An Alternative to Individualism: Relational Concept of Human in Confucian Role Ethics

The article proposes to see Confucian role ethics as a philosophical project that puts forward metaethical and metaphilosophical arguments regarding the nature of ethics and the concept of human beings, instead of concentrating on its interpretational work in explicating the nature of early Confucian ethics. Thus, a more fitting context for evaluating the core claims of role ethics is suggested, one that is comprised of different positions, coming from a wide range of philosophical and cultural backgrounds, as well as different disciplines, all of which criticize individualism or formulate a non-individualistic concept of person. Role ethics concept of person, as a totality of one’s lived roles and relations, is discussed by concentrating on the specificity of two key notions in this position, that is, “relation” and “role”. The article ends with a suggestion that the deeper and fuller investigation and exposition of normativity, as stemming from the specific and concrete role-relationships, is the most needed and promising direction of further development of role ethics.

Conclusion

The conclusion considers some of the implications of early Chinese views of mental illness and self-cultivation for contemporary thought concerning mental illness. I argue that some of the views of early Chinese thinkers can be adapted using contemporary conceptions of mental illness, and that difficulties for certain kinds of character, virtue, and role ethics that arise surrounding issues of mental illness might be solved by adapting these views to contemporary contexts.

Target Centred Virtue Ethics and Role Ethics

The development of ‘virtue jurisprudence’ (a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics for law) has highlighted the importance of virtue in legal ethics. Yet it has been criticized because it cannot account for “robust” role differentiation. In this chapter I argue that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can account for two features which constitute the ‘Role Dilemma’: (a) There is robust role differentiation; that is, role differentiation as conceived by the Standard Conception of law (and, e.g., business).(b) Occupiers of legal roles are not permitted to act immorally (except perhaps in “tragic” dilemmas).Virtue ethics and Standard Conceptions of law (and, e.g., business) are standardly thought to be incompatible. This may be true where virtue ethics is conceived in “orthodox” neo-Aristotelian terms. I reject this version of virtue ethics for role ethics and show that Target Centred Virtue Ethics can subscribe to both horns of the dilemma (a) and (b) above.

Basic Virtue and Differentiated Virtue

This chapter argues that virtue ethics in traditional form has been overly simple, since it has not adequately integrated within its theoretical structures such important ethical features as role ethics, the narrative quality of our lives, cultural and historical location. It is important for Target Centred Virtue Ethics to offer a theoretical account of how such features can be accommodated within virtue ethics and how the targets of virtues can be more closely specified once that is done. The resulting view is not relativist but an objectivist realist position. This is achieved by a distinction between basic and differentiated virtue so that in role ethics, for example, a basic virtue such as generosity is role differentiated to form a virtue of generosity qua CEO which limits permitted acts of generosity.

Priorities and ethics in population-based healthcare

As a result of reading this chapter you will be able to: understand the language of ethics and the role ethics play in public; health practice; understand the principles of priority-setting for health and healthcare; systems within a constrained budget; appreciate how an ethical framework guides choices for population; health and health policy-making, including making choices to reduce health inequalities