Learning from the Early Confucians

The concluding chapter addresses what contemporary people might learn from the early Confucians about the study’s themes. It argues that moral autonomy is the core of personal autonomy, and that both require training and support to exercise. Furthermore, we should learn to embrace many forms of our dependence on each other as not only inevitable but usually also healthy and good, if society is reasonably well ordered. This has important implications for education, welfare policy, jobs policy, and other areas of government action. A contemporary quasi-Confucian approach to these issues would likely argue for “sufficientarian” government that actively supports family life and work, rather than negative liberty alone. We should also rethink narrow conceptions of expertise, and recognize the sort of generalized human mastery or virtue (autonomy in a broad sense) that directs and makes possible specialized forms of expertise.

Dreaming of a Meritocracy, Grappling with Reality

This chapter examines early Confucian political theory, and argues that they were well aware of both the potentials and pitfalls of politics. This is most visible in their prescriptions about the cultivation, discipline, and employment of elites for the greater benefit of society. Mèngzǐ and Xúnzǐ dreamed of a perfect meritocracy where the wise are recognized, given power, and rule benevolently, overseen and selected by a sage king. This vision led to the persistent utopianism that Metzger and Angle criticize in later Chinese political thought. But Mèngzǐ and Xúnzǐ were also vividly aware of the extreme difference between actual conditions and their meritocratic dream, and developed a number of thoughtful responses to the failures of existing politics. These ideas form a philosophy of elite cultivation and discipline that analyzes the “rule by people” necessary to complement and implement the “rule of law.”

Paradoxes of Freedom

This chapter examines modern Western objections to both authority and dependence, in both cases on the grounds that they threaten human autonomy, which implies that we should minimize both authority and dependence whenever possible. The chapter includes historical overviews of the modern Western “flight from authority” as well as the gradual fragmentation and transformation of notions of dependence on others. It examines Maine on status and contract, Berlin on liberty, and Mill and others on the dangers of paternalism. The chapter analyzes the concepts of authority and autonomy through an engagement with Raz’s “service conception of authority,” arguing that early Confucians have a generally similar approach to the nature and value of authority, albeit with some important differences, which avoid some common objections to Raz’s views. The chapter closes with an overview of the rest of the book.

Dependence, Autonomy, and the Varieties of Relationship

This chapter places master-student relations in the context of Confucian social theory, focusing on issues of obedience, remonstration, and respect for different sorts of authorities. It surveys Confucian accounts of the good society centered on role relations, personal development, and flourishing, both individual and communal. It then examines the question of autonomy within these relationships, looking closely at remonstration, obedience, and disobedience. It concludes with a broader discussion of human dependence, placing Confucian conceptions in dialogue with Kittay, Fineman, and MacIntyre. All three, like the Confucians, see dependency relations as central to human life and the problems of politics, in sharp contrast to most liberal views that imagine a social contract between autonomous, free, and equal individuals. Confucians view extreme dependence as a special case of the pervasive interdependence of all human beings on each other, with family relations serving in many respects as the model for other relations.

Early China and the Quest for Mastery

This chapter introduces early Chinese history, texts, and thought sufficiently to make the rest of the work intelligible to nonspecialists, and positions this study in relation to current debates in Chinese philosophy and the study of early China. The main argument is that we should stop seeing “China” as an inverted mirror image of the West, and let go of the enduring myth of Chinese and specifically Confucian authoritarianism. The chapter criticizes extreme versions of Confucian role ethics put forward by Ames and Rosemont, in favor of a Confucian relational self that possesses a conditioned form of autonomy, as advocated by Wong.

The Confucian Dào

This chapter explores Confucian practices, including archery, ritual, music, and poetry. It argues that the early Confucian Dào should be understood as a practice-centered tradition that shapes human relationships, character, and skills. Becoming good at these practices requires authoritative teachers, but their authority should not give contemporary people pause—the early Confucians took no vows of obedience, nor did they advocate ascetic renunciation. This chapter explores the three aspects of “the master”: a master practitioner of Confucian arts, an attractive exemplar of good living, and an effective guide for others. The Confucian Way forms a lifelong path, with distinct stages, that reflects a gradualist developmental paradigm, and makes family life central to good living. In sum, this chapter explores the reliance of students on their teachers, in order to suggest that it is salutary rather than deforming for both students and teachers.

Virtue, Skill, and Mastery

This chapter examines the early Confucian conception of virtuous mastery or expertise. It develops an account of early Confucian virtue theory, bolstered by sustained studies of ritual propriety and wisdom. It argues that virtues should be understood as forms of mastery that combine both skill and virtue. The chapter analyzes competing interpretations of Aristotle’s influential discussion of skill and virtue. It supports Russell and Annas, who accent the way Aristotelian virtues are like skills, or involve skill, against MacIntyre and others who find deep differences between skill and virtue. Virtue does not appear automatically, but is rather something people must practice to develop, and like other forms of mastery produces a spectrum of achievement.