scholarly journals The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-628
Author(s):  
Jelena Mijic
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Conditional Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Contextualist Theory ◽  
Satisfactory Answer ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge ◽  
Skeptical Paradox ◽  
Brain In A Vat

This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses? contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called ?abominable conjunction?. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose?s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick?s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black?s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.

Virtual Citizenship

1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Downes ◽  
Richard Janda
Keyword(s):  
Information Technologies ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Nation State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Modern Media ◽  
Collective Imagination ◽  
Contemporary Media ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis paper examines the importance of metaphor and media to the ideas of citizenship, nation, and place. In particular, the authors explore the relationship between citizenship and the double metaphor of the “nation-state”. If this double metaphor were to lose its hold on the collective imagination, what metaphor could take its place and be represented through modern media of communication? The authors use the example of deterritorialization, discussing first the emergence of the phenomenon particularly given the role of contemporary media of communication, and noting how it bears upon community, place and citizenship to suggest that such an erosion is taking place. They suggest that the “global market” metaphor is gaining ascendancy, and is represented in simulacrum through contemporary information technologies. The third part of this paper conducts a thought experiment implementing a deterritorialized, global market for citizenship, asking to what degree such a market already characterizes contemporary citizenship and assessing what is attractive and unattractive about it. The paper concludes with a caution against either ignoring or embracing this emerging normative construction.

scholarly journals Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luca Moretti ◽  
Tomoji Shogenji
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
The Body ◽  
Component Model ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Sense Experience ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
The Third ◽  
First Response ◽  
Skeptical Paradox

This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.

scholarly journals Brain in a Vat or Body in a World: Brainbound Versus Enactive View of Experience

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Thompson ◽  
Diego Cosmelli
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
The Body ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Living Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Neuronal Processes ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Brain In A Vat ◽  
Embodied Agent

We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that the brain and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are explanatorily inseparable. Such entanglement implies that we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body, and hence we have good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system forconsciousness includes the body and not just the brain. In this way, we put the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to a new use, one that supports the “enactive” view that consciousness is a life-regulation process of the wholeorganism interacting with its environment.

scholarly journals Ontology of the three worlds in the context of Buddhist philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Petr Dmitrievich Abramov
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
The Other ◽  
Dalai Lama ◽  
Buddhist Logic ◽  
The Third ◽  
The One ◽  
The Third World ◽  
Energy Processes

Dalai Lama notes that the Buddhist system of the objects of the realm largely coincides with such developed by Karl Popper. The subject of this article is ontology of the three worlds. The goal lies in analysis of the components of this ontology, demonstration of its prospects and advantages over dualism. First come matter or physical objects; second come mind, subjective reality; third come abstract concepts. Any object of reality is reduced to one of the three worlds and is refracted in a peculiar way in the other two. The third world is the mediator between others worlds; and the autonomous sphere that is not fully conditioned by them. We experience through representations, rather than directly, which is depicted in Buddhism as the image of a gloved hand. The knowledge concentrated in the third world contribute to development of consciousness. A thought experiment with the central and peripheral atoms reveal that there are no indivisible elements and everything exists in mutually dependent, while Buddhist logic substantiates that love and compassion can develop boundlessly. The concept of interdependent existence and non-substantiality of things draws Buddhism and quantum physics closer together. On the one hand, consciousness cannot be naturalized, reduced to matter; and on the other hand, it is inextricable from the energy processes. The conclusion is made that the three fundamental attributes of consciousness in Buddhism outlined by Thubten Gyats (13th Dalai Lama) – subjectivity, intentionality, and reflexivity, can be complemented by another two –  ability to continuously develop virtues, positive traits, and t interdependence between consciousness and subtle forms of matter. The three realms of Buddhism are such only on the phenomenal level; however, on the noumenal level, which unlike Buddhism is not recognized by Popper, is not the trinity, but the unity.

scholarly journals Economic Rationality and Ethical Values in Design-Defect Analysis: The Trolley Problem and Autonomous Vehicles

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Bradley Wendel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Autonomous Vehicle ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Trolley Problem ◽  
Products Liability ◽  
The Third ◽  
Design Defect

The trolley problem is a well-known thought experiment in moral philosophy, used to explore issues such as rights, deontological reasons, and intention and the doctrine of double effect. Recently it has featured prominently in popular discussions of decision making by autonomous vehicle systems. For example, a Mercedes-Benz executive stated that, if faced with the choice between running over a child that had unexpectedly darted into the road and steering suddenly, causing a rollover accident that would kill the driver, an automated Mercedes would opt to kill the child. This paper considers not the ethical issues raised by such dilemmas, but the liability of vehicle manufacturers for injuries that foreseeably result from the design of autonomous systems. Some of the recent commentary on the liability of autonomous vehicle manufacturers suggests unfamiliarity with modern products liability law, particularly the design-defect standard in the Third Restatement of Torts. A superficial understanding of products liability principles – for example, believing it is a regime of strict liability in any meaningful sense – can lead to serious errors in the application of this area of law to autonomous vehicles. It is also a mistake to believe that the economic approach to negligence liability, as developed by Posner and Calabresi, accurately characterizes modern products liability principles. Under the Third Restatement approach, a court or jury will consider whether a product embodies a reasonable balance of safety and utility, and “reasonable” can be interpreted in accordance with ordinary community ethical standards. Thus, some of the issues that are central to resolving trolley problems in moral philosophy may actually recur in design-defect litigation.

scholarly journals Normativity and factualism: Wright’s critique of Kripke’s understanding of rules

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122
Author(s):  
Michal Sladecek
Keyword(s):  
The Third ◽  
Weak Points ◽  
Skeptical Paradox

This paper deals with Wright?s criticism of Kripke?s interpretation of Wittgeinstein and his understanding of the problem of following the rules, and particularly the understanding of a so called skeptical paradox. In the first part of the text, the author gives the basic points of Kripke?s position, whereas the second part examines Wright?s answer to the skeptical solution, that is, Wright?s defense of the objectivity of both the meaning and the connections of rules and their use. The third part discusses the range and certain weak points of Wright?s position which have to do with the issue of the constitutive question of rules and the nature of their normativity.

scholarly journals Lewis’s contextual solution to the Lottery paradox and the Gettier problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Marija Rekovic
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Skeptical Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The main topic of this paper is conversational contextualism, one of the most dominant versions of epistemic contextualism, endorsed by David Lewis. Proponents of conversational contextualism, including Lewis, argue that the key advantage of this view lies in its unique way of analyzing and solving the most prominent epistemological problems. Among those problems are the skeptical paradox, the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The first part of the paper is concerned with the general features of conversational contextualism. In the second part of the paper the author highlights the main hypotheses of conversational contextualism, proposed by Lewis, as an attempt to solve the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The last part of the paper analyzes the pros and cons of the Lewisian solutions to the aforementioned problems. The key part in that analysis is the Cohen?s criticism of those solutions.

Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy

1963 ◽  
Vol 53 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. W. Walbank
Keyword(s):  
Fiftieth Anniversary ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Century ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
The Third ◽  
Hellenistic World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Satisfactory Answer ◽  
Constitutional System

Any discussion of the policy of the Roman Senate towards the Hellenistic world at the end of the third century B.C. must inevitably take account of the work of two men who wrote their most important books around this topic. One is, of course, Polybius, the other Maurice Holleaux. Holleaux's book on Rome, Greece and the Hellenistic monarchies appeared in 1921; but it came as the culmination of several studies on this subject, which had been exercising his attention particularly since 1913. Today, then, we stand virtually at the fiftieth anniversary of Holleaux's thesis, and we can appropriately consider how far it has stood the test of time. However, that is not my main purpose in this paper, which will be concerned much more with what Polybius has to say on the subject. As everyone knows, it is the evidence of Polybius that stands behind Holleaux's remarkable reconstruction of Roman policy; and Holleaux's problem is quite central to Polybius' interests—indeed it is very close to, though not identical with, his main theme. ‘Who,’ he asks, ‘is so worthless and so indolent as not to want to know by what means and under what constitutional system the Romans in less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history?’ It is perhaps not unfair to judge a historian by the degree of success he attains in tackling his main theme. If that seems a reasonable proposition, we may ask ourselves: Does Polybius in fact offer a satisfactory answer to the question he has raised?

scholarly journals The Cartesian evil demon and the impossibility of the monstrous lie

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Alfonso González
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Evil Demon ◽  
Objective Reality ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
The Third ◽  
Idea Of God

In this paper, I address the issue of whether the evil demon could have caused the idea of God. In order to determine the capabilities of the evil demon, I perform a thought experiment in which I reaffirm the conclusion that an imperfect being could have never caused an idea of perfection and infinitude, i.e., the idea of God. The article is divided into five sections and a conclusion. While the first section is introductory, the second looks at the problem of God and knowledge certainty. Elucidating how reality is gradual according to Descartes, in the third section I address the distinction between objective, formal and eminent reality. In turn, in the fourth section, I argue that if the objective reality of God exists, that is, an idea of perfection, the imperfect evil demon could have never caused it. The last section examines the reverse argument of the fourth section, viz, whether God could have caused the existence of evil and imperfection. Keywords: God, evil demon, imperfection.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document