Are All Network Ties Created Equal? Distinguishing Between Strength and Use of Ties in Bureaucrat–Lobbyist Alliances

Scholars of policy networks consistently find that agreement on policy explains network ties, but inconsistent results on the importance of strategic considerations, such as the influence of potential partners. We use original data on communications between bureaucrats and lobbyists on pending Medicaid legislation to distinguish network ties (contacts) from bureaucrats’ use of those ties to attempt to advance their policy goals (requests for lobbying help). We find that policy agreement explains both the strength of network ties and bureaucrats’ requests for advocacy from their partners, but that interest group influence and unified partisan control of government explain only the latter.

Slovakia

In Slovakia, the main lines of conflict that determine coalition formation have changed over time. Iinitially the conflicts were based on national-ethnic issues, later this was followed by disagreement over the direction of reforms and the European integration process. Eventually they have settled around socioeconomic policies with alternating right and left governments in power. Only three coalition cabinets have served the full parliamentary terms, and all of them have both enjoyed a majority support in Parliament and included a dominant large party. In contrast, coalitions without a major leading party, and where the power structure has been more evenly distributed, have been more likely to terminate due to inter-party conflicts before the end of the full constitutionally mandated term. The coalitions of the second type coalitions have also been pursuing more of consensual style of politics. They have been based on social-economic policy agreement between the parties but differed considerably in terms of the GAL-TAN dimension. While socioeconomic policies appear is a strong driving force in coalition bargaining, the second (GAL-TAN) dimension tends to matters more when it comes to the survival of the coalition. In terms of coalition governance, six out twelve cabinets represented the Prime Minister Dominated model. The cabinets with a leading party (HZDS, SDKÚ-DS, and SMER-DS) did not have as many internal conflicts as the cabinets with a relatively even power distribution. The latter type of cabinets relied instead on their ability to negotiate and compromise in the name of consensus and so they represent a Coalition Compromise Model.

Dodd-Frank Prohibits Purely Policy-Based Dismissals of the CFPB Director

The president may not fire the director of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau for purely policy-based reasons: Dodd-Frank gives the director a fixed term and limits the grounds for removability to “good cause.” Further, Congress designated the CFPB as an “independent agency” under the Paperwork Reduction Act. As a consequence, presidents may not demand policy agreement from a CFPB Director, as long as the Director implements policies in good faith compliance with the law.