scholarly journals The Effect of Perceived Uncertainty on Competitive Behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Duncan Drewry ◽  
Zachary Reese
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
System Justification ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Ambiguity Tolerance ◽  
Just World ◽  
The Face ◽  
Sense Of Justice

How do people behave in the face of uncertainty? Some studies suggest that even when they are unaware of how others will behave, people default to cooperative behavior; however, other research suggests that uncertainty leads to more competitive behavior. Little research has examined how individual differences moderate such behavioral decisions. This study proposes that a stable (dispositional) sense of justice may, ironically, lead to more competitive behavior. Specifically, people who score highly in belief in a just world, system justification, and religiosity, and low in ambiguity tolerance may be more inclined to compete rather than cooperate because they believe people who experience positive outcomes deserve those outcomes regardless of the means taken to achieve them. Across two studies, participants (N = 288) engaged in a prisoner’s dilemma game — a task where they must choose to compete or cooperate — and completed the aforementioned individual difference measures. Results show that people tended to cooperate, but those high in system justification and belief in a just world were more likely to compete. In other words, people with a strong sense of cosmic justice were likely to exhibit competitive behavior under uncertain conditions. KEYWORDS: Ambiguity Tolerance; Competition; Cooperation; Just World Beliefs; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Prosocial Behavior; Religiosity; System Justification; Uncertainty

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

The prisoner’s dilemma in the workplace: how cooperative behavior of managers influence organizational performance and stress

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Spurný ◽  
Ivan Kopeček ◽  
Radek Ošlejšek ◽  
Jaromír Plhák ◽  
Francesco Caputo
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Performance ◽  
Stress Resistance ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Organizational Context ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Working Environment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Stress Levels ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The aim of the paper is to analyze the impact of cooperativeness of managers who occupy central positions in interaction networks on the performance and stress levels of a whole organization. Design/methodology/approach To explore this relationship, a multi-parameter agent-based model is proposed which implements the prisoner’s dilemma game approach on a scale-free network in the NetLogo environment. A description of the socioeconomic aspects and the key concepts implemented in the model is provided. Stability and correctness have been tested through a series of validation experiments, including sensitivity analysis. The source code is available for further exploration and testing. Findings The simulations revealed that improving the stress resistance of all employees moderately increases organizational performance. Analyzing managers’ roles showed that increasing only the stress resistance of managers does not account for significantly higher overall performance. However, a substantial increase in organizational performance and a decrease in stress levels are achieved when managers are unconditionally cooperative. This effect is stronger for the lowered stress resistance of employees. Therefore, the willingness of managers to cooperate under all circumstances can be a key factor in achieving better performance and building a more pleasant, stress-free working environment. Originality/value This paper aims to present a model for analyzing cooperation, specifically in the organizational context, extending the prisoner’s dilemma with novel concepts and mechanisms. Although the results confirm the existing theories about the importance of central nodes in complex networks, they also provide further details on how the cooperative behavior of central nodes (i.e. the managers) might benefit the organization.

The analysis of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game based on weighting effect

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150066
Author(s):  
Xinting Hu ◽  
Mengyun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Weighting Function ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Real ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Average Payoff

In this paper, an improved evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model is proposed by considering the weighting effect. Taking into account individual’s perceived payoff (benefits), the evolutionary tendency of the cooperators and three equilibrium points of the proposed model are obtained. We then numerically investigate how different exterior and interior factors influence on individuals’ cooperative behavior and their payoff both in the ER random network and the BA scale-free network. Our results reveal that the heterogeneous network structure is conducive to cooperation. In addition, the existence of leader nodes is an important driving force for promoting individuals’ cooperation. By further analyzing the rationality coefficient which appears in the weighting function, we obtain that a greater of irrationality could lead more people to take cooperative strategies. Finally, two indicators which are used to measure the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are defined. The results show that the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are larger in the heterogeneity network than that in homogeneous network.

scholarly journals Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-408
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Joseph Y Halpern
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Conflict Situations ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Equity And Efficiency

In the past few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when noncooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass call translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a deviation by one player in a normal-form game does not affect the strategies used by other players. However, a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game. The approach can also be extended to take into account a player’s concerns that his social group (or God) may observe his actions. This extension helps explain prosocial behavior in situations in which previous models of social behavior fail to make correct predictions (e.g. conflict situations and situations where there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency).

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS ON SPATIAL LOCALITY IN N-PERSON ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2003 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
REIJI SUZUKI ◽  
TAKAYA ARITA
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Spatial Locality ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of spatial locality on the evolution of cooperative behavior in the N-person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (N-IPD) by focusing on two essentially distinct factors: the scale of interaction (which decides the neighboring members playing the N-person games) and the scale of reproduction (which decides the neighboring candidates for an offspring in each cell). We conducted evolutionary experiments of strategies for one-dimensional N-IPD game with various settings of these two factors. Experimental results revealed that these two factors bring qualitatively different effects to the emergence of cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we investigated the dynamics of the evolution of spatial locality in N-IPD. When we introduced the evolution of the scale of interaction into our model, the dynamic evolution of the scale of interaction through generation facilitated the emergence of global cooperation when the scale of reproduction was relatively small. Experiments with the evolution of the scale of reproduction are also discussed.

On the Relationship between the Duration of an Encounter and the Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Individual Fitness ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Finite State ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of A Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_part_2) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest-competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

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