Moral Panics

Who would have thought that scuffles between teenagers on the southeast coast of England on a cold April weekend in 1964 would have produced the notion of moral panic? Originating as a concept used to understand the reaction to the behavior of these teenagers, moral panic is one of the few sociological ideas that has entered common parlance. The reaction was considerable in relation to the degree of harm or damage. However, local and national media picked up on the events and alarm expressed by civic leaders and local business groups and made hay with headlines decrying the behavior and announcing the arrival of riot police to relieve what was described as a besieged town. More headlines further contributed to a spiral of reaction, and the issues were raised in the Houses of Parliament. The police and judiciary were urged to “crack down.” In the climate of a much-distorted view of events and behavior, overlong and custodial sentences were handed out for petty offenses such as vandalism. The participants in the moral panics include “folk devils” (the English teenagers), an influential and exaggerating media, local interest and pressure groups (civic and business leaders, religious leaders, and those who make “claims” as to expertise on the perceived problem), local and national politicians, the police, and judges. An important feature of moral panics is the “reaching beyond” the immediate problem with claims that there are society-wide implications; in the case of the teenagers in 1964, their deviant conduct was claimed to be symptomatic of general decline in morals. A moral panic is distinguished from general social anxieties and specific moral crusades when there is first a heightened concern over behavior of a group and the consequences this poses for wider society. There must be a division between “them,” the folk devils, and “us,” the responsible and law-abiding citizens. There must be consensus within society, or at least considerable segments of it, that the threat proposed is very serious. Additionally, the threat, damage, costs, and figures proposed by claims-makers are wildly exaggerated and do not coincide with an objective reality. Finally, moral panics are volatile. They typically explode, reach a pitch, and subside. Classic moral panics can also result in illiberal laws. As we will see, children and young people, and childhood, have regularly been the sites of moral panics.

Folk Devils and the Hipster Figure: On Classification Struggles, Social Types and Figures in Moral Panic Research

This chapter draws on a case study of contested societal reactions to the middle-class hipster figure and gentrification in contemporary London. The analysis shows how public reactions involve forms of class politics and classificatory struggles over the moral meaning gentrification processes and the role of the hipster figure in the latter. Through this, the chapter discusses how the folk devil can be conceptualized as a social type by drawing on Bourdieu’s research on classification.

‘Eastern Criminals’ and Moral Panic: On Lithuanian Offenders in Danish Prison Facilities

This chapter analyses an increased number of arrests made on young Lithuanian burglars in Denmark. Following the newspaper hype and political reactions to the burglaries, a distorted picture of the ‘devils’ is produced, letting the public believe that the Lithuanian lawbreakers are particularly inhumane, ruthless and violent. Despite the police reporting that they never have had any violent incidents with Lithuanians, the public image prevails. This negative image ends up affecting their treatment and their rights in Danish detention centres, as prison guards act in accordance with the image, rather than in accordance with their own experience. This makes Lithuanians a particularly vulnerable group of inmates in Denmark.

The Sorcerer as Folk Devil in Contemporary Melanesia

This chapter ethnographically explores a Christian revival movement in Vanuatu led by children. Examining events surrounding the hanging of two adults accused of sorcery, the text challenges the assumption that moral panics are only created with the assistance of mass media. Instead, the chapter shows that they also arise in contexts where gossip, dreams and visions play a similar role in both defining social problems and moral panic.

Infinite Capital Accumulation Through the Endless Harvesting of Limitless Dead Souls. Criminogenic Asymmetries, Structural Inequalities, Mimesis, and Parallel Oligarchies

This article is neither an empirical nor an analytical study; rather, it is a concise statement of a research paradigm that reflects the personal (and perhaps idiosyncratic) concerns of its author, which he wishes to continue and elaborate upon in much further detail at some point in the near future (if any). The general concern is with devising a functional criminological taxonomy of the multitudinous mutabilities migrating between neo-liberal political economy and organised and semi-organised criminality, here defined as criminogenic asymmetries. My central premise is this: although frequently associated in the scholarly literature with corruption, underdevelopment, anomie, and the breakdown of the brokerage of trust, neo-liberalism itself is the sufficient explanation for criminogenic asymmetries. As should be expected, the “moral panic” over the “death of democracy”, already part of our post-1989 history but currently symbolised by the “power crime” presidency of Donald J. Trump, w ill be utilised as the primary empirical example of these trends, both concurrent and convergent.

Patching up the differences: An exploration into Whanganui gang identity

<p>The District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009 (‘Gang Insignia Act 2009’) came into force in 2009 and prohibited the ‘display’ of ‘gang insignia’ within ‘specified areas’ of the Whanganui District. The purported aim of the legislation was to reduce intimidation of the public and confrontations between gangs. There was no requirement for intent on the part of the wearer of the insignia. This made the Whanganui gang insignia ban unique in terms of criminal law as it maintained that harm was inflicted due to group identity rather than specific conduct. This raises the question of how an identity can be constructed so that it is considered capable of causing criminal harm. To address this question, this research looked at the ways in which the media contributed to the construction of gang identity during the period of 2004 to 2013. This was achieved through (1) a content analysis of reports from three print newspapers and two online newspapers, (2) a content analysis of reader interactions with the reports, and (3) a textual analysis of two print newspapers. The research was guided by moral panic theory so looked for ways in which the events related to stages or elements of moral panic. The focus of the moral panic was also expanded so as to explore the overall context operating at the particular time. It was found that the events did correspond to a moral panic model and that whilst the panic was triggered by key occurrences of gang violence, the underlying motive for the panic could be attributed to racial tensions, penal populism, and the use of a terrorist frame. Whilst this research focuses on the construction of gang identity, the techniques used by the media can be applicable to other group identities.</p>

Patching up the differences: An exploration into Whanganui gang identity

<p>The District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Act 2009 (‘Gang Insignia Act 2009’) came into force in 2009 and prohibited the ‘display’ of ‘gang insignia’ within ‘specified areas’ of the Whanganui District. The purported aim of the legislation was to reduce intimidation of the public and confrontations between gangs. There was no requirement for intent on the part of the wearer of the insignia. This made the Whanganui gang insignia ban unique in terms of criminal law as it maintained that harm was inflicted due to group identity rather than specific conduct. This raises the question of how an identity can be constructed so that it is considered capable of causing criminal harm. To address this question, this research looked at the ways in which the media contributed to the construction of gang identity during the period of 2004 to 2013. This was achieved through (1) a content analysis of reports from three print newspapers and two online newspapers, (2) a content analysis of reader interactions with the reports, and (3) a textual analysis of two print newspapers. The research was guided by moral panic theory so looked for ways in which the events related to stages or elements of moral panic. The focus of the moral panic was also expanded so as to explore the overall context operating at the particular time. It was found that the events did correspond to a moral panic model and that whilst the panic was triggered by key occurrences of gang violence, the underlying motive for the panic could be attributed to racial tensions, penal populism, and the use of a terrorist frame. Whilst this research focuses on the construction of gang identity, the techniques used by the media can be applicable to other group identities.</p>

The Politics of Social Discourses about Youth in New Zealand 1950-1965 and 1990-2005

<p>This thesis explores the politics of changing discourses around the youth question in New Zealand’s postwar (1950-1965) and near-contemporary history (1990-2005). Building on a modified Foucaultian framework, it examines for both periods anxieties over young people’s relationships with home, school and the wider society. It also contrasts the two periods to illustrate the ideological shift from the welfare state to neoliberalism, as it was played out through youth-related discourses. This thesis goes beyond the moral panic approach, especially regarding the postwar period. It will demonstrate that rethinking what is conventionally condensed and marginalised as ‘context’ is key to understanding the politics of youth discourses. Postwar debates about young people, because youth were conceived as being in social crisis, served to expose ideological differences that the welfare state had ostensibly overcome. That in turn destabilized the apparent moral consensus and opened up opportunities for resistance and subversion. By contrast, the liberal and emancipatory discourse of society in the 1990s and early 2000s served to insulate neoliberal politics from volatile public concerns. This in turn paradoxically provides a stronger and more efficient foundation for social control over youth.</p>

The Politics of Social Discourses about Youth in New Zealand 1950-1965 and 1990-2005

<p>This thesis explores the politics of changing discourses around the youth question in New Zealand’s postwar (1950-1965) and near-contemporary history (1990-2005). Building on a modified Foucaultian framework, it examines for both periods anxieties over young people’s relationships with home, school and the wider society. It also contrasts the two periods to illustrate the ideological shift from the welfare state to neoliberalism, as it was played out through youth-related discourses. This thesis goes beyond the moral panic approach, especially regarding the postwar period. It will demonstrate that rethinking what is conventionally condensed and marginalised as ‘context’ is key to understanding the politics of youth discourses. Postwar debates about young people, because youth were conceived as being in social crisis, served to expose ideological differences that the welfare state had ostensibly overcome. That in turn destabilized the apparent moral consensus and opened up opportunities for resistance and subversion. By contrast, the liberal and emancipatory discourse of society in the 1990s and early 2000s served to insulate neoliberal politics from volatile public concerns. This in turn paradoxically provides a stronger and more efficient foundation for social control over youth.</p>

Media and Moral Panic: Challenging LGBT in Minangkabau People 2016-2017

Following the report of the existence of LGBT Group in Minangkabau society 2017, the local media, personal blog of public figures, official media social of local government, and several leaders of adat, religious leader, some civil societies responses assess to the new challenges for the decreasing of cultural and religious norm of Minangkabau people. The narrative has four stages: suggesting that the rejection of LGBT is against the cultural values of Minangkabau ethnic identity, reducing the social and adat (customary law) of Minangkabau people, considering LGBT is a threat and a social disease that affects the young generation of Minangkabau, and assuming LGBT is a form of decline for Islamic values that are considered embedding in the local tradition of society. This research argues that LGBT is a moral panic for the Minangkabau people produced by the power. This kind of moral panic emphasizes the disposition of the understanding of adat, religion and traditions around the public discourse. It means that this moral panic framework is a reproductive attempt to strengthen exclusive and conservatism trend in contemporary Minangkabau society and patriarchal influence which claim their attempts to maintain matrilineal values. To build on this argument, this paper will firstly present the context of heteronormativity in Indonesia and then discussing the context of Minangkabau people in West Sumatra.