Applying Responsible Ownership to Advance SDGs and the ESG Framework, Resulting in the Issuance of Green Bonds

This study aimed to contribute to the strand of literature encompassing governance, sustainability, and stakeholder theory by addressing an inchoate element of responsible ownership: collective action by different stakeholders. Our study’s originality rests on the introduction of an ownership strategy as a governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership in order to implement the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) framework. Using a twofold empirical methodology—studying of archival data and qualitative case work—we provide empirical evidence from a case study of a Nordic energy company showing that applying an ownership strategy helped to strengthen the approach to SDGs and ESG while leading to positive benefits: in this case, the issuance of green bonds. Our theoretical contribution is the addressing of a gap in the literature exploring how an ownership strategy can be a uniting point for collective action, based on the hypothesis that an ownership strategy provides an important reinforcement of a “virtuous cycle”. Policymakers who are interested in promoting long-term commitment of different stakeholders with a focus on sustainability and improved agency should encourage the formulation of an ownership strategy that explains the owners’ commitment to the environment, social causes, and/or governance guidelines. Therein lies the practical contribution of this work. In this study, we found that an ownership strategy with these elements helped to strengthen the firm’s commitment to SDGs and ESG.

A fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of ownership strategy and acquisition performance in cross-border acquisitions

Based on a survey database of cross-border acquisitions by Chinese private firms, this study uses a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore the holistic impact of acquisition ownership, organizational factors and environmental factors on acquisition performance in cross-border acquisitions. It is found that the cross-border acquisitions taken by Chinese private enterprises have four kinds of acquisition ownership strategies leading to high acquisition performance under different internal and external conditions. This study points out that ownership strategy is a key decision affecting cross-border acquisition performance and provides a variety of paths leading to the same outcome rather than just finding the linear relationship between corporate activity and performance. This study supports the assumption of equivalence, and reveals a variety of scenarios in which cross-border acquisition ownership contributes to the outcome of high cross-border acquisition performance, and further confirms the view of causal asymmetry between condition and outcome. This study reveals whether the proportion of cross-border acquisition ownership affects cross-border acquisition performance and under what circumstances is conducive to the realization of expected cross-border acquisition performance.

THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON CORPORATE REAL ESTATE OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY

Although real estate resources represent a high percentage of the corporate assets of non-property companies, their future role is unclear. Longevity and difficulty in revising property-related decisions clash under dynamically changing environmental conditions. This makes it necessary to consider the ownership strategy and its altering role in order to avoid inefficiencies and not to hinder companies in mastering structural change successfully. In a first step, data from a telephone company survey (CATI) among 69 corporate real estate managers of German companies are grouped by performing a two-step cluster analysis according to the degree to which they are affected by structural change. The resulting clusters are then tested regarding differences in their ownership strategy. The empirical analysis shows that firms highly affected by structural change exhibit a higher willingness to decrease the proportion of ownership. The decline in real estate assets is particularly evident in the office segment and in increased acceptance of sale-and-rent-back solutions. First hints show that structural change and associated new business requirements change the relevance of CRE ownership. To avoid competitive disadvantages, especially European firms should scrutinize their high ownership ratios.

THE IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK QUALITY ON THE OWNERSHIP STRATEGY. EVIDENCE FROM EU FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AND CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is considered by scholars as a critical factor for economic growth and development. The recent economic crisis in the European Union (EU) has brought up again the discussion of the key drivers specific to the attraction of FDI. In addition to strict economic factor, the literature emphasises the role of institutions in a country as determinants in attracting FDI inflows. This study is one of the first to address the ownership strategy of multinational enterprises from the EU region undertaking FDI in former transitional economies in South (SEE) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE) using the concept of the quality of institutions. An analysis of the impact that the quality of market supporting institutions in determining ownership structure has of foreign affiliates in former transitional economies is attempted using an econometric model on institutional, regulatory, country specific and company level data based on a sample of 285 EU companies undertook FDI in 4 South and Central Eastern European countries during 1995-2015. We apply and advance the institution-based view of strategy by integrating it with resource-based and transaction cost considerations, incorporating three of the most important theoretical paradigms of international business studies.

Ownership strategy: A governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership

A new strand of corporate governance literature on ownership is developing the next generation of the concept of active ownership: responsible ownership. This paper aims to contribute to this strand of literature by addressing an inchoate element of responsible ownership: collective action by owners. We introduce an ownership strategy as a governance mechanism for collective action and responsible ownership and ask how an ownership strategy improves corporate governance. Using data from semi-structured interviews with owner representatives, board members, and non-executive insiders, together with observation and documentary analysis, we find support for the theoretical construction and an answer to the research question. Specifically, we find that the ownership strategy functions as a collaboration pact, which cultivates long-termism, and that the outcome is improved agency, i.e. that both the relationship between owners and directors and between directors and management is improved due to better alignment. The findings indicate that an ownership strategy establishes a much-needed long-term focus and commitment of owners while creating a sense of security and understanding among the members of the board of directors, i.e. that they are working with the will of their owners. As such, it suggests new avenues of research for corporate governance literature.

The Impact of Corruption Distance on Ownership Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs

The ownership strategy of foreign subsidiaries is an important decision for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Previous research has analyzed the effect of country dimensions on this strategy, both from the home and the host country. In this paper we delve into the effect of differences between home and host country on the MNEs’ ownership strategies. Empirically, we analyze the influence of corruption distance on the ownership strategies of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs, using data from 3,941 foreign subsidiaries. We found that the higher the absolute corruption distance between Spain (or Portugal) and the host country, the higher the ownership controlled by MNEs. However, when the host is more corrupt than the home country, MNEs have a lower ownership level in the local subsidiaries.