The media’s role in shaping the public opinion on education: A thematic and frame analysis of externalisation to world situations in the Portuguese media

This article uses thematisation theory (Luhmann, 1996; Pissarra Esteves, 2016) and frame analysis (Entman, 1993) to analyse externalisations to world situations (Schriewer, 1990) in the Portuguese print media’s discussion of education. Our data constitutes news and opinion articles collected after each PISA cycle’s results was published. The analysis demonstrates that the education themes discussed in the media between 2001 and 2017 are consistent, despite occasionally being discussed more intensively, frequently following the themes highlighted by PISA reports and OECD media communications. The frames used for these themes are more diverse, changing according to the speaker’s agenda and viewpoints. Externalisations (frequently PISA, OECD, and other participants in the survey) serve as sources of authority that help in thematising and framing education. This process works as a mechanism of double reduction for the complexity of the social world, narrowing the possibilities of how education is seen and interpreted by the public.

Colonial Petitions, Colonial Petitioners, and the Imperial Parliament, ca. 1780–1918

Petitioning was a common form of protest, request, or expression across the British Empire, and historians of colonial rule and resistance have often drawn on petitions as sources to investigate particular controversies. This article assesses the significance, variety, and context of petitioning to the Imperial Parliament from both the British Isles and the colonies. To do so, we present new data drawn from more than one million petitions sent to the House of Commons in the period from 1780 to 1918, alongside qualitative research into a wider range of petitions to other metropolitan sources of authority. This range permits us to assess how colonial subjects across the empire demanded attention from Westminster and what the practice of petitioning reveals about the British self-image of parliamentary scrutiny and equality before the law.

Actually or Potentially Within Reach: The Place of China in New Zealand’s Grand Strategy 1965-1972

<p>In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat. It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.</p>

Actually or Potentially Within Reach: The Place of China in New Zealand’s Grand Strategy 1965-1972

<p>In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat. It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.</p>

Sovereignty and Reason of State

In the wake of the upheavals of the 1560s, new ideas about strengthening the power of rulers began to emerge. The central concept was sovereignty, first brought to public attention by the French jurist and lawyer Jean Bodin. Bodin wanted to defend the sovereign against external and internal threats, anchoring its power in divine and natural law but also giving him (or it) considerable scope for discretion. This chapter explores the origins and implications of this new interest in sovereignty, showing how it focused attention on the power of the ruler in relation to other sources of authority, notably the Church and the conscience of individuals. At Rome, Cardinal Bellarmine argued for the limits of state authority and for the indirect power of the papacy over magistrates, but other Catholics took different approaches. In particular, Giovanni Botero’s The Reason of State offered an approach to statecraft in which Church and state worked together. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands Justus Lipsius wove together classical texts, especially Tacitus, offering a route to stability and unity in a time of conflict; he acknowledged that conventional morality was sometimes inappropriate for a statesman who would need to adapt to the times. In France, Michel de Montaigne’s ground-breaking Essays combined personal reflection with subtle commentary on the world around him, as he sought to preserve his own integrity and maintain stability within his local community.

Claiming Credibility in Online Comments: Popular Debate Surrounding the COVID-19 Vaccine

At times of crisis, access to information takes on special importance, and in the Internet age of constant connectedness, this is truer than ever. Over the course of the pandemic, the huge public demand for constantly updated health information has been met with a massive response from official and scientific sources, as well as from the mainstream media. However, it has also generated a vast stream of user-generated digital postings. Such phenomena are often regarded as unhelpful or even dangerous since they unwittingly spread misinformation or make it easier for potentially harmful disinformation to circulate. However, little is known about the dynamics of such forums or how scientific issues are represented there. To address this knowledge gap, this chapter uses a corpus-assisted discourse approach to examine how “expert” knowledge and other sources of authority are represented and contested in a corpus of 10,880 reader comments responding to Mail Online articles on the development of the COVID-19 vaccine in February–July 2020. The results show how “expert” knowledge is increasingly problematized and politicized, while other strategies are used to claim authority. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of sociological theories, and some tentative solutions are proposed.

Innovative Tools to Assess a Large Number of Students in the Open Distance and e-Learning MOOCs

The literature on students registered in the Open Distance and e-Learning (ODeL) institutions suggests many obstacles related to their summative-driven assessments, which give insufficient time for study, difficulties in access and use of innovative assessment tools, ineffective feedback, and lack of feedback of study materials. These challenges lead students to learn just enough to get grades without understanding the topics or acquiring knowledge and skills. On the other hand, massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) give students, who have to fulfil multiple roles and are affected by the barriers of distance, cost and time, an opportunity to pursue their studies online. This chapter employed humanistic learning theory (HLT) to present a variety of digital teaching and learning tools that enable assessment suitable for a large number of students in the ODeL MOOCs. Humanistic learning theory emphasises a shift towards considering students, their characteristics, and their influence on learning. In addressing the gap created by assessments that were not focused on the specific human capabilities, including creativity, personal growth, and choice, this chapter first presents principles of HLT linking them with the form of assessments in MOOCs. Secondly, the ways to assess a large number of students in ODeL MOOCs are outlined. Lastly, various digital tools that can assess a large number of students are discussed, considering students as sources of authority.

Contradictory cares in community-led planning

The affective, practical and political dimensions of care are conventionally marginalised in spatial planning in the UK, in which technical evidence and certified expert judgements are privileged. Citizens are encouraged to participate in the planning system to influence how the places where they live will change. But to make the kind of arguments that are influential, their care for place must be silenced. Then in 2011, the Localism Act introduced neighbourhood planning to the UK, enabling community groups to write their own statutory planning policies. This initiative explicitly valorized care and affective connection with place, and associated care with knowledge of place (rather than opposing it to objective evidence). Through long-term ethnographic studies of two neighbourhood planning groups I trace the contours of care in this innovative space. I show how the groups’ legitimacy relies on their enactment of three distinct identities and associated sources of authority. Each identity embodies different objects, methods, exclusions and ideals of care, which are in tension and sometimes outright conflict with each other. Neighbourhood planning groups have to find ways to hold these tensions and ambivalences together, and how they do so determines what gets cared for and how. I describe the relations of care embodied by each identity and discuss the (ontological) politics of care that arise from the particular ways in which different modes of care are made to hang together: how patterns of exclusion and marginalisation are reproduced through a policy which explicitly seeks to undo them, and how reconfiguring relations between these identities can enable different cares to be realised. This analysis reveals care in practices that tend to be seen as antithetical to caring, and enables speculation about how silenced relations could be made visible and how policy could do care better.

Transnational Migration Law: Authority, Contestation, Decolonization

This chapter trace how “transnational migration law” has come to construct human mobility. It argues that transnational migration law is best conceived of as a useful methodological approach, rather than a distinct area of legal doctrine or spatial domain of law. Conceived as a method, transnational migration law can reveal the juridical assemblage of practices, subjects, and relations for regulating migration. This chapter illuminates some of the core and potentially rival sites, forms, and practices of transnational migration lawmaking, drawing attention to the productive and coercive forces of transnational migration law that have resulted in the maintenance of a “global hierarchy of mobility.” Yet, recognizing that state attempts to monopolize “the legitimate means of movement” are incomplete and contested, the chapter argues that scholars of “transnational migration law” must pay attention to diverse and situated Indigenous legal traditions as sources of authority. In doing so, the chapter critically unpacks the relationship between migration and struggles for decolonization and global justice.