scholarly journals Autonomous Driving and Public Reason: a Rawlsian Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Brändle ◽  
Michael W. Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Autonomous Driving ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Acceptable Solution ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Reasonable Pluralism ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Trolley Cases

AbstractIn this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines (religions, philosophies, worldviews) within liberal democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate solution to the normative challenges of autonomous driving need not come at the expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the normative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework might be employed for this purpose.

Political Parties and the Overlapping Consensus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Creative Agency ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
The Common ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Political Liberal

This chapter rejects the ‘extrinsic’ view of public reason examined in Chapter 4, and argues that political parties can play an important role in helping citizens to relate their comprehensive doctrines to political liberal values and institutions. Once we understand the distinctive normative demands of partisanship, this chapter claims, we can see that there is no inherent tension between them and the demands of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This is because partisanship (unlike factionalism) involves a commitment to the common good rather than the sole advancement of merely partial interests, and this implies a commitment to public reasoning. The chapter further examines three distinctive empirical features of parties that particularly enable them to contribute to an overlapping consensus. These are their linkage function, their advancement of broad multi-issue political platforms, and their creative agency.

scholarly journals In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-level Principles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Juan Moreso ◽  
Chiara Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

AbstractThis article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism.

Autonomy and Responsibility in Hybrid Systems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wulf Loh ◽  
Janina Loh
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Systems ◽  
Hybrid System ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Autonomous Driving ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Driving System ◽  
Autonomous Cars ◽  
Self Driving Cars ◽  
Trolley Cases ◽  
Autonomous Driving System

In this chapter, we give a brief overview of the traditional notion of responsibility and introduce a concept of distributed responsibility within a responsibility network of engineers, driver, and autonomous driving system. In order to evaluate this concept, we explore the notion of man–machine hybrid systems with regard to self-driving cars and conclude that the unit comprising the car and the operator/driver consists of such a hybrid system that can assume a shared responsibility different from the responsibility of other actors in the responsibility network. Discussing certain moral dilemma situations that are structured much like trolley cases, we deduce that as long as there is something like a driver in autonomous cars as part of the hybrid system, she will have to bear the responsibility for making the morally relevant decisions that are not covered by traffic rules.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

scholarly journals Should we Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critical Analysis of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Melin
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
As Species ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Sentient Beings

AbstractMartha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is today one of the most influential theories of justice. In her earlier works on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum only applies it to humans, but in later works she extends the capabilities approach to include sentient animals. Contrary to Nussbaum’s own view, some scholars, for example, David Schlosberg, Teea Kortetmäki and Daniel L. Crescenzo, want to extend the capabilities approach even further to include collective entities, such as species and ecosystems. Though I think we have strong reasons for preserving ecosystems and species within the capabilities approach, there are several problems with ascribing capabilities to them, especially if we connect it with the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice. These problems are partly a consequence of the fact that an ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems needs to be based on an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines, in accordance with the framework of political liberalism on which the capabilities approach builds. First, the ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems presupposes the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the ascription of capabilities to ecosystems and species and the view that they are subjects of justice is justified by claiming that they have integrity and agency, but these characteristics have different meanings when applied to collective entities and humans, respectively. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice seems to require the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own, which differ from the interests of the sentient beings that are part of them. However, even if we do not ascribe capabilities to species and ecosystems and regard them as subjects of justice, there are still strong reasons to protect them within the capabilities approach, as the preservation of ecosystems and species is an important precondition for many human and animal capabilities.

scholarly journals Autonomous Driving: Framework for Pedestrian Intention Estimation in a Real World Scenario

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Morales Alvarez ◽  
Francisco Miguel Moreno ◽  
Oscar Sipele ◽  
Nikita Smirnov ◽  
Cristina Olaverri-Monreal
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Autonomous Driving ◽  
Intention Estimation

scholarly journals How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56
Author(s):  
Enrico Zoffoli
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly ?political? conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong?s own take on this point is more distinctively ?political? than Rawls?s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens? comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong?s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an ?overlapping consensus?) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong?s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls?s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the ?sincerity objection? and the ?liberal objection?.

scholarly journals CityLearn: Diverse Real-World Environments for Sample-Efficient Navigation Policy Learning

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marvin Chancán
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Autonomous Driving ◽  
Visual Navigation ◽  
Place Recognition ◽  
Visual Appearance ◽  
Learning Techniques ◽  
Benchmark Datasets ◽  
Image Representations ◽  
Visual Place Recognition ◽  
Self Motion

<div>Visual navigation tasks in real-world environments often require both self-motion and place recognition feedback. While deep reinforcement learning has shown success in solving these perception and decision-making problems in an end-to-end manner, these algorithms require large amounts of experience to learn navigation policies from high-dimensional data, which is generally impractical for real robots due to sample complexity. In this paper, we address these problems with two main contributions. We first leverage place recognition and deep learning techniques combined with goal destination feedback to generate compact, bimodal image representations that can then be used to effectively learn control policies from a small amount of experience. Second, we present an interactive framework, CityLearn, that enables for the first time training and deployment of navigation algorithms across city-sized, realistic environments with extreme visual appearance changes. CityLearn features more than 10 benchmark datasets, often used in visual place recognition and autonomous driving research, including over 100 recorded traversals across 60 cities around the world. We evaluate our approach on two CityLearn environments, training our navigation policy on a single traversal. Results show our method can be over 2 orders of magnitude faster than when using raw images, and can also generalize across extreme visual changes including day to night and summer to winter transitions.</div>

Religion in the EU: Using Modified Public Reason to Define European Human Rights

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1439-1468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian M. Awe
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Dialectical Process ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
The Eu

At the current stage of its evolution, the European Union (“Union” or “EU”) has reached a juncture where many leaders and scholars believe that greater integration is both desirable and necessary. Presumably, a primary method by which greater solidarity and integration can be achieved within the EU is through the public inclusion of common value-laden concepts – as defined through a dialectical process – present within comprehensive doctrines such as religion. To date, however, an effective and inclusive means for utilizing religion in this manner has yet to be formulated. In response, this article takes two prominent paradigms – Jurgen Habermas' intersubjective discourse theory and John Rawls' liberalism – to approach the problem and draws from them a new solution that, while tied to their theoretical underpinnings, is nonetheless a novel approach to achieving greater integration within the Union. Under this new framework, the process of legislatively defining human rights allows the morality common to European comprehensive doctrines – including official and unofficial religions – to bolster the Union's solidarity, legitimacy, and democracy both procedurally and substantively.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document