Autonomous Driving and Public Reason: a Rawlsian Approach

In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines (religions, philosophies, worldviews) within liberal democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate solution to the normative challenges of autonomous driving need not come at the expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the normative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework might be employed for this purpose.

Justice in Transactions: A Public Basis for Justifying Contract Law?

This paper challenges Peter Benson’s claim that his theory of justice in transactions can provide a public basis of justification in the Rawlsian sense specifically worked out for contract law. It argues that Benson’s distinct conception of the contracting parties and their relationships makes it an unlikely candidate for public justification in contemporary liberal democracies that are characterized by the fact of a reasonable pluralism of worldviews. Moreover, Benson’s method of deriving principles of contractual justice from existing contract law doctrines and principles risks pre-empting any critical potential for normative contract theory. In addition, its quasi universalism seems difficult to match with the political autonomy of citizens in democratic societies. Finally, Benson’s understanding of contract law as separate from politics appears at odds, not merely with Rawlsian political justice, but with the very idea of public justification.

Moral Reasoning in Military Medical Ethics

Applied ethics must resolve moral dilemmas, because, at the end of the day, medical personnel and military commanders must act. Reaching a defensible ethical decision requires moral agents to define the military and medical mission clearly and answer the following questions. Is the proposed operation or policy an effective and necessary means to attain the mission’s goals? Are the costs proportionate, keeping in mind that costs include military, medical, and moral costs? Finally, is the deliberative forum appropriate? Military medical ethics entails private (doctor-patient) and public discourse. Public discourse or deliberation engages the political community and its institutions. It requires widespread participation, well-reasoned arguments, reasonable pluralism, and, ultimately, responsive public policy.

La justicia como imparcialidad, progreso y perfección

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. Also I argue that it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice.

Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy.

Ethical Autonomy

This book examines the importance of personal autonomy for democratic citizenship and for good lives. It charts the evolution of autonomy and analyzes the proliferation of autonomy in free societies. The book pinpoints serious deficiencies in received ideals of autonomy for individual persons. It delivers an extended critique of personal autonomy, noting the excessive openness and lack of moral structure that personal autonomy provides. It elaborates an argument in favor of ethical autonomy, an alternative kind of autonomy that integrates individual self-rule with moral character. Ethical autonomy includes important restraints on an autonomous individual’s imagination, deliberation, and will. It supports central liberal commitments, it fits with reasonable pluralism, it enhances active and astute forms of democratic citizenship, and it is grounded in fundamental principles of liberty of conscience. This novel understanding enriches the values of freedom, toleration, respect, individual rights, limited government, and the rightful rule of law.