Emotions as Abstract Evaluation Criteria in Biological and Artificial Intelligences

Biological as well as advanced artificial intelligences (AIs) need to decide which goals to pursue. We review nature's solution to the time allocation problem, which is based on a continuously readjusted categorical weighting mechanism we experience introspectively as emotions. One observes phylogenetically that the available number of emotional states increases hand in hand with the cognitive capabilities of animals and that raising levels of intelligence entail ever larger sets of behavioral options. Our ability to experience a multitude of potentially conflicting feelings is in this view not a leftover of a more primitive heritage, but a generic mechanism for attributing values to behavioral options that can not be specified at birth. In this view, emotions are essential for understanding the mind. For concreteness, we propose and discuss a framework which mimics emotions on a functional level. Based on time allocation via emotional stationarity (TAES), emotions are implemented as abstract criteria, such as satisfaction, challenge and boredom, which serve to evaluate activities that have been carried out. The resulting timeline of experienced emotions is compared with the “character” of the agent, which is defined in terms of a preferred distribution of emotional states. The long-term goal of the agent, to align experience with character, is achieved by optimizing the frequency for selecting individual tasks. Upon optimization, the statistics of emotion experience becomes stationary.

The effects of subliminal or supraliminal sadness induction on the sense of body ownership and the role of dissociative symptoms

Previous research has shown that emotions can alter our sense of ownership. Whether this relationship is modulated by differences in emotion experience and awareness, however, remains unclear. We investigated this by comparing the susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion (RHI) between participants who were either exposed to a low-arousing emotion induction (sadness) or placed in a neutral control group. Several factors that might influence this relationship were considered: dissociative symptoms were included to observe if a sadness induction led to a higher RHI score in participants scoring high in dissociation, as a result of detached emotion experience. Whether the level of awareness of the emotion mattered was also tested, as subliminal processing was shown to require less focal attention. Therefore, our sample (N = 122) was divided into three experimental groups: Sad pictures were presented to two of the three groups differing in presentation mode (subliminal: n = 40, supraliminal: n = 41), neutral pictures were presented supraliminally to the control group (n = 41). Additionally, the effects of slow (3 cm/s) and fast (30 cm/s) stroking, applied either synchronously or asynchronously, were examined as the comforting effects of stroking might interfere with the emotion induction. Results showed that the supraliminal sadness induction was associated with a stronger subjective illusion, but not with a higher proprioceptive drift compared to the subliminal induction. In addition, a stronger subjective illusion after fast and synchronous stroking was found compared to slow and asynchronous stroking. A significant proprioceptive drift was detected independent of group and stroking style. Both slow and synchronous stroking were perceived as more comforting than their respective counterparts. Participants with higher dissociative symptoms were more susceptible to the subjective illusion, especially in the supraliminal group in the synchronous condition. We concluded that individual differences in emotion experience are likely to play a role in body ownership. However, we cannot clarify at this stage whether differences in proprioception and the subjective illusion depend on the type of emotion experienced (e.g. different levels of arousal) and on concomitant changes in multisensory integration processes.

Emotion Experience and Expression Goals Shape Emotion Regulation Strategy Choice

Research has begun to investigate how goals for emotion experience—how people want to feel—influence the selection of emotion regulation strategies to achieve these goals. We make the case that it is not only how people want to feel that affects strategy selection, but also how they want to be seen to feel. Incorporating this expressive dimension distinguishes four unique emotion goals: (1) to experience and express emotion; (2) to experience but not express emotion; (3) to express but not experience emotion; and (4) to neither experience nor express emotion. In six experiments, we investigated whether these goals influenced choices between six common emotion regulation strategies. Rumination and amplification were selected most often to meet Goal 1—to experience and express emotion. Expressive suppression was chosen most often to meet Goal 2—to experience but not express emotion. Amplification was chosen most often to meet Goal 3—to express but not experience emotion. Finally, distraction was chosen most often to meet Goal 4—to neither experience nor express emotion. Despite not being chosen most for any specific goal, reappraisal was the most commonly selected strategy overall. Our findings introduce a new concept to the emotion goals literature and reveal new insights into the process of emotion regulation strategy selection.

Communicating emotion through facial expressions: Social consequences and neural correlates

Individuals modulate their facial emotion expressions in the presence of other people. Does this social tuning reflect changes in emotional experiences or attempts to communicate emotions to others? Here, “target” participants underwent facial electromyography (EMG) recording while viewing emotion-inducing images, believing they were either visible or not visible to “observer” participants. In Study 1, when targets believed they were visible, they produced greater EMG activity and were more accurately perceived by observers, but did not report accompanying changes in their emotion experience. In Study 2, simultaneous facial EMG recording and fMRI scanning revealed that social tuning of targets’ facial expressions correlated with activity in brain structures associated with mentalizing. These findings speak to long-standing, competing accounts of emotion expression, and suggest that individuals actively tune their facial expressions in social settings to communicate their experiences to others.

Emotions Across Cultures

What can evolutionary theories tell us about emotions, and how can research on emotions inform evolutionary theories? In this chapter, we discuss links between evolutionary theories of emotion and the cross-cultural study of emotion. We examine what predictions can be derived from evolutionary theories about cross-cultural consistency and variability. In particular, we emphasise the notion that evolved psychological mechanisms result in cultural differences instantiated as variations on common themes of human universals. We focus on two components of emotions: emotion experience and nonverbal expressions. Several case studies from emotion science are outlined to illustrate this framework empirically. In the domain of emotion experience, we highlight shame as an illustration of the idea of variations occurring across cultures around a common theme. In the domain of nonverbal expression of emotion, this idea is illustrated by the in-group advantage, that is, superior recognition of emotional expressions produced by members of one's own group. We consider both statistical learning and motivational explanations for this phenomenon in light of evolutionary perspectives. Lastly, we review three different theoretical accounts of how to conceptualise cross-culturally shared themes underlying emotions. We conclude that the cross-cultural study of consistency and variation in different emotion components offers a valuable opportunity for testing predictions derived from evolutionary psychology.