legitimate reason
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2021 ◽  
pp. 247-258
Author(s):  
Yener Ünver ◽  
◽  
Jocelyne Alayan ◽  

Unlawful action cannot be justified even when it is committed in sport or the health field. Although character-wise, both fields are covered by different legal rules, both of them lie under the discipline of law and must be conducted within the rule of law. Theoretically, doping can be considered as fraud, although to this date, no doping actions were incriminated. It is regulated as a disciplinary offense (Turkish Football Federal Disciplinary Directive, art. 61). The usage and possession of drugs by athletes is considered a criminal offense (Turkish Criminal Code, art. 18 & ors.) and a legitimate reason for an athlete’s contract termination. A football player who organizes or uses a counterfeit report concealing a health problem or represents a fraudulent statement to the official authority is considered to have committed a fraud crime (Turkish Criminal Code, art. 24 & ors.) as well as a disciplinary offense (Turkish Football Federal Disciplinary Directive, art. 47-48).


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Toby Betenson

Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases.


Author(s):  
Adam R. Pearce

Abstract Some claim that criminalisation is morally permissible only when the conduct criminalised is morally wrong. This claim can be disambiguated into at least three principles which differ according to whether, and how, wrongness is dependent on details of the law: the strong constraint, the moderate constraint, and the weak constraint. In this paper I argue that the weak wrongness constraint is preferable to the strong and moderate constraints. That is, we should prefer the view that conduct criminalised must be morally wrong, but qualifying wrongness can depend on criminalising the conduct first. Further, I will show that my arguments in support of the weak wrongness constraint have wider implications. Favouring the weak wrongness constraint implies that condemning wrongs cannot be the only legitimate reason in favour of criminalisation. Those who think condemnation can justify criminalisation should be pluralists.


Author(s):  
Ewing Mahoney

This chapter addresses the surveillance of lawyers. Lawyers had no immunity from MI5 surveillance during the Cold War, and progressive lawyers had even less. However, just as the surveillance of MPs was an affront to the principles of parliamentary democracy that MI5 was under a mandate to defend, the surveillance of lawyers was just as great an affront to the Rule of Law, another core liberal value that the Service was bound to respect and sustain, albeit that it did neither convincingly. There is no legitimate reason why lawyers should be targeted, unless there was reason to believe that they were involved in espionage or subversion, of which there is evidence of neither. In the absence of any such suspicion, radical movements are entitled to confidential legal advice, as are radical individuals involved in litigation, while lawyers who provide support for unpopular causes are entitled to expect freedom from harassment by the State.


Lentera Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Jayus Jayus ◽  
Muhammad Bahrul Ulum ◽  
Moch. Marsa Taufiqurrohman

This study aims to discuss the existing contentious recall policy that becomes the legitimate reason to replace or retire the House member proposed by political parties. The discussion also examines to what extent recall, in practice, whether it enables the promotion of Indonesia's anti-corruption agenda. Through the recall, political parties can withdraw their members in the House, either in the form of dismissal or changing positions before the end of the term of office of members who sit in the House of representatives. This study finds that the existing recall policy impedes democracy and negates how to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. As a result, the current policy needs an option to ensure that recall will work as it is expected. Therefore, this alternative should include constituents to propose recall, which will disrupt the existing parties' domination, resulted in a more participatory system, and it reflects the more reciprocal ways to link people, parties, and the House in Indonesian politics. The judiciary's role is another essential aspect to highlight, in which the process and settlement of the recall may involve the Constitutional Court as the hub of the political and constitutional settlement. KEYWORDS: Indonesian Democracy, Anti-Corruption Agenda, Recall Policy, Political System.


Author(s):  
JE Penner

This chapter assesses whether equity employs a distinctive moral criterion when it intervenes in people’s legal rights. It offers a different account about the extent and justification for the way in which English equity maps onto Aristotle’s second sense of equity. Combating the stickler for justice is a legitimate reason for state coercion, but it explains only a small number of equitable doctrines, for example estoppel and mistaken payment. Working within a Kantian framework, the chapter argues that the state is justified in forcing on some claimants an ethical duty to refrain from sticking to their rights in a bad way in order to protect the legal system from the damage this practice may cause. But while equity’s interventions in the parties’ rights in Aristotle’s second sense are legitimate, they are too few and far between to be counted as the intellectual foundation that sets equity apart from the common law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 01-18
Author(s):  
Abdul Kader Mohiuddin

The face powder was demanded by many nations in the world in the beginning AD and in Asia white skin was believed to be the sign of aristocratism, membership of the elite, and yet, white color is the pure symbol of the internal beauty and nobility. In addition, some face powders are sold in varying specialty shades to suit different skin needs; for example, a face powder with a greenish tinge will minimize the appearance of redness, while a purple-tinted powder may help the appearance of sallow or yellow skin. There is a legitimate reason to use face powder, and the pharmacopeias prescribe them in the treatment of many skin affections. At all events the proper use of powder is beneficial, it lightly covers and unifies a complexion, hiding the ravages of time, improving even the beautiful face. Face powder comes in different shades to match varying skin tones, and it is a good idea to choose the skin tone that most closely matches the natural skin. This will help the makeup appear more natural; it should be virtually unnoticeable. It may be necessary to use different face powders for summer and winter, as the skin may become tanner in the summer, or drier and in need of extra moisture in the winter. They are of benefit in acne, freckles, sunburn and red nose. Beneath their attractive aspect and odor, face powders should be made by the perfumer to combine the qualities of an elegant cosmetic and therapeutic agent; they must primarily possess adherence, lightness and be transparent; secondly, they should be detergent and delicately absorbent in order to aid the natural functions of the skin, taking up the fatty matters not easily dislodged by water; they should also tend to increase the natural elasticity and regular functions of the skin.


2019 ◽  
pp. 113-126
Author(s):  
Dov Fox

A negligently failed abortion, birth control, or sterilization foists on plaintiffs the very pregnancy or parenthood they enlisted professional assistance to avoid. Courts refuse to remedy these reproductive injuries on the ground that babies are blessings. But this repudiates plaintiffs’ moral agency to decide what’s good for their own lives. It’s specious and patronizing to think that all unsuspecting parents will come to be glad that misconduct rode roughshod over their decisions to be sterilized, use contraception, or have an abortion. And courts shouldn’t dismiss complaints in which causation is uncertain, provided that plaintiffs can show that negligence increased the chances of unwanted procreation by a non-insignificant degree. But it’s only fair to hold defendants liable for whatever portion of the reproductive injury their negligence caused, or the corresponding chance that their misconduct is to blame for causing it. Plaintiffs shouldn’t be denied the compensation they’re entitled to just because they exercised their protected liberties to decline abortion or adoption. Insisting that negligence victims cut off ties with a fetus or child as a condition of recovery disrespects their interest in making reproductive decisions for themselves. Forcing their hand yet again only exacerbates that injury to such a meaningful part of their lives that specialists had previously given them legitimate reason to expect. Raising the unplanned child may be worse for them than the childless future they’d hoped for—but abortion or adoption may be worse than either of those.


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