Moral Panics

Who would have thought that scuffles between teenagers on the southeast coast of England on a cold April weekend in 1964 would have produced the notion of moral panic? Originating as a concept used to understand the reaction to the behavior of these teenagers, moral panic is one of the few sociological ideas that has entered common parlance. The reaction was considerable in relation to the degree of harm or damage. However, local and national media picked up on the events and alarm expressed by civic leaders and local business groups and made hay with headlines decrying the behavior and announcing the arrival of riot police to relieve what was described as a besieged town. More headlines further contributed to a spiral of reaction, and the issues were raised in the Houses of Parliament. The police and judiciary were urged to “crack down.” In the climate of a much-distorted view of events and behavior, overlong and custodial sentences were handed out for petty offenses such as vandalism. The participants in the moral panics include “folk devils” (the English teenagers), an influential and exaggerating media, local interest and pressure groups (civic and business leaders, religious leaders, and those who make “claims” as to expertise on the perceived problem), local and national politicians, the police, and judges. An important feature of moral panics is the “reaching beyond” the immediate problem with claims that there are society-wide implications; in the case of the teenagers in 1964, their deviant conduct was claimed to be symptomatic of general decline in morals. A moral panic is distinguished from general social anxieties and specific moral crusades when there is first a heightened concern over behavior of a group and the consequences this poses for wider society. There must be a division between “them,” the folk devils, and “us,” the responsible and law-abiding citizens. There must be consensus within society, or at least considerable segments of it, that the threat proposed is very serious. Additionally, the threat, damage, costs, and figures proposed by claims-makers are wildly exaggerated and do not coincide with an objective reality. Finally, moral panics are volatile. They typically explode, reach a pitch, and subside. Classic moral panics can also result in illiberal laws. As we will see, children and young people, and childhood, have regularly been the sites of moral panics.

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 364-387
Author(s):  
Benjamin T. Smith ◽  
Wil G. Pansters

During the 1950s Californian civil society advocates and politicians developed a moral panic over youth narcotic use. One of the key elements of this moral panic was the assertion that most drugs came over the border and that the only solution to this problem was blackmailing Mexico through temporary closure of the border. The idea not only became a tenet of later drug policy, but also, in conjunction with pressure from Mexico’s own moral reformers, forced regional politicians in Mexico to enact periodic clean up campaigns.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Lumsden

This article addresses the failure of studies concerning moral panics to take into account the reaction of those individuals who are the subject of social anxiety. It responds to the suggestion by McRobbie and Thornton (1995) that studies of moral panic need to account for the role played by the ‘folk devils’ themselves, for a moral panic is a collective process (Young, 2007). The paper presents findings from ethnographic fieldwork with the ‘boy racer’ culture in Aberdeen, qualitative interviews with members of outside groups, and content analysis of media articles. The societal reaction to the ‘boy racer’ subculture in Aberdeen is evidence of a contemporary moral panic. The media's representation of the subculture contributed to the stigmatization of young drivers and the labelling of the subculture's activities as deviant and antisocial. The drivers were aware of their negative portrayal in the media; however their attempts to change the myth of the ‘boy racer’ were unsuccessful. Although subcultural media can provide an outlet of self-expression for youths, these forms of media can also become caught-up in the moral panic. Ironically the youths’ own niche and micro media reified the (ir)rationality for the moral panic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-171
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Müller

On May 26, 2016, the police raided 43 cannabis dispensaries in Toronto, Canada, making 90 arrests. This article aims to describe the narrative of the responsible state agencies concerning the police raid and compare it to the narrative of those who opposed it, such as activists, as well as consumers and sellers of cannabis. While such concepts as moral entrepreneur, moral panic, and moral crusade have traditionally been used to study those in power, I will employ them to explore both the state narrative and ways in which counterclaims-makers resisted it. In order to do so, I will further develop the concept of moral entrepreneurship and its characteristics by relating it to studies of moral panics and social problems. This article will be guided by the following question: How did each party socially construct its cannabis narrative, and in what way can we use the concept of moral entrepreneurship to describe and analyze these narratives as social constructions? I have investigated the media coverage of the raid and ethnographically studied shops in Toronto in order to study the narratives. My findings show that both parties used a factual neutral style, as well as a dramatizing style. The later includes such typical crusading strategies as constructing victims and villains and presenting the image of a dystopian social world. In order to explain the use of these strategies, we will relate them to the shifting wider social and historical context and to the symbolic connotation of cannabis shops in Toronto in particular and in Canada as a whole.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicky Falkof

This article discusses the discursive and narrative intersections between two moral panics that appeared in the white South African press in the last years of apartheid: the first around the claimed danger posed by white male homosexuals, the second around the alleged incursion of a criminal cult of white Satanists. This connection was sometimes implicit, when the rhetoric attached to one was repeated with reference to the other, and sometimes explicit, when journalists and moral entrepreneurs conflated the two in public dialogue. Both Satanists and gay white men were characterized as indulging in abnormal practices that were dangerous to the health of the nation, using a long-standing colonial metaphor of sanitation and hygiene. I argue that fears of homosexuality and beliefs in Satanism operated as social control measures for disciplining potentially unruly groups whose sexual or personal practices were not admissible within apartheid’s injunctions on homogenous conformity among whites. The connection between homosexuality and Satanism, like the connection between homosexuality and communism, served to pathologize whites whose disobedient bodies and beliefs were considered treacherous.


Author(s):  
Chas Critcher

The concept of moral panic was first developed in the United Kingdom in the early 1960s, principally by Stan Cohen, initially for the purpose of analyzing the definition of and social reaction to youth subcultures as a social problem. Cohen provided a “processual” model of how any new social problem would develop: who would promote it and why, whose support they would need for their definition to take hold, and the often-crucial role played by the mass media and institutions of social control. In the early 1990s, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda produced an “attributional” model that placed more emphasis on strict definition than cultural processes. The two models have subsequently been applied to a range of putative social problems which now can be recognized as falling into five principal clusters: street crime, drug and alcohol consumption, immigration, child abuse (including pedophilia), and media technologies. Most studies have been conducted in Anglophone and European countries, but gradually, the concept is increasing its geographical reach. As a consequence, we now know a good deal about how and why social problems come to be constructed as moral panics in democratic societies. This approach has nevertheless been criticized for its casual use of language, denial of agency to those promoting and supporting moral panics, and an oversimplified and outdated view of mass media, among other things. As proponents and opponents of moral panic analysis continue to debate the essentials, the theoretical context has shifted dramatically. Moral panic has an uncertain relationship to many recent developments in sociological and criminological thought. It threatens to be overwhelmed or sidelined by new insights from theories of moral regulation or risk, conceptualizations of the culture of fear, or the social psychology of collective emotion. Yet as an interdisciplinary project, it continues, despite its many flaws, to demand sustained attention from analysts of social problem construction.


2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Ryan Logan

In early June 2013, several of Indiana's largest businesses and prominent religious leaders from various Christian denominations came together to pledge their public support for the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013 (also known as S.744). Together, these business and religious leaders gathered at the headquarters of Indianapolis' own pharmaceutical giant, Eli Lilly and Company, along with volunteers from the grassroots organization known as the Indianapolis Congregation Action Network (IndyCAN). IndyCAN and its branch, the Campaign for Citizenship, had organized this meeting between these religious and business leaders in order to gain the support of some of Indianapolis' most prominent figures for the new immigration reform bill.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Furedi

From its inception the medium of writing has been a source of moral concern. The growth of the printed media reinforced these apprehensions. Fears about the media effect on the behaviour of readers became recurring phenomena – in some cases provoking reactions characterised as a moral panic. These periodic outbursts of disquiet can be best understood as panics about the potential impact of the media on public morality. Such reactions were not simply media panics but panics about the effects of the media. The focus of anxiety was not on any particular issue but on the threat to moral authority posed by the media on the outlook and behaviour of the public. By its very existence the media appeared to represent a potential threat to the moral order. Exploring the moral dimension of this reaction is essential for the study of moral panics.


Author(s):  
G Praharawati ◽  
◽  
F M Mangunjaya ◽  
H M Saragih ◽  
A Y Firdaus ◽  
...  

Efforts to conserve peatlands and prevent forest fires are inseparable from human awareness and behavior. This study aims to find a model for a religious, moral approach by the clerics in supporting the implementation of peatland restoration. The study was carried out in designated Muslim locations with trained clerics. The farmers surveyed also have experienced by the Peatland Restoration Agency (BRG) programs: i.e., physical support, such as a canal dam program and demonstration plot of agriculture without burning (PLTB). The methods used combine quantitative surveys with a Likert scale to explore attitudes, subjective norms, perception, intention, and their impact on behavior. The results obtained show that the community religious leaders can be an important trigger in encouraging the movement. In the model, visible subjective norm (SN) variables contribute directly to intention by 23%. Perceived behavior control (PBC) directly has a positive and significant effect on intention 53% (p-value). This means the individual, in making a decision and intention to participate, is a factor that has a broad impact on the community and gives a positive value of 53% (good enough) on the intention. The individuals' decisions to participate in peatland conservation are prompted by perception of having a wide impact on the community.


2020 ◽  
pp. 205015792092226
Author(s):  
Neomi Rao ◽  
Lakshmi Lingam

India is a rapidly growing youth market for smartphone technology. Accompanying the spike in Indian youths’ smartphone use is a proliferation of media coverage on the purported impact of smartphones on youths’ physical, psychological, and social well-being. We use a qualitative media analysis to show that the online and print media narratives around this issue reveal widespread fear and anxiety about youths’ smartphone use. We argue that this stems from a moral panic reaction to youths’, particularly young women’s, potential exercise of agency using their smartphones and accessing forbidden content over the internet. This narrative fails to include the potential affordances of internet access for youth and other marginalized people while also failing to address deeper concerns about digitization.


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