ONE-OFF COMPENSATION TO FAMILY MEMBERS FOR AN ACCIDENT AT WORK OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

A one-off for family members in the event of the death of an insured person as a result of an accident at work or occupational disease shall be of an insurance nature. It is granted in the event of the death of an insured person who was covered by accident insurance. The benefit is paid by ZUS on the basis of a decision. It is paid from the accident fund, where the premiums paid for accident insurance are collected. In addition, the amount of the premium depends on the degree of risk of accident. The conditions for one-off compensation and its amount were structured in a schematic manner, since it was not necessary to determine the nature and size of the damage. Such rules for determining one-off compensation lead to simplification and scheme for compensation for damage. These features of compensation mean that the damage can be repaired in a limited manner. Accident compensation does little to meet the characteristics of civil law compensation. The extent to which the compensatory function of compensating for damage is to be carried out will depend on the type of damage and its extent, as well as on whether family members will be entitled to other accident benefits.

Prevalence and predictors of post-traumatic stress symptoms in 2200 hospitalised and non-hospitalised injured New Zealanders

Objective: Post-traumatic stress disorder following injuries unrelated to mass casualty events has received little research attention in New Zealand. Internationally, most studies investigating predictors of post-injury post-traumatic stress disorder focus on hospitalised patients although most survivors are not hospitalised. We compared the prevalence and predictors of symptoms suggestive of post-traumatic stress disorder 12 months following injury among hospitalised and non-hospitalised entitlement claimants in New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Corporation. This government-funded universal no-fault insurance scheme replaced tort-based compensation for injuries in 1974 since when civil litigation (which can bias post-traumatic stress disorder estimates) has been rare. Methods: A total of 2220 Accident Compensation Corporation claimants aged 18–64 years recruited to the Prospective Outcomes of Injury Study were interviewed at 12 months post-injury to identify symptoms suggestive of post-traumatic stress disorder using the Impact of Events Scale. Multivariable models examined the extent to which baseline sociodemographic, injury, health status and service interaction factors predicted the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms among hospitalised and non-hospitalised groups. Results: Symptoms suggestive of post-traumatic stress disorder were reported by 17% of hospitalised and 12% of non-hospitalised participants. Perceived threat to life at the time of the injury doubled this risk among hospitalised (adjusted relative risk: 2.0; 95% confidence interval: 1.2–3.2) and non-hospitalised (relative risk: 1.8; 95% confidence interval: 1.2–2.8) participants. Among hospitalised participants, other predictors included female gender, Pacific and ‘other’ minority ethnic groups, pre-injury depressive symptoms, financial insecurity and perceived inadequacies in healthcare interactions, specifically information and time to discuss problems. Among non-hospitalised survivors, predictors included smoking, hazardous drinking, assault and poor expectations of recovery. Conclusion: One in six hospitalised and one in eight non-hospitalised people reported post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms 12 months following injury. Perceived threat to life was a strong predictor of this risk in both groups. Identifying early predictors of post-traumatic stress disorder, regardless of whether the injury required hospitalisation, could help target tailored interventions that can reduce longer-term psychosocial morbidity.

Social Unemployment Insurance: A case (more or less) in favour

Budget 2021 announced a social unemployment insurance (SUI) system, to be developed in partnership with BusinessNZ and the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, and modelled on the accident compensation (ACC) scheme. This new policy addresses the needs of workers involuntarily laid off as industries restructure and seek new skills. This article considers concerns raised about the SUI proposal, drawing comparisons with the ACC experience. While SUI would perpetuate market income inequalities and may not do much to prevent poverty, it could also reduce other sources of inconsistency and disadvantage.

Entitlement to cover for chronic pain syndrome under the Accident Compensation Scheme

<p>Sufferers of primary chronic pain syndrome are not currently entitled to cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme. The Supreme Court decision in Allenby v H, which adopted a wider interpretation of the term "physical injury", presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider whether chronic pain syndrome should constitute an injury. Policy factors, particularly the need to uphold the integrity of the legislation enacted by Parliament, demand that the status quo exclusion of chronic pain syndrome is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies this position is recommended.</p>

Entitlement to cover for chronic pain syndrome under the Accident Compensation Scheme

<p>Sufferers of primary chronic pain syndrome are not currently entitled to cover from New Zealand's Accident Compensation scheme. The Supreme Court decision in Allenby v H, which adopted a wider interpretation of the term "physical injury", presents an opportunity for the courts to reconsider whether chronic pain syndrome should constitute an injury. Policy factors, particularly the need to uphold the integrity of the legislation enacted by Parliament, demand that the status quo exclusion of chronic pain syndrome is maintained. A legislative amendment which clarifies this position is recommended.</p>

A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury Cover in Accident Compensation

<p>New Zealand’s accident compensation system is ‘no-fault’, meaning that New Zealanders are compensated for their injuries whether or not they can find someone to blame for their misfortune. However, until 2005, claimants injured while receiving medical treatment had to show either that their injuries were caused by negligence, or that their injuries were both rare and severe. The negligence standard was taken from tort law, and required the claimant to show that the injury was a registered health professional’s fault. This fault requirement created many of the problems that tort law had in the past: it was inefficient, arbitrary, and created a blaming culture that bred hostility between the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), the injured, and health professionals. In 2004, ACC published a review of the medical misadventure provisions, calling for them to be replaced by no-fault compensation provisions in line with the spirit and content of the rest of the accident compensation scheme. In 2005, medical misadventure became treatment injury, and both application and acceptance rates rose for claims concerning injuries received during medical treatment. However, the treatment injury provisions still contained fault elements, despite the legislature’s claim that the provisions were no-fault. In this paper, I will address the role of fault in a compensation scheme for those injured during medical treatment. First, I will define fault in its tort law context and outline some strengths and weaknesses of fault as a legal concept. Then, I will provide a short overview of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, the medical misadventure provisions, the push for reform, and the structure of the treatment injury provisions. This will give background to an in-depth discussion of the treatment injury provisions’ incorporation of fault standards. Also relevant to this discussion is the accident compensation scheme’s reporting mechanism, which potentially complicates ACC’s role as purely an injury compensating, preventing and rehabilitating body. Finally, it is necessary to consider whether compensation itself is inherently fault-based, an argument raised by some commentators. My conclusion is that some aspects of the treatment injury provisions still use fault to determine cover in some situations. The provisions give particular weight to the fault of the claimant in causing her own injury. This use of fault standards can be removed from the treatment injury provisions with some minor amendments, which are set out at the end of this paper.</p>

A Truly No-Fault Approach to Treatment Injury Cover in Accident Compensation

<p>New Zealand’s accident compensation system is ‘no-fault’, meaning that New Zealanders are compensated for their injuries whether or not they can find someone to blame for their misfortune. However, until 2005, claimants injured while receiving medical treatment had to show either that their injuries were caused by negligence, or that their injuries were both rare and severe. The negligence standard was taken from tort law, and required the claimant to show that the injury was a registered health professional’s fault. This fault requirement created many of the problems that tort law had in the past: it was inefficient, arbitrary, and created a blaming culture that bred hostility between the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), the injured, and health professionals. In 2004, ACC published a review of the medical misadventure provisions, calling for them to be replaced by no-fault compensation provisions in line with the spirit and content of the rest of the accident compensation scheme. In 2005, medical misadventure became treatment injury, and both application and acceptance rates rose for claims concerning injuries received during medical treatment. However, the treatment injury provisions still contained fault elements, despite the legislature’s claim that the provisions were no-fault. In this paper, I will address the role of fault in a compensation scheme for those injured during medical treatment. First, I will define fault in its tort law context and outline some strengths and weaknesses of fault as a legal concept. Then, I will provide a short overview of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme, the medical misadventure provisions, the push for reform, and the structure of the treatment injury provisions. This will give background to an in-depth discussion of the treatment injury provisions’ incorporation of fault standards. Also relevant to this discussion is the accident compensation scheme’s reporting mechanism, which potentially complicates ACC’s role as purely an injury compensating, preventing and rehabilitating body. Finally, it is necessary to consider whether compensation itself is inherently fault-based, an argument raised by some commentators. My conclusion is that some aspects of the treatment injury provisions still use fault to determine cover in some situations. The provisions give particular weight to the fault of the claimant in causing her own injury. This use of fault standards can be removed from the treatment injury provisions with some minor amendments, which are set out at the end of this paper.</p>

Vindicatory Damages in the Child Welfare Tort Cases

<p>This thesis argues that vindicatory damages should be available in the child welfare tort cases against public authorities. These are cases in which the plaintiffs sue public authorities either for not protecting them from harm when they were children, or where it is alleged that the authority’s employees abused the children while in its care. Vindicatory damages would be intended to mark the wrong to the plaintiff, rather than attempting to compensate the consequences. This thesis argues in support of the availability of a separate head of vindicatory damages in tort law, including negligence, and explores some of the liability issues which arise in these cases, including vicarious liability, liability for omissions and liability in negligence for the way in which a statutory power is exercised or for a breach of a statutory duty. New Zealand's accident compensation scheme is also discussed: it is argued that vindicatory damages in tort law should not be barred by the scheme.</p>

Vindicatory Damages in the Child Welfare Tort Cases

<p>This thesis argues that vindicatory damages should be available in the child welfare tort cases against public authorities. These are cases in which the plaintiffs sue public authorities either for not protecting them from harm when they were children, or where it is alleged that the authority’s employees abused the children while in its care. Vindicatory damages would be intended to mark the wrong to the plaintiff, rather than attempting to compensate the consequences. This thesis argues in support of the availability of a separate head of vindicatory damages in tort law, including negligence, and explores some of the liability issues which arise in these cases, including vicarious liability, liability for omissions and liability in negligence for the way in which a statutory power is exercised or for a breach of a statutory duty. New Zealand's accident compensation scheme is also discussed: it is argued that vindicatory damages in tort law should not be barred by the scheme.</p>

Accident Compensation in Swiss and New Zealand Law: Some Selected Issues That Undermine the Purpose in Both Schemes

<p>This dissertation analyses selected issues that undermine the coherence and the purposes of the Swiss and New Zealand accident compensation schemes. Unlike other European states the Swiss accident compensation provides cover for non-work related accidental injury, which makes it a useful subject of comparison with the New Zealand accident compensation scheme which provides a comprehensive, no fault compensation scheme for personal injury. In undertaking a largely comparative approach the paper argues that both schemes have drifted away considerably from the original underlying purpose to provide compensation for work incapacity and, on the other hand, to restore the claimant to a level of work capacity as soon as possible. This thesis is illustrated by examining the vulnerability of the schemes to political change, the arbitrary dichotomy between incapacity to work caused by accidental injury and incapacity caused by sickness, the definitions of an accident in both schemes and the assessment of evidence. The paper finds that both schemes should be amended and suggests alternative approaches for each issue.</p>