scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Research Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 175-248
Author(s):  
Alex John London
Keyword(s):  
Research Ethics ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Medical Professionals ◽  
Research Participants ◽  
Ethical Norms

This chapter reviews a series of arguments that purport to show that there is an inherent moral dilemma in research with humans and that this conflict produces a corresponding social dilemma, known as the prisoner’s dilemma. If these arguments are sound, it would show that dual requirements of the egalitarian research imperative outlined in chapter 4 cannot be satisfied in practice. This chapter argues that these arguments fail and that their intuitive force in this area is bolstered by two dogmas of research ethics: the claim that the ethical norms in this area derive from the role-related obligations of medical professionals and the claim that research is an inherently utilitarian undertaking. This chapter demonstrates that rejecting those dogmas creates a space for reconciling the production of socially valuable information with respect for research participants as free and equal.

Evolution of Conditional Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Seyhun Saral
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Psychological Mechanisms ◽  
Medium Level ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Initial Move ◽  
Evolutionary Success ◽  
Strategy Types

Conditional cooperation has been a common explanation for the observed cooperation, and its decline in social dilemma experiments. Numerous studies showed that most of the experimental subjects can be categorized into three types: conditional cooperators, self-maximizers and hump-shaped (triangle) cooperators. In this study, I investigate conditional strategy types and their role on the emergence of cooperation and their evolutionary success. For this purpose, I use an extension of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The agents are characterized by their initial move and their conditional responses to each level of cooperation. By using simulations, I estimate the likelihood of cooperation for different probability of continuations.I show that, when the continuation probability is sufficiently large, high levels cooperation is achieved. In this case, the most successful strategies are those who employ an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation, followed by perfect conditional cooperators. In intermediate levels of continuation probabilities, however, hump-shaped contributor types are the ones that are most likely to thrive, followed by imperfect conditional cooperators. Those agents cooperate in a medium level of cooperation within themselves and each other. The results explain the existence of hump-shaped type of cooperators with a purely payoff-based reasoning, as opposed to previous attempts to explain this strategy with psychological mechanisms.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of A Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_part_2) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest-competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

Prisoner's Dilemma Popularized: Game Theory and Ethical Progress

Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-304
Author(s):  
Peter Danielson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Science Writer ◽  
The Common ◽  
Zero Sum

Is game theory good for us? This may seem an odd question. In the strict sense, game theory—the axiomatic account of interaction between rational agents—is as morally neutral as arithmetic. But the popularization of game theory as a way of thinking about social interaction is far from neutral. Consider the contrast between characterizing bargaining over distribution as a “zero-sum society” and focussing on “win-win” cooperative solutions. These reflections bring us to the book under review, Prisoner's Dilemma, a popular introduction to game theory and its relation to ethics by the respected science writer William Poundstone. The book begins with a moral dilemma and ends by discussing the evolution of co-operation. Poundstone emphasizes—correctly, to my mind—the ethical potential of game theory. He concludes his first chapter with this striking claim: “Today's practitioners of game theory are attempting to forge a kind of ethical progress. Is there any way to promote the common good in a prisoner's dilemma? The attempt to answer this question is one of the great intellectual adventures of our time” (p. 9).

scholarly journals Oxytocin and vasopressin modulation of prisoner’s dilemma strategies

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 891-900
Author(s):  
Maria Leonor Neto ◽  
Marília Antunes ◽  
Manuel Lopes ◽  
Duarte Ferreira ◽  
James Rilling ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interactive Effects ◽  
Double Blind ◽  
Partner Type ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Partner Types ◽  
Social Decision Making

Background: The neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin have been repeatedly implicated in social decision making by enhancing social salience and, generally, cooperation. The iterated and sequential version of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a social dilemma paradigm eliciting strategies of cooperation versus competition. Aims: We aimed to characterise the role of PD players’ sex, game partner type (computer vs. human) and oxytocin or vasopressin inhalation on the player’s strategy preference. Methods: Participants (153 men; 151 women) were randomised to intranasal 24 IU oxytocin, 20 IU vasopressin or placebo, double-blind, and played the PD. We examined main and interactive effects of sex, drug and partner type on strategy preference. Results: We found a pervasive preference for a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e. general sensitivity to the partner’s choices) over unconditional cooperation, particularly when against a human rather than a computer partner. Oxytocin doubled this sensitivity in women (i.e. the preference for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation strategies) when playing against computers, which suggests a tendency to anthropomorphise them, and doubled women’s unconditional cooperation preference when playing against humans. Vasopressin doubled sensitivity to the partner’s previous choices (i.e. for tit-for-tat over unconditional cooperation) across sexes and partner types. Conclusions: These findings suggest that women may be more sensitive to oxytocin’s social effects of anthropomorphism of non-humans and of unconditional cooperation with humans, which may be consistent with evolutionary pressures for maternal care, and that vasopressin, irrespective of sex and partner type, may be generally sensitising humans to others’ behaviour.

Competitiveness and Conflict Behavior in Simulation of a Social Dilemma

2000 ◽  
Vol 86 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1219-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Houston ◽  
Judy Kinnie ◽  
Bernice Lupo ◽  
Christeine Terry ◽  
Sandy S. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Adult Students ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Social Cues ◽  
Conflict Behavior ◽  
Competitive Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Competitiveness Index

This experiment examined the competitive behavior in a seven-choice Prisoner's Dilemma game of 108 adult students (68 women, 40 men) classified as high, average, or low in competitiveness based on their scores on the Competitiveness Index. Participants were then presented one of three preprogrammed response conditions representing (1) Competitive, (2) De-escalating, or (3) Noncompetitive conflict behavior from a simulated opponent. Participants high in competitiveness engaged in more competitive behavior and reported higher satisfaction with the task than those low in competitiveness. As expected, the Competitive conditions elicited more competitive behavior than Noncompetitive conditions. The results suggest competitive individuals may be particularly susceptible to social cues that trigger competitive behavior.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document