The Coalition Life-cycle in Central Eastern Europe

This volume analyses the coalition life-cycle in ten countries in Central Eastern Europe, from pre-electoral alliances to government formation and portfolio distribution, to governing in coalitions, the events that eventually lead to a government termination, and electoral performance of coalition parties. This final chapter summarizes the main patterns of coalition politics and compares among the ten countries. In terms of the three models of coalition governance Hungary comes closest to the Dominant Prime Minister Model, Lithuania and Latvia approach the Ministerial Government Model, and Slovenia comes closest to the Coalition Compromise Model. The chapter also discusses how these findings contrast with the general patterns known from the literature on coalition politics in Western Europe. A few of the patterns of coalition politics are similar, including the relative frequency of different types of coalition governments and the increase and spread of the use of coalition governance mechanisms, such as written coalition contracts. Other features are more distinct: there have been fewer single-party governments and there is a stronger tendency to the Ministerial Government Model than in Western Europe. Over time, processes of learning and adjustment to coalition governance can be identified, however without a linear and general trend. Much of the change is rooted in party system changes, for instance the reversal of the initial growth of new political parties and the recent decline of the effective number of parties (ENP). While a less tangible result, the chapters also stress the role of personalities and animosities to impact coalition considerations.

Slovenia

Under the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in Slovenia, after elections, coalition governments have formed. However, the coalition partners have also adopted a ‘dropping out from government’ strategy between elections, which in some cases has led to minority governments. This has occurred despite a frequent use of several conflict-prevention and conflict-resolution mechanisms. One such mechanism, coalition agreements, are mostly understood in terms of policy agreements. After each election in the period 1992–2000, the leading party, the LDS, signed a coalition agreement with each coalition partner. Since 2013, such coalition agreements include a mechanism of explicitly stating in coalition agreements that certain issues are to be avoided. Regardless, governments termination in majority cases happened due to different (policy or personal) conflicts within the government. Early in the period, government coalitions were ideologically mixed. This was characteristic for governments under LDS leadership from 1992 to 2004, while after the 2004 elections, the governmental coalitions were much more ideologically homogenous. Alternation between like-minded ideological coalitions (centre-left or centre-right) took place. Simultaneously, the main lines of conflict changed. In the 1990s, initially a mostly ideological cleavage between ‘transformed’ and ‘newly established’ political parties was present, while after the 2004 elections, the economic cleavage became more salient. All parliamentary parties, except the Slovenian National Party, have at least briefly participated in governments, while the Democratic Party of Retired Persons have been since the mid-1990s the party with the biggest coalition potential. Since 2011, small parties have received pivotal roles in coalition formation. Generally speaking, participation in the government has not been electorally rewarding for the political parties.

Slovakia

In Slovakia, the main lines of conflict that determine coalition formation have changed over time. Iinitially the conflicts were based on national-ethnic issues, later this was followed by disagreement over the direction of reforms and the European integration process. Eventually they have settled around socioeconomic policies with alternating right and left governments in power. Only three coalition cabinets have served the full parliamentary terms, and all of them have both enjoyed a majority support in Parliament and included a dominant large party. In contrast, coalitions without a major leading party, and where the power structure has been more evenly distributed, have been more likely to terminate due to inter-party conflicts before the end of the full constitutionally mandated term. The coalitions of the second type coalitions have also been pursuing more of consensual style of politics. They have been based on social-economic policy agreement between the parties but differed considerably in terms of the GAL-TAN dimension. While socioeconomic policies appear is a strong driving force in coalition bargaining, the second (GAL-TAN) dimension tends to matters more when it comes to the survival of the coalition. In terms of coalition governance, six out twelve cabinets represented the Prime Minister Dominated model. The cabinets with a leading party (HZDS, SDKÚ-DS, and SMER-DS) did not have as many internal conflicts as the cabinets with a relatively even power distribution. The latter type of cabinets relied instead on their ability to negotiate and compromise in the name of consensus and so they represent a Coalition Compromise Model.

Romania

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.

Latvia

Although a profound ethnic cleavage separates the native Latvians and from the Slavic minorities, and institutional thresholds operate to prevent fragmentation of parliamentary politics, Latvia’s voter preferences generate fractured legislatures and a high turnover of parliamentary parties. Coalitions arise from free-style bargaining among a narrow circle of party elites where the head of state (president) plays a rather limited role. Parties are driven by both office-seeking and policy-seeking considerations but control over public resources is notably important to maintain party organizations and fight elections. Notable is also that the Slavic parties are excluded from government coalitions. Regardless of the type of coalition, very similar coalition agreements outline mechanisms for coalition governance, reinforcing the primus inter pares status of the prime minister as defined in the law. Although cabinet duration is rather low, party discipline in the legislature is high and opposition proposals are usually rejected. Technical reasons aside, most cabinets in the twentieth century collapsed due to disagreements over policy while cabinet termination in the twenty-first century is more frequently related to party strategic considerations. Coalitions tend to lose support in elections, but this does not apply equally to all coalition parties.

Hungary

The core features of coalition politics in Hungary are majority coalitions and stable governments. A small number of parliamentary parties are strongly divided both on cultural and economic cleavage lines. This does not offer much flexibility in coalition formation. Before 2010 coalitions were controlled by alternating senior parties of either conservative or left orientation, thereafter coalitions have been characterized by one-party conservative dominance. The coalitions of the left were based on more equal partnership, deeper policy consciousness, and more established party organization than the conservative coalitions. Hungary has developed in to a case of prime ministerial government built on constitutional, legal, political, and occasionally personal grounds. Secured by the constructive no-confidence vote, enjoying authority in the nomination and dismissal of ministers, being party leader, and not facing strong political rivals or institutional veto points, most prime ministers have enjoyed unquestionable power. Over the decades, governance has become increasingly centralized and politicized. The management of coalition conflicts has moved away from Parliament and cabinet to narrow circles of party political or personal nominees. Publicly available coalition agreements, with few exceptions, have not been policy-oriented and have not provided much guidance on coalition governance or conflict resolution techniques. Still, disciplined legislative and parliamentary behaviour has been common and early elections have never taken place. Government termination has rarely occurred due to policy conflicts between the coalition partners. Junior coalition parties have paid huge electoral costs for their participation in government.

Czech Republic

With only a few exceptions, Czech cabinets have been coalition cabinets. Two essential features of coalition politics in the Czech Republic are unstable majorities and ideological heterogeneity inside governing coalitions. Only very rarely have there been pre-electoral cooperation, and a threshold for alliances in the electoral system has meant a substantial obstacle for smaller parties. There has been no pre-electoral cooperation, such as pre-electoral coalitions with a mutual commitment to form a joint government after the elections. Instead, cabinet-building usually has been a long process, on average much longer than in the other new European Union (EU) member states. The largest parties have relied on cooperation with small centre-right parties. Another critical and typical feature of the Czech coalition formation process are strong presidential interventions. This has been practised by all presidents, starting with Vaclav Havel, continuing with Vaclav Klaus, and the current president Milos Zeman. Coalition agreements, mostly in a written form, have been crucial. Political parties have found it difficult to cooperate without such agreements. In general, the character and composition of the agreements have very much been policy-oriented. However, there have also existed unwritten rules and informal structures which have undermined coalition governance because they have established inequality among formally equal ministers. While originally tilted towards Prime Minister Dominance, because of presidential involvement, the governance system for intra-cabinet relations has become one that alternates between the coalition compromise model and the ministerial government model.

Bulgaria

Democracy in Bulgaria came as a result of a pact that preserved the role of the communist successor party to a larger degree than in many other post-communist countries in Central Eastern Europe (CEE). That had an impact on the nature of coalition government as well as an important but rarely noted aspect of the legacy of the successor party, the Bulgarian Socialist party (BSP). Because of the dominant position of the BSP, its personalized and centralized vision and practice of governing have remained characteristic of the political system. Coalition government is the dominant pattern in Bulgarian democratic politics: of the eleven party-based cabinets since 1990, only four were single-party ones. There are several major features of coalition government in Bulgaria: one is that party-building and coalition-making have been deeply intertwined over the entire period. Further, coalitions have been based on the understanding that parties divide the power and accompanying privileges, rather than that they share responsibility for government. Thus, in contrast to some longer-standing democracies the coalition formation process rarely involves detailed agreements on policy, and has mostly revolved around personalities and portfolios. As a result, coalition agreements have been minimal and the periods of coalition bargaining have been relatively short. Conflict resolution mechanisms are centralized and personalized, and coalitions have broken down because of narrow party political interests rather than because of principled conflicts over public policy.

The Economic and Political Context of Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe

This chapter introduces the economic and political context in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) at the wake of the democratic transition. It compares these circumstances to those in Western Europe and then goes on to trace the political and economic development of CEE since the onset of democratic rule. This economic and political context provides important background information to get a better understanding of coalition politics in the ten CEE countries studied in this volume. The chapter shows that the countries in CEE had quite different starting conditions. They differed substantially on factors such as level of industrialization, unemployment, and economic growth and they opted for different strategies in the transition from central planned to a free market economy. While most of the countries had reached comparatively high levels of market orientation within a few years of democratization, considerable differences remained when the countries joined the European Union. The ten countries also differ with regard to their democratic traditions, and opted for different institutional designs on matters such as the electoral system, the role of the head of state, and the organization of the legislature. High uncertainty associated with initial design choices has resulted in frequent institutional reforms. The communist legacy not only affected the development of party systems, it also affected the political culture in the polities. In conclusion, the countries studied in this book show both initial and persisting variation in terms of economic performance, their institutional framework, the social conditions, and attitudes towards politics among the electorate.

Poland

The polish party system has evolved from having been an extremely fragmented one to a moderate pluralist one. Up to 2005, the main political cleavage was that between post-communist and anti-communist parties. There was also a left–right dimension of political competition, but it was the ‘old regime’ divide that constituted the basic axis of political conflict. Coalitions were formed either by the successor party (SLD) or by the post-‘Solidarity’ parties. All cabinets between 1993 and 2005 were minimal winning ones. Since 2005 two parties with ‘Solidarity’ pedigree compete with each other for the victory in parliamentary elections. On the left–right spectrum, they both represent the ‘right’. The left has been marginalized. Socioeconomic and socio-cultural conflicts between the nationalist-conservative PiS and the liberal-conservative PO have dominated the electoral and parliamentary arenas. Also, after 2005, minimal winning coalitions led by either PiS or PO have prevailed, but new forms of cabinets have appeared. In 2005, a single-party cabinet was formed by PiS. In 2006, a support party agreement (the so called pakt stabilizacyjny) was signed by PiS and two small, populist parties. After a few months, the coalition was formalized in a regular coalition agreement. Within the same time period, from the turn of the millennium, the two large parties have both practiced a governance model with prime ministers dominating internal procedures and mechanisms. Another regularity is that the largest parliamentary party always forms the cabinet, either on its own (rarely) or in alliance with smaller parties. Also, junior parties in the coalitions are likely to be punished rather than awarded by the electorate. Notable is that formal coalition agreements have been signed by coalition partners since 1993. They are programmatic as well as procedural and contain not only distribution of portfolios but also the rules of resolving intra-coalition conflicts.