Beyond Legislative Veto Power: The Transformative Effects of the Early Warning System for Subsidiarity Control Ten Years Down the Line

The majority of European Union (EU) studies tend to be critical of the Early Warning System (EWS) for subsidiarity control, deeming it as ineffective in blocking unwanted EU legislation. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to identify and discuss several transformative effects of the EWS connected with the quality and democratic character of the EU governance, beyond the tool’s legislative veto power. A critical review of the EWS’ interpretations as an accountability mechanism, Europeanization engine, parliamentary autonomy enhancing tool, platform of politicization of Europe, as well as an instrument improving the Commission’s regulatory culture reveals that —although flawed by design— the modus operandi of the EWS has in fact contributed to reinforcing the input legitimacy of the EU. The argument is also made that the EWS should be viewed as a sort of ‘reality-check’ for the EU’s legislative moderation, thus enhancing the ‘perceived output legitimacy’ of the EU policy-making. The paper, however, concludes that although the positive effects of the EWS ought to be recognized and valued, the mechanism in its current form has exhausted its democratic potential and needs to be complemented with new forms of representative politics in EU affairs.

NARODNA SKUPŠTINA PO VIDOVDANSKOM USTAVU

The author gives his view of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of 1921, pointing out its importance at that time, but also its shortcomings. The choice of a centralist, unitary state system is recognized as one of the basic aspirations of the constitution-maker, that resulted in the king's dominant position as an integrative element, which made it impossible to establish (un)wanted balances between the king and parliament. In institutional terms, orleans parliamentarism is analyzed as an established type of parliamentary system of government, and also its functioning in practice. The author analyzed the constitutional position of the National assembly, emphasizing its weakness in relations with the king, explaining instruments such as the absolute legislative veto, through which the king exercised supremacy in the legislative sphere despite the constitutional proclamation to exercise legislative competence jointly. The unlimited right to dissolve the assembly, despite the undivided opinion of the constitutional theory on the prohibition of successive dissolution, further weakened the position of the National assembly, and established the king as an inviolable arbiter in resolving parliamentary crises, which may ultimately confront the people's will. The king's unrestricted right to dissolve parliament usurped the budgetary right of the National assembly, as one of the foundations of the parliamentary system, which further made it possible for the executive to rule without a budget. Constrained by the constitutional arrangement, insufficient representative functions, burdened by the democratic deficit, the National assembly proved to be weak in articulating various political interests, but was the scene of party and national tensions.

Legislative Processes Are Constitutional Questions

This chapter shows that even in private litigation cases, the federal judiciary is not always comfortable getting involved. There is a voluntary component to Congress's delegation of power and related changes in the legislative process that makes this area of litigation more complex than war powers. Here one sees there is no ideological or institutional rhythm to delegation of power and legislative process cases. Indeed, the federal courts are inconsistent in their interest in legislative process cases (the last delegation of legislative power cases were decided during the New Deal) and when they do enter these debates, such as the debate over the “legislative veto,” they get roundly criticized for it. The most obvious conclusion from the chapter is that judges appear to want some kind of toehold in the area of legislative processes and delegation of power without taking the full plunge regularly.

The politics of the executive, legislative veto players and foreign debt

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine a curvilinear effect of legislative constraints on foreign debt. Design/methodology/approach A cross-sectional, time-series data analysis of 68 developing countries during the period from 1981 to 1999 was performed. Findings Foreign borrowing is most likely to increase at both low and high levels of legislative constraints, while it is most likely to decrease at moderate levels. Originality/value The paper is a first-cut empirical analysis of a curvilinear relationship between legislative constraints and foreign debt.