Das Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Zeit bei Kant und Schopenhauer

This paper focuses on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s models of self-consciousness and their specific relation to time. It aims to show that genuine philosophical theories can explain the idiosyncratic relation between ourselves and the world without relying on pure metaphysical speculations or strictly empirical and phenomenally oriented conceptions, as many contemporary proponents of analytic philosophy entail. The first groundbreaking doctrine in this regard is Kant’s transcendental theory of apperception, which unfolds a new theoretical dimension of thinking, grounding the logical unity of thought in the pure, originally synthetic unity of the subject itself. In order to constitute a structural order within the appearing phenomenal world, Kant conceptualizes a theory of self-affection in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason, positing a dynamic relation between the spontaneously acting intellect and the purely receptive inner sense of time as a result of productive transcendental imagination. The problematic relation between self-reliance and empirical consciousness that Kant did not resolve completely led to various subsequent transformations of Kant’s transcendental principles, one of which boasts Schopenhauer as a prominent but rarely considered representative. Schopenhauer’s systematic approach consists in a modified version of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which ties the Kantian subject of logical and transcendental unity to an intuitive corporeal individual that can only conceptualize itself as an original, willing subject. The Schopenhauerian subject unfolds its empirical character in accordance with its own inner impulses and motivations, which manifest themselves in time but can only be interpreted as a phenomenal representation of a higher, metaphysical unity, which Schopenhauer calls the will as a thing in itself. Schopenhauer reaches his final metaphysical conclusion via a problematic analogy, positing another perspective on the corporeal nature of the individual which, by means of abstraction, can be extended to the whole phenomenal world. Therefore, Schopenhauer interprets the underlying (intelligible) character of the subject and the phenomenal world as a whole as a timeless, omnipresent will to live which can be temporally experienced within the nature of our own subjectivity.

Bridging the Gap? Naïve Realism and the Problem of Consciousness

How should we decide between philosophical theories of perception? This paper addresses this question by considering the debate between naïve realists and their opponents, and in particular the claim that naïve realism provides a distinctive way of resolving the Problem of Consciousness. I argue that the naïve realist’s solution requires rejecting what many consider to be a ‘fixed point’ in theorizing about perception: a commitment to physicalism. In light of this, I consider different ways of understanding naïve realism and its motivation, suggesting that naïve realism might be best understood as a transcendental theory of perception.

An essential base of the central types of the convex theory

In this paper, we consider the model-theoretical properties of the essential base of the central types of convex theory. Also shows the connection between the center and Jonsson theory in permissible enrichment signatures. Moreover, the theories under consideration are hereditary. This article is divided into 2 sections: 1) an essential types and an essential base of central types (in this case, the concepts of an essential type and an essential base are defined using the Rudin-Keisler order on the set of central types of some hereditary Jonsson theory in the permissible enrichment); 2) the atomicity and the primeness of ϕ(x)-sets. In this paper, new concepts are introduced: the ϕ(x)-Jonsson set, the AP A-set, the AP A-existentially closed model, the ϕ(x)-convex theory, the ϕ(x)-transcendental theory, the AP A-transcendental theory. One of the ideas of this article refers to the fact that in the work of Mustafin T.G. it was noticed that any universal model of a quasi-transcendental theory with a strong base is saturated, but we generalized this result taking into account that: the concept of quasi-transcendence will be replaced by the ϕ(x)-transcendence, where ϕ(x) defines some Jonsson set; and the notion of a strong base is replaced by the notion of an essential base, but in a permissible enrichment of the hereditary Jonsson theory. The main result of our work shows that the number of fragments obtained under a closure of an algebraic or definable type does not exceed the number of homogeneous models of a some Jonsson theory, which is obtained as a result of a permissible enrichment of the hereditary Jonsson theory.

¿Una razón sin astucia? Revisitando el tópico fenomenología trascendental e historia

En este ensayo su autor revisita el tópico fenomenología trascendental e historia 12 años después de la publicación de un trabajo amplio sobre el tema. El escrito esta dividido en tres partes donde se muestras acuerdos y discrepancias con esa interpretación inicial. En la primera se rebate la tesis tan extendida de que la fenomenología de Husserl es alérgica a la historia y se establece una conjetura razonable sobre por qué, y a pesar de la evidencias en contra, sigue todavía bastante vigente esa idea entre los no versados en su obra. En la segunda parte, se muestra en positivo la articulación entre fenomenología e historia y se concluye que la manera quizá más adecuada de entender el sentido último del pensamiento de Husserl es comprenderlo como una teoría transcendental de la historia. Para mostrar esto se expondrá, en primer lugar, el hecho crucial del paso de la fenomenología estática a la fenomenología genética. En segundo lugar, se incidirá en la mutua interconexión entre historia intencional, a priori de la historia y filosofía o teleología de la historia. Por fin, en una tercera y última parte, se realizan algunas valoraciones críticas de las ideas husserlianas. También una autocrítica de algunas partes del mencionado trabajo publicado hace 12 años. Todas tienen que ver, en última instancia, con lo que hoy entiendo como excesiva potencia de la teleología de la historia y la idea de racionalidad y fundamento que la animan.In this essay, the author revisits the topic transcendental phenomenology and history 12 years after the publication of a book on the subject. The paper is divided into three parts and shows agreements and discrepancies with that initial interpretation. The first part contradicts the widespread thesis that Husserl's phenomenology is allergic to history, and develops a conjecture about why, despite the evidence to the contrary, this thesis is still quite common among those not strictly versed in Husserl’s work. The second part shows the positive articulation among phenomenology and history. It concludes that the best way to understand the ultimate meaning of Husserl's thought is considering it as a transcendental theory of history. In order to show the plausibility of this reading, this part of the essay will expose, first, the step from static to genetic phenomenology, and secondly, the mutual interconnection between intentional history, a priori of history, and philosophy or teleology of history. Finally, in a third and final part, some critical assessments of Husserl's ideas are made, also a criticism of the mentioned book of the author of the paper published 12 years ago. They are concerned, ultimately, with what I now understand as an excessive power of teleology of history and the idea of rationality and foundation that animates it.

Problems of Interpretation of Kant’s Concept of Experience

The editor’s preface to the special issue “Kant’s concept of experience” introduces into the circle of the main theoretical problems associated with the concept of experience in Kant’s transcendental theory of knowledge.

Logic of modern educational paradigm: I. Kant versus J. Locke

The paper contrasts the enlightenment and reflective educational paradigms on the basis of studying their underlying logic. The author argues that the enlightenment paradigm, developed by J.A. Comenius, is designed in accordance with inductive logic, which can be understood through actualization of J. Locke`s sensual epistemology and theory of a person as a reflective self-identity over time. In this paradigm, the emphasis is done on the teacher's activity in transferring knowledge to the pupil and shaping his personality. The author claims that the enlightenment paradigm of education is out of date and is not relevant to requirements of contemporary information society. Belief about cognition as passive reception of information by the senses and processing of this information by the mind disagrees with the conclusions made on the basis of research in cognitive science. And belief about a person as a thinking intelligent being, who is able to realize his or her identity over time and expand his or her experience, does not characterize it as an autonomous being capable of self-improvement. The paper proves that the transformation of educational paradigms is possible by changing views concerning the essence of cognitive process and the content of the concept of person. The deductive logic of reflective educational paradigms reveals through the actualization of I. Kant`s transcendental theory of knowledge and the normative theory of personhood. The author concludes that Kant's idea of the autonomy of reason in its theoretical and practical application should become the fundamental principle of the new education paradigm, within the scope of which the primary subject of the educational process is the pupil as representative of the humankind, endowed by nature with certain makings that need to be cultivated, that is to output to a higher level. The main difference between the reflective and the enlightenment paradigms, in the author's opinion, lies in the fact that within the first one the pupil is viewed as an active subject, having autonomy and capable of self-activity. In accordance with this, the entire educational process must be built on the horizontal-democratic principle.

THE LOGIC AND TOPOLOGY OF KANT’S TEMPORAL CONTINUUM

In this paper we provide a mathematical model of Kant’s temporal continuum that yields formal correlates for Kant’s informal treatment of this concept in theCritique of Pure Reasonand in other works of his critical period. We show that the formal model satisfies Kant’s synthetic a priori principles for time (whose consistence is not obvious) and that it even illuminates what “faculties and functions” must be in place, as “conditions for the possibility of experience”, for time to satisfy such principles. We then present a mathematically precise account of Kant’s transcendental theory of time—the most precise account to date.Moreover, we show that the Kantian continuum which we obtain has some affinities with the Brouwerian continuum but that it also has “infinitesimal intervals” consisting of nilpotent infinitesimals; these allow us to capture Kant’s theory of rest and motion in theMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.While our focus is on Kant’s theory of time the material in this paper is more generally relevant for the problem of developing a rigorous theory of the phenomenological continuum, in the tradition of Whitehead, Russell, and Weyl among others.