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2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 49
Author(s):  
Muchtar A H Labetubun

Copyright as an exclusive right for the creator or copyright holder to carry out the results of his ideas or ideas in the form of specific information or certain. Basically, copyright is the right to copy, adapt or produce a work, copyright is possible for the right holder to limit the copying or in any form without the illegitimate permission of a work, it can be realized by registration copyright, in its application, of course, there are obstacles that exist in the enforcement of copyright law itself. One example is the lack of awareness in registration copyright of songs by the creator. The research objective was to determine and analyze the legal awareness of regional pop songwriters to register their copyright. The research method uses normative research through a conceptual approach and a statue approach. The results show that the composers of regional pop songs know the importance of recording copyright because it is in accordance with the mandate of Act No. 28 of 2014 concerning Copyright and has also participated in the socialization carried out by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, but songwriters do not record their work. Some songwriters consider that the registration is of no use because, from an economic standpoint, they cannot profit or lose personally, besides that their aspirations have not been fully channeled by the related institutions they shelter in this case the Collective Management Institute. Therefore to decide on the sale of the song's copyrighted work rather than registering it to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in the Field of Intellectual Property.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Loletta Darden

Should extant or expired copyright or patent designs (such as those featuring Mickey Mouse, Wonder Woman, and the Coca-Cola bottle) be eligible for trademark or trade dress protection? Or, should they enter the public domain upon expiration of the copyright or patent without regard for their source-indicating capacity? The law is in conflict on this question. Early Supreme Court precedent imposed a per se bar precluding trademark or trade dress protection for designs of extant or expired copyrights or patents. Yet, later Supreme Court and regional appellate court cases deviated from that precedent, creating conflicting jurisprudence and promoting marketplace conditions that undermine trademark law’s purpose and policy ofmaintaining a fair and ordered marketplace. Disallowing trademark protection for nonfunctional source-indicating designs because of their current or past copyright or patent status sets up the possibility for consumer confusion, deception, and fraud in the marketplace. This is precisely the type of marketplace disorder that trademark law is designed to prevent. This Article offers normative justifications for the eligibility of copyright or patent protected designs to receive overlapping and sequential trademark protection, as well as a path for resolving the conflicting jurisprudence. This Article addresses the conflict in overlapping intellectual property protections at the patent/trademark interface and the copyright/trademark interface. At the patent/trademark interface, the per se bar is unnecessary because trademark law’s functionality doctrine properly resolves the concerns with overlapping IP rights, asfunctional designs are categorically ineligible for trademark protection. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and regional appellate courts use different tests for assessing functionality, yielding inconsistent and conflicting results that are impractical in the new economy. This Article proposes a single functionality test that is more comprehensive than the plethora of existing and conflicting tests currently in use. The proposed test assesses a design’s use in relation to the product and the design’s function in a manner that is less conceptual and more specific to a particular application of the design. At the copyright/trademark interface, the per se bar is also unnecessary for two reasons. First, trademark law’s functionality doctrine resolves the conflict for useful articles. A modified version of the functionality test applied to useful articles precludes trademark-ineligible designs from protection. Second, for character designs and music, it is their specific use that would determine their eligibility for trademark protection. Therefore, the proposed use test would examine that specific use to determine whether the design is being used as a source indicator or as an unlawful attempt to extend copyright protection. The proposedtests at the patent/trademark and the copyright/trademark interfaces provide processes for identifying both functional designs and uses of character designs and music that would be ineligible for trademark protection, further demonstrating that a per se bar is unnecessary. Courts have attempted to ground their reasoning for the per se bar in the copyright and patent law policy that grants the public a right to exploit the subject matter of expired copyrights and patents. This Article posits that trademark law’s public policy for maintaining a fair and ordered marketplace preempts the per se bar’s public policy of a right to copy, rendering the bar inapplicable in the trademark context. There is a presumption running through current jurisprudence that trademark rights must yield to the public’s right to copy, but copyright and patent law are already deemed acceptable incursions on that right. The rules of statutory interpretation, as well as the natural law origin of the right to copy, debunk the presumption that trademark protection must be denied purely because of copyright or patent status. Since there is simply no basis in law or policy for a per se bar of trademark protection, the time has come for Congress or the Court to end the per se bar and resolve the conflict in jurisprudence. 


Author(s):  
S. V. Yunoshev ◽  
◽  
M. Yu. Zhirova ◽  

The paper considers the issue of the improvement of the defender’s procedural status in the current criminal procedure. The authors analyze the respective statements of the Statute of Criminal Procedure of 1864. The study states that one of the significant results of the Great judicial reform of Emperor Alexander II was the introduction of professional advocacy. However, the defender’s status established by the Statute distinguished itself by the unprecedented development, vesting a defender with powers absent in the previous legislation. The paper analyzes the particular procedural powers of a defender concerning an optimal model of their regulation. The study shows that, in general, the statements of the RF Code Criminal Procedure have moved so far forward compared to the similar Statute statements, especially concerning the access of a defender to the stage of a pre-trial investigation. However, it appears that to solve many problematic aspects of the current status of a defender, the experience of corresponding procedural regulation in the Statute can be a target to improve this status. In particular, the authors focus on the fact that, according to the Statute norms, a defender was less limited in the right to copy data and the materials of a criminal case. The study substantiates that a defender in the pre-revolutionary period had much more opportunities to offer evidence to a court; particularly, it concerned the proof of witness. According to the Statute statements, the parties were procedurally equal in the right to refer to special knowledge, which is absent in the current criminal procedure. The paper states that at the moment, the defender’s right to gather evidence has some significant gaps and limitations compared to the similar right during the term of the Statute.


Fundamina ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-287
Author(s):  
J Joel Baloyi

This contribution recounts the historical development and expansion of the reproduction right in copyright in response to, and as a result of, technological developments, with a focus on the music reproduction right. It is shown how the very first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was enacted in response to the effects of a technological development, namely the invention of the printing press, which had been experienced over some time. To safeguard the interests of rightsholders, the Statute of Anne gave rise to and was itself epitomised by the reproduction right (the right to copy or print). The uncertainty with regard to the question of whether the Statute of Anne applied only in respect of books and other literary works, or whether it also extended to musical works, was resolved in the case of Bach v Longman, which extended the application of the Statute to musical works. It was particularly in the area of musical works that the reproduction right was further developed in the wake of rapid technological developments that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and have continued into the digital age. This has led to the expansion of the music reproduction right into a multi-pronged right, covering usages made possible by the various technological developments, thus creating increased sources of income for rights-holders. Using a historical and contextual analysis, the contribution recounts these developments and their continuing relevance today.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-192
Author(s):  
Zhongfa Ma ◽  
◽  
Chi Zhang
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
L. Bently ◽  
B. Sherman ◽  
D. Gangjee ◽  
P. Johnson

This chapter is about the rights conferred by the law on copyright owners, and the scope of what determines the types of activity that amounts to copyright infringement. It begins by considering the right to copy the work, focusing on the issue of reproduction with respect to literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works as well as films, sound recordings, broadcasts, and typographical arrangements. It then looks at other rights granted to copyright owners, including distribution right; the right to rent and lend copies of the work; the right to perform the work in public; and the right to make an adaptation of the work.


Author(s):  
Connie Strittmatter

Emily Riha, Copyright Permissions Coordinator at the University of Minnesota, presented at the 2017 Kraemer Copyright Conference her experience when the process of securing copyright permissions moved from Printing Services to the University Libraries.


2016 ◽  
Vol 98 (03) ◽  
pp. 162-164
Author(s):  
P Smart

‘Talent is always conscious of its own abundance, and does not object to sharing.’ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle When authors submit an article for publication, most publishers will ask for a signature from the author on a copyright form. The relationship between an author and the publisher is then a partnership but one that many authors are reluctant to enter into. After all, why should a publisher take copyright from an author of an article when the author had the idea and has done all the hard work for the content of the article? In response to this question, publishers will generally claim that copyright transfer agreements protect authors from copyright infringements such as plagiarism, libel and unauthorised uses as well as protecting the integrity of the article. Copyright in the UK was originally concerned with preventing the unlawful copying of printed material in the 17th century in response to the then new technology of book printing. The first copyright act in the UK, the Statute of Anne in 1710, was subtitled ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning’, and granted privileges and monopolies to book printers. Since then, copyright law has evolved to incorporate many forms of communication, including photography, film, music, computers, engraving, designs on t-shirts and digital technology among other forms of media. The most recent act in the UK is the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. While copyright covers an author’s right to copy, distribute and revise the work, it does not protect ideas – just their fixation or expression. The moment that an idea is fixed or expressed physically, copyright starts and does not have to be registered. In this article, Pippa Smart provides an overview of the legal framework that protects authors and publishers. Jyoti Shah, Commissioning Editor


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