Humanitarian effectiveness in complex emergencies: South Sudan and Darfur

<p>My Master‟s Thesis explores the extent to which the international community has established processes of evaluation and learning that are improving humanitarian responses to complex humanitarian emergencies over time. It does so by reviewing a range of existing evaluations of successive crises in the former Sudan, with particular emphasis on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and Darfur. I assert that by addressing the shortcomings of past humanitarian operations and learning from them, the international community can improve the effectiveness of future humanitarian responses. OLS, which was the first multilateral humanitarian operation after the end of the Cold War and which is perceived as one of the biggest failures in humanitarian aid history, will be used as a starting point. Consequently, I used the case of Darfur in order to answer the following research questions: How has humanitarian effectiveness evolved in the former Sudan since the launch of OLS? Have lessons been learned from the failures of OLS? To answer these questions, I applied the UN OCHA-proposed Elements of Effectiveness as a framework, namely: performance, accountability, coordination, contextualization, principles and standards, relevance, participation, capacity, resilience and preparedness, innovation, and access. The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part (chapter 2) explains how humanitarian aid has evolved after the end of the Cold War in regard to complex emergencies, and why the international community has felt the need for evaluating and improving humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters three and four critically analyse humanitarian effectiveness in the former Sudan, during OLS and in Darfur, respectively, in order to demonstrate how ineffective humanitarian aid has been and how little has changed in the international response, despite the fact that the former Sudan has been one of the largest recipients of humanitarian aid since the end of the Cold War. I argue that humanitarian aid has generally been seen as a failure since the end of the Cold War, and that evaluating humanitarian effectiveness is necessary for the improvement of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, complex emergencies are inherently political and require addressing their underlying socio-economic causes. Therefore, humanitarian aid cannot be solely blamed for the overall failures of international interventions, as it only exists alongside of crises and it is limited to saving lives, alleviating suffering of affected populations, and maintaining their human dignity. International actors mostly failed to address political problems of crises in the aftermath of the Cold War and humanitarian aid was used as the only response. When the crisis in Darfur broke out, the international community had more than ten years of experience in responding to complex emergencies. Yet, it again failed to respond effectively and repeated many of the mistakes of OLS. Major weaknesses of both operations were, apart from lacking political response, also problems associated with accessibility and lacking coordination and cooperation between humanitarian agencies. Although some improvements have been finally made in terms of humanitarian effectiveness in the past decade, there are still major problems in the humanitarian sector, such as insufficient funding mechanisms and inability of the UN to resolve prolonged crises on a political level. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is still characterised by a lack of data. Therefore, I assert that it is important to develop better standards for humanitarian response based on reflections on past operations. The Elements of Effectiveness give the impression of a useful starting point for developing such standards. Unified standards for monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian operations on an on-going basis will enable the international community to learn from past mistakes and to effectively fulfil the primary objectives of humanitarian aid.</p>

Humanitarian effectiveness in complex emergencies: South Sudan and Darfur

<p>My Master‟s Thesis explores the extent to which the international community has established processes of evaluation and learning that are improving humanitarian responses to complex humanitarian emergencies over time. It does so by reviewing a range of existing evaluations of successive crises in the former Sudan, with particular emphasis on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and Darfur. I assert that by addressing the shortcomings of past humanitarian operations and learning from them, the international community can improve the effectiveness of future humanitarian responses. OLS, which was the first multilateral humanitarian operation after the end of the Cold War and which is perceived as one of the biggest failures in humanitarian aid history, will be used as a starting point. Consequently, I used the case of Darfur in order to answer the following research questions: How has humanitarian effectiveness evolved in the former Sudan since the launch of OLS? Have lessons been learned from the failures of OLS? To answer these questions, I applied the UN OCHA-proposed Elements of Effectiveness as a framework, namely: performance, accountability, coordination, contextualization, principles and standards, relevance, participation, capacity, resilience and preparedness, innovation, and access. The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part (chapter 2) explains how humanitarian aid has evolved after the end of the Cold War in regard to complex emergencies, and why the international community has felt the need for evaluating and improving humanitarian effectiveness. Chapters three and four critically analyse humanitarian effectiveness in the former Sudan, during OLS and in Darfur, respectively, in order to demonstrate how ineffective humanitarian aid has been and how little has changed in the international response, despite the fact that the former Sudan has been one of the largest recipients of humanitarian aid since the end of the Cold War. I argue that humanitarian aid has generally been seen as a failure since the end of the Cold War, and that evaluating humanitarian effectiveness is necessary for the improvement of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, complex emergencies are inherently political and require addressing their underlying socio-economic causes. Therefore, humanitarian aid cannot be solely blamed for the overall failures of international interventions, as it only exists alongside of crises and it is limited to saving lives, alleviating suffering of affected populations, and maintaining their human dignity. International actors mostly failed to address political problems of crises in the aftermath of the Cold War and humanitarian aid was used as the only response. When the crisis in Darfur broke out, the international community had more than ten years of experience in responding to complex emergencies. Yet, it again failed to respond effectively and repeated many of the mistakes of OLS. Major weaknesses of both operations were, apart from lacking political response, also problems associated with accessibility and lacking coordination and cooperation between humanitarian agencies. Although some improvements have been finally made in terms of humanitarian effectiveness in the past decade, there are still major problems in the humanitarian sector, such as insufficient funding mechanisms and inability of the UN to resolve prolonged crises on a political level. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is still characterised by a lack of data. Therefore, I assert that it is important to develop better standards for humanitarian response based on reflections on past operations. The Elements of Effectiveness give the impression of a useful starting point for developing such standards. Unified standards for monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian operations on an on-going basis will enable the international community to learn from past mistakes and to effectively fulfil the primary objectives of humanitarian aid.</p>

Central Asian Women as Agents of Political Violence in the Islamic State

The investigation, charge, prosecution, and rehabilitation of female terrorists is a controversial subject because patriarchal values widely drive the context of jihadi violence. Thousands of women made their way from over 80 countries worldwide to the Islamic State realms in Syria and Iraq, with Central Asia accounting for 20 per cent of this migration. As the forces of ISIS were retreating – and even before – Central Asian countries were keen to repatriate women and children from Syria and Iraq. In contrast to Western Europe, public opinion was supportive of these humanitarian operations. This study is informed by the debriefing of approximately fifty of these women, in a context in which they have already faced the legal repercussions for “joining” the ranks of ISIS. The women interviewed hail from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; it is clear women left an overwhelmingly patriarchal context to find a dehumanisingly misogynistic jihadi society. Their agency as second-class ISIS “citizens” needs to be systematically explored to inform effective counterterrorism strategy, be it profiling, legislation, preemptive intervention and rehabilitation policies.

How Lean transforms relationships to empower employees and increase impact

The challenges of humanitarian leadership are well-studied by the social sciences. However, there is untapped potential in applying private sector management principles and best practices to humanitarian work. Some non- profit organisations have fruitful experience applying Lean Management, an innovative management system developed by Toyota, which is not just about manufacturing better cars or improving industrial processes. Lean focuses the organisation on providing more value to its customers which, in the case of the humanitarian sector, are its beneficiaries. Our panel shared their experience of using Lean Management to address common issues in humanitarian operations. Their stories demonstrate the potential of Lean to transform work and relationships by devolving power to lower-level workers and partners. By empowering staff and local entities, it also improves relationships, collaboration, and ultimately the outcomes of humanitarian missions.

Screening of final beneficiaries – a red line in humanitarian operations. An emerging concern in development work

Funding agreements for humanitarian action frequently include restrictions and requirements in their grants that aim to ensure that recipients of the funding comply with counterterrorism measures and sanctions adopted by the donor. These measures can be problematic if they prevent humanitarian actors from operating in accordance with humanitarian principles or are incompatible with international humanitarian law. While attention has focused primarily on requirements in grants for humanitarian action, increasingly donors to development work have also started including sanctions- and counterterrorism-related restrictions in their grants. The present article focuses on one such measure that is currently a live concern: requirements to screen and, thus, potentially exclude final beneficiaries. It explains why these requirements go over and above what sanctions and counterterrorism measures require, and why they are inconsistent with humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law. The article also explores the position in relation to development interventions.