the matter is what truth-value is assigned to each pair of sentence and context. In this paper, I reply to this statement by arguing that contextualism cannot be made as flexible as relativism without in fact turning it into a version of relativism. The key to my response to Stojanovic is that, while relativism relativizes utterance truth, contextualism does not, so parameters that are not fixed at the context of utterance will be accessible for the relativist, but not for the contextualist. Although the relativity of utterance truth follows as soon as propositional truth is relativized to contexts of assessment, as the relativist does, it is easy to lose sight of this fact if we identify the context of assessment with the assessor’s context. Hence, the point of this paper is that the difference between relativism and contextualism is not one as to whose parameters play a role in determining the sentence’s truth-value. If it were, contextualism could indeed be made just as flexible as relativism.

The Identity Theory of Propositional Truth in Dorion Cairns

Previously unpublished passages from the Cairns Nachlass are assembled and commented on to present the identity theory in contrast with the traditional coherence and correspondence theories, and then seven more detailed analyses of related aspects are also edited.To say that a syntactical object is true or is a fact, is to say that the act of intending it as having a perhaps indistinct structure and a perhaps obscure material content may unite in a positive synthesis of identification with an act wherein “the same” syntactical object is distinctly and clearly evident as having “the same” structure and content. The fulfilling act is eo ipso a grasping of the still grasped syntactical object as having been produced by a syntactical activity founded in original explication of the subject-matter. The realization of such a synthesis is a verification of the truth (and consistency) of the syntactical object, a verification of the “existence” of the fact (01710).Se reúnen y comentan pasajes inéditos del Nachlass de Cairns para presentar la teoría de la identidad en contraste con las tradicionales de la coherencia y la correspondencia, también se editan luego siete análisis más detallados de aspectos relacionados.Decir que un objeto sintáctico es cierto o es un hecho, es decir que el acto de mentarlo como teniendo una estructura tal vez confusa y un contenido material tal vez os-curo, puede unir en una síntesis positiva de identificación con un acto en el que "el mismo" objeto sintáctico es clara y evidentemente teniendo "la misma" estructura y contenido. El acto de cumplimiento es eo ipso un captación del objeto sintáctico todavía captado como habiendo sido producido por una actividad sintáctica fundada en explicación original de la materia. La realización de tal síntesis es una verificación de la verdad (y la consistencia) del objeto sintáctico, una verificación de la "existencia" del hecho (01710).

Similarities and differences between two Hungarian particles for also: szintén and is

The paper provides a comparative analysis of the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of two Hungarian particles with the same logical core meaning also: is and szintén. The analysis yields important theoretical implications since it demonstrates how two particles sharing the same logical-propositional/truth-functional core meaning can expand into two different markers. In discourse, is acts as an intensional/metacognitive pragmatic marker in the sense as proposed by Aijmer et al. (2006), while szintén functions as a coherence-signaling discourse marker. The two particles share certain syntactic-semantic properties: neither of them can be followed by a topic, they both have distributive meaning, and both of them can pertain to the noun phrase that they immediately follow, as well as to ordered n-tuples of noun phrases. However, there are also syntactic and pragmasemantic differences between them. Namely, their ordered n-tuples have different word orders; is can function as a pragmatic marker while szintén cannot; szintén can appear as a separate clause, while is cannot (this is presumably related to the fact that szintén can be stressed, while is is obligatorily unstressed); and finally, szintén can have a peculiar discourse-preserving function. We explain the syntactic differences between the two particles using the partial spell-out technique of minimalist generative syntacticians (first applied to Hungarian by Surányi 2009), and the Cinque-hierarchy-based approach to Hungarian sentence- and predicate-adverbials (Surányi 2008). We account for the pragmasemantic properties of the pragmatic-marker variant of is in the formal representational dynamic theory of interpretation called ReALIS, already presented in the LingBaW series (Alberti et al. 2016, Kleiber and Alberti 2017, Viszket et al. 2019).

A Naturalistic Perspective on Knowledge How: Grasping Truths in a Practical Way

For quite some time, cognitive science has offered philosophy an opportunity to address central problems with an arsenal of relevant theories and empirical data. However, even among those naturalistically inclined, it has been hard to find a universally accepted way to do so. In this article, we offer a case study of how cognitive-science input can elucidate an epistemological issue that has caused extensive debate. We explore Jason Stanley’s idea of the practical grasp of a propositional truth and present naturalistic arguments against his reductive approach to knowledge. We argue that a plausible interpretation of cognitive-science input concerning knowledge—even if one accepts that knowledge how is partly propositional—must involve an element of knowing how to act correctly upon the proposition; and this element of knowing how to act correctly cannot itself be propositional.

Shell nouns as grammatical metaphor revealing disparate construals: Investigating the differences between British English and China English based on a comparable corpus

This article describes a study of shell nouns (SNs) complemented by appositive that-clauses observed in a two-million-word corpus of media English by British and Chinese writers. The grammatical metaphor theory was applied to the data in the light of a novel proposal that the metaphorical forms of SN+that constructions, in their contextual semantic settings, serve to re-construe various transitivity processes. The study produced significant findings, including: (1) the two writer groups demonstrate significantly different preferences for SN types but the British and the Chinese uses are instantiated from a common core set; (2) the Chinese group prefers the re-construal of Identifying Relational processes of facts and evidence as markers of neutral and impersonal discourse; (3) British writers favour the re-construal of Verbal processes of assertion and stance and tend to re-construe Attributive Relational processes with varying degrees of commitment to the encapsulated propositional truth; (4) both groups are inclined towards the re-construal of Mental processes of cognition with a common preference for the re-construal of the experience of knowing, believing and thinking. The findings above lend important empirical support to systemic functional theories and suggest further research in the future regarding SNs as indicators of disparate construals in discourse.

Plato and Aristotle on Truth and Falsehood

The chapter starts off with an analysis of the pre-philosophical usage of truth terminology in ancient Greek, followed by a brief survey of some relevant conceptual developments in the pre-Socratic and Sophistic literature. This serves as a foil for the analysis of the various usages of truth terminology in Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology of “Forms.” Whereas truth is here conceived primarily as a quality of the objects of scientific knowledge, the chapter then also describes the development of a theory of falsehood and truth as qualities of assertions or beliefs in some of Plato’s late works. The section on Aristotle addresses his theory of the declarative sentence, his analysis of propositional truth and falsehood, his theory of the underlying “truth-making” relations, and his ontology of truth-makers. Finally, the chapter also discusses whether the approach we find in Aristotle should be classified as a correspondence theory of truth.

Methodists and Holiness

Nineteenth-century Britain saw the emergence of a variety of new Dissenting movements which cannot be regarded as belonging to older-established traditions. While some, such as the Brethren, have received considerable attention from historians, others are less well served; indeed, some have discouraged such investigation, partly because of their convictions regarding their divine origin. Consequently, an appreciation of them within their social and religious context has been difficult to achieve. This has been reinforced by the tendency to study such movements in isolation from one another. This chapter establishes where commonalities existed among these movements and between them and Dissent more generally. Those under review fall into several categories. Primitivists looked back to the New Testament as a golden age, from which all subsequent church history had been a decline. The Huntingtonians sought a restoration of a supposed New Testament pattern of spiritual experience. Other primitivists, who may also be called Restorationists, sought to re-establish a pattern of church life replicating that which they read off from the New Testament, or else reacted against such an approach on the basis that it was neither commanded nor possible. Another family of movements adopted a more pragmatic approach, since their primary concern was not the establishment of correct church order but effective evangelism and nurture. The chapter argues that there was a web of connections between these movements, and that they did not in fact develop in isolation from one another. While their pluriformity should not be understated, certain commonalities do emerge. All were suspicious of traditional theological learning. Most emphasized the need for personal conversion. Ecclesiologically, most believed in the sole authority of Scripture, the centrality of communion, the baptism of believers, plural unordained leadership, and often also the autonomy of local congregations; they also tended to be gathered churches. These movements usually began through secession from existing denominations, and this shaped their agenda. A tension felt by most lay between the call for separation from the world and the expression of the unity of all true believers; in several cases, the balance between purity and unity shifted over time. The way in which Scripture was seen as functioning in church life affected the extent and visibility of women’s involvement. Outreach was frequently directed at members of other denominations (who might be regarded as unconverted) as much as at the unchurched. While many of these movements appealed primarily to the working classes and the poor, some such as Brethren and Catholic Apostolics combined this with a middle-class element, and few were democratic in ethos. While there was often a cerebral element to their apologetic, most movements stressed the sovereign freedom of the Holy Spirit to act in and through members. Although their approach to Scripture as propositional truth and their sense of their own mission rendered them liable to division, they have remained a visible part of the British religious landscape to the present.