Phonosemantic Interference: Multiple Motivation in the Imitative Word Coinage (on the Material of Invented Languages)

Introduction. Phonosemantic interference is a phenomenon in imitative word coinage in which the sound shape of a single imitative sign can be conditioned by several categorically different motives of nomination. Several phonosemantic studies have reported this effect; however, a clear definition of the term, the description of the existing models of motive combinations, as well as possible explanations behind this phenomenon have yet to be developed. The objective of this article is to attempt to formulate the definition of this term and to describe the mechanisms of phonosemantic interference using new linguistic material (artificially constructed lexis).Methodology and sources. The study is conducted within the framework of the phonosemantic approach developed by Stanislav Voronin on the material of artificially constructed words from well-known fictional languages Lapin, Klingon, Elvish, and Navi. Methods of the research include the method of continuous sampling, typological comparison, and the method of phonosemantic analysis.Results and discussion. Using the material of artificially constructed lexis, the examples of the combination of several motives of nomination for a single sound-imitative sign are demonstrated and the motives of their coinage are studied. The typological comparison of the artificially constructed words against imitative words of natural origin has revealed similar models of multiple motivation both in artificial and natural word coinage, which suggests that multiple nomination is a regular way of primary nomination. The definition of the term phonosemantic interference has been provided.Conclusion. Multiple motivation reflects the complex nature of the intermodal perception of extralinguistic objects. In the case of phonosemantic interference, the phonetic form of a word is the product of a co-operative action of several senses. The reflection of several denotata in a single sound form increases the variety of primary forms and meanings and helps explicate subtle semantic contrasts. The notion of phonosemantic interference enables analyzing, describing, and understanding the mechanisms of complicated cases of imitative word coinage within the framework of the already well established phonosemantic taxonomy.

Auditory–Visual Matching of Conspecifics and Non-Conspecifics by Dogs and Human Infants

We tested whether dogs and 14–16-month-old infants are able to integrate intersensory information when presented with conspecific and heterospecific faces and vocalisations. The looking behaviour of dogs and infants was recorded with a non-invasive eye-tracking technique while they were concurrently presented with a dog and a female human portrait accompanied with acoustic stimuli of female human speech and a dog’s bark. Dogs showed evidence of both con- and heterospecific intermodal matching, while infants’ looking preferences indicated effective auditory–visual matching only when presented with the audio and visual stimuli of the non-conspecifics. The results of the present study provided further evidence that domestic dogs and human infants have similar socio-cognitive skills and highlighted the importance of comparative examinations on intermodal perception.

Explanations, mechanisms, and developmental models: Why the nativist account of early perceptual learning is not a proper mechanistic model

In the last several decades a number of studies on perceptual learning in early infancy have suggested that even infants seem to be sensitive to the way objects move and interact in the world. In order to explain the early emergence of infants? sensitivity to causal patterns in the world some psychologists have proposed that core knowledge of objects and causal relations is innate (Leslie & Keeble 1987, Carey & Spelke, 1994; Keil, 1995; Spelke et al., 1994). The goal of this paper is to examine the nativist developmental model by investigating the criteria that a mechanistic model needs to fulfill if it is to be explanatory. Craver (2006) put forth a number of such criteria and developed a few very useful distinctions between explanation sketches and proper mechanistic explanations. By applying these criteria to the nativist developmental model I aim to show, firstly, that nativists only partially characterize the phenomenon at stake without giving us the details of when and under which conditions perception and attention in early infancy take place. Secondly, nativist start off with a description of the phenomena to be explained (even if it is only a partial description) but import into it a particular theory of perception that requires further empirical evidence and further defense on its own. Furthermore, I argue that innate knowledge is a good candidate for a filler term (a term that is used to name the still unknown processes and parts of the mechanism) and is likely to become redundant. Recent extensive research on early intermodal perception indicates that the mechanism enabling the perception of regularities and causal patterns in early infancy is grounded in our neurophysiology. However, this mechanism is fairly basic and does not involve highly sophisticated cognitive structures or innate core knowledge. I conclude with a remark that a closer examination of the mechanisms involved in early perceptual learning indicates that the nativism/empiricism debate (as usually construed in developmental literature) is wrong headed and should be closed.