The Sacred in the Everyday

An appreciation for the sacred, including a deep sense of reverence, awe, and solemnity concerning particular things and people, is expressed throughout the Analects in its discussion of a rich variety of experiences, virtues, and practices that are regarded as special, distinctive, or set apart from other things, and yet very much a part of our daily lives. This chapter focuses on everyday activities that are not directly or primarily related to spirits or spiritual entities or forces, but which are clearly sacred. It explores the virtues of ritual propriety and filial piety, the concept of de (“moral power”), and the virtues of humility and gratitude in the Analects. It goes on to examine the presentation of Kongzi as an exemplar in the text.

Good Dances Make Good Guests: Dance, Animation and Sovereign Assertion in ‘Amis Country, Taiwan

Within the context of official multiculturalism and the promotion of tourism to improve the economic prospects of Taiwanese Indigenous people, ritual dances of ‘Amis/Pangcah people, known as malikoda, have become sites of conflict concerning ritual propriety and performance. Although as participatory practices, malikoda can never be performed for an audience, they have served to mediate outside power, including but not limited to ancestral spirits and political figures. However, whether and how those outside ‘Amis communities can malikoda remains subject to debate. Malikoda animates a model of Indigenous sovereignty, which can flexibly incorporate external forces that impinge on ‘Amis communities. Yet, the felicity conditions for malikoda are unstable. To resolve this, ‘Amis people have relied upon a combination of heritage and local discourses that define the dance as an act of hospitality. Both types require the alignment of various actors, media and interpretations at multiple scales, often obviating interpretation. Thus, attention to malikoda highlights how Indigenous people engage with indigeneity as a cultural resource under multiculturalism and raises broader questions about the role of animation in sovereign assertion.

Beyond Respecting Mencius and Criticizing Xunzi: A Return to Equal Status for the Two Sages

Mencius 孟子 took Confucius’ idea of benevolence and, based on it, developed his theory that human nature is good. Xunzi 荀子 emphasized Confucius’ idea of ritual propriety and developed his theory that human nature is bad. This juxtaposition largely came to define their philosophies and their place in the history of Confucianism. Reconciling the two has been a point of contention ever since the Han dynasty. By the end of the Han dynasty, the scales had tipped in favor of Mencius, and this favoritism continued through the Six Dynasties era, the Tang and Song dynasties and beyond. As the Mencius became canonized, the Xunzi fell further out of favor with academics. Through all this, there have still been attempts to directly reconcile and even combine the two branches of Confucianism. This is an important cultural enterprise, which has gained new force in recent years. This article threads out some of the more important arguments in this continuing discussion and advocates for viewing the two branches with equal import and authority in the Confucian tradition.

Virtue, Skill, and Mastery

This chapter examines the early Confucian conception of virtuous mastery or expertise. It develops an account of early Confucian virtue theory, bolstered by sustained studies of ritual propriety and wisdom. It argues that virtues should be understood as forms of mastery that combine both skill and virtue. The chapter analyzes competing interpretations of Aristotle’s influential discussion of skill and virtue. It supports Russell and Annas, who accent the way Aristotelian virtues are like skills, or involve skill, against MacIntyre and others who find deep differences between skill and virtue. Virtue does not appear automatically, but is rather something people must practice to develop, and like other forms of mastery produces a spectrum of achievement.

Practice and Discourse: Ritual Vessels in a Fourth-Century BCE Chinese Tomb

Supposedly articulated by Confucius himself (ca. 551–ca. 479 BCE), this tightly knit political rhetoric provides a logical context for understanding the intrinsic relationship between qi (vessel, insignia, instrument) and li (ritual, rite, propriety), a central concern of Rujia 儒家—the School of Confucians—in the second half of the Eastern Zhou, from the fifth to third century BCE. The idea that vessels store essential ritual codes is stated more plainly in the Book of Rites: “The round and square food containers fu 簠 and gui 簋, the stand zu 俎, and the tall dish dou 豆, with their regulated forms and decoration, are the vessels (qi) embodying ritual propriety (li).” One of the major intellectual forces at the time, Rujia developed the notion of li on two fronts: as a principal concept in its political, moral, and aesthetic teachings, and as specific rules governing different kinds of ritual performances, including the use of ritual vessels and other ritual paraphernalia on special occasions. Accordingly li is applied to two major aspects of human lives: ceremonies and related practices; and social conventions—primarily those of law, human relations, and morality—that govern the working of society at large. These two aspects overlap. In the idealized society envisioned by Eastern Zhou Confucians, ceremonies and ritual vessels reflect and regulate human relationships and thus determine legal and moral standards. In this sense a bronze or pottery vessel can embody ritual codes and social principles. Whereas the Confucian theory of li has been a central subject in modern scholarship on traditional Chinese philosophy, the Confucian discourse on qi has received much less attention. To those who study Eastern Zhou material and visual culture, this lack is related to another overlooked issue concerning the relationship between discourses and practice: In what way were Confucian ritual writings, especially those on ritual vessels and procedures, connected to actual ritual performance? This question is not general but specific and historical because the predecessors of Rujia arose from ritual specialists, and many of its members carried on this profession in the late Eastern Zhou and even the Han. This is why Confucian ritual texts are often practical guides to conducting ritual affairs. How can we connect these writings to contemporary ritual objects, tombs, and other ritual structures found through archaeological excavations?

Decoding the Ambiguous Narrative Voice in the “Tale of Yingying”: Ritual Propriety as Key

Yuan Zhen’s “Tale of Yingying” has long been known for its ambiguous narrative voice. This article argues that what we perceive as a conflict in the narrative voice, did not exist for readers of the Tang dynasty (618-907). The tale was composed to emphasize the essential nature of ritual propriety for both men and women; both the male protagonist Zhang and the female character Yingying are targets of criticism. Unearthing the resonances and allusions of the discourse, and analyzing the social and political background of the mid-Tang, this study proposes that the tale may be read at two levels, using ritual propriety as key. From the literary point of view, this tale presents a regrettable love story, one that does not yield its fruit, due to the tide of passion – passion is the crucial element in romance, but in the end, it is also passion that drives the two lovers apart. From the didactic point of view, the author condemns Yingying not in self-justification, as those who support the autobiographical reading often presume, but because she is a fallen woman and a potentially dangerous femme fatale. Zhang is ridiculed for initiating the ritual transgression, and in failing to behave as a junzi (gentleman). This tale is an educational inquiry into self-cultivation and politics. By incorporating two points of view, that of Zhang and that of Yingying, the tale provokes reflection on the nature of romance and its possible effects on men and women, and ultimately, the indispensability of propriety.