Filozofia polityczna a racja stanu. Część 2

Reason of state understood as the reason for its existence and expressed by a synthesis of the normative as well as the political, including its normative and empirical, universal and particular, abstract and concrete dimensions requires a justification by political philosophy. Yet, in the output of the main body of Western political philosophy, including the Aristotelian, Marxist, and liberal traditions, the reason of state lacks any validation. In those traditions, there is no distinction between the elements to be found in all states and those present only in some of them. In fact, both in Aristotle and Marx, the normative in the conduct of all states sets the limits of the empirical which expresses their real behavior. The normative of general principles outlines the political of concrete states. The normative supervises the political and the political is to confirm the normative. Thus, in Aristotle and Marx, the political is to indicate the necessity of the normative, its power of influence and complex character. In turn, the modern as well as contemporary liberals, especially contractarians, completely deprive their normative argument of any empirical confirmation. Thus, they consciously and purposefully give it exclusively a normative dimension. Accordingly, the normative fully replaces the empirical which leads to the elimination of the political. In his concept of public reason, Rawls goes even further and considers the empirical identical with the normative, and consequently the political with the normative. For some of his followers, the irrevocable character of the connection between the normative and the empirical in the notion of public reason is to be guaranteed by elimination of the political. This is to be achieved by the abolition of the state itself and thus the deprivation of the idea of reason of state of any conceptual foundation. However, both in Montesquieu and Burke, there is a strong distinction between what characterizes all states and what distinguishes each of them. Such a distinction results from the difference between what is common to their subjects or citizens and the societies they create, and what distinguishes them from themselves and their societies. At the same time, Montesquieu’s liberalism and Burke’s conservatism offer an equilibrium of the normative and the political which in turn constitutes a doctrinal support for the concept of reason of state beyond the main traditions of western political philosophy.

Reformation, Resistance, and Reason of State (1517-1625)

The period 1517–1625 was crucial for the development of political thought. During this time of expanding empires, religious upheaval, and social change, new ideas about the organization and purpose of human communities began to be debated. In particular, there was a concern to understand the political or civil community as bounded, limited in geographical terms and with its own particular structures, characteristics, and history. There was also a growing focus, in the wake of the Reformation, on civil or political authority as distinct from the church or religious authority. To explain these new ideas about political power, the concept of sovereignty began to be used, alongside a new language of reason of state. Yet political theories based upon religion still maintained significant traction, particularly claims for the divine right of kings. In the midst of these developments, the language of natural law became increasingly important as a means of legitimizing political power; natural law provided a rationale for earthly authority that was separate from Christianity and its use enabled new arguments for religious toleration. This book offers a new reading of early modern political thought, drawing on a wide range of sources from Europe and beyond. It makes connections between Christian Europe and the Muslim societies that lay to its south and east, showing the extent to which concerns about the legitimacy of political power were shared. It demonstrates that the history of political thought can both benefit from, and remain distinctive within, the wider field of intellectual history.

Sovereignty and Reason of State

In the wake of the upheavals of the 1560s, new ideas about strengthening the power of rulers began to emerge. The central concept was sovereignty, first brought to public attention by the French jurist and lawyer Jean Bodin. Bodin wanted to defend the sovereign against external and internal threats, anchoring its power in divine and natural law but also giving him (or it) considerable scope for discretion. This chapter explores the origins and implications of this new interest in sovereignty, showing how it focused attention on the power of the ruler in relation to other sources of authority, notably the Church and the conscience of individuals. At Rome, Cardinal Bellarmine argued for the limits of state authority and for the indirect power of the papacy over magistrates, but other Catholics took different approaches. In particular, Giovanni Botero’s The Reason of State offered an approach to statecraft in which Church and state worked together. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands Justus Lipsius wove together classical texts, especially Tacitus, offering a route to stability and unity in a time of conflict; he acknowledged that conventional morality was sometimes inappropriate for a statesman who would need to adapt to the times. In France, Michel de Montaigne’s ground-breaking Essays combined personal reflection with subtle commentary on the world around him, as he sought to preserve his own integrity and maintain stability within his local community.

Religion and Government in Hugo Grotius’s Annales: Orthodoxy, William the Silent and Reason of State

In Grotius’s Annales, religion appears almost exclusively as a social and political problem. References (implied or explicit) to religion as a good thing or its positive effects are lacking. This aspect of Grotius’s text arises from its equation of ‘religion’ with ‘combative orthodox religion in the post-reformation era’. However, it is not credible that this view represents Hugo Grotius’s actual opinion of the Christian faith as such. The solution seems rather that the above equation must be a conscious rhetorical strategy designed to strengthen the argument of the Annales. Continuing from that conclusion, however, the texts allow us to deduce some views on reason of state and religious policy, which do seem to have been actually held by Grotius in this period, or at least to have enjoyed his active interest.

Poland's Reason of State in the Creation of a New International Order. Foreign Policy as Poland's Reason of State in the 21st Century

The article analyzes the Polish reason of state in changing international order understood as the loss of hegemon position by the United States. The author defines the reason of state as an analytical operant and relates it to the security and sovereignty of a state in the international environment. The text also outlines possibilities of development of Poland's reason of state in the region and global geopolitics.