The Sun in its Glory: The Diffusion of Jonathan Dymond’s Works in the United States, 1831-1836

The English Quaker and linen-draper Jonathan Dymond (1796-1828) is best known for his strong philosophic articulation of the testimony against war. The first American edition of Dymond’s work, though, was published not by Quakers but by a small group of activist-thinkers in north-eastern Connecticut, the Windham County Peace Society, which issued a thousand copies of Dymond’s The Applicability of the Pacific Principles of the New Testament to the Conduct of States in the spring of 1832. Dymond’s systematic moral philosophy extended into many corners of the burgeoning philanthropic movements in New England, most notably among Immediate Abolitionists, within the Peace movement and in support of the extension of women’s education. Numerous non-Quakers embraced and publicised his thought in this period: William Lloyd Garrison, the multi-religious family of George Benson Sr., famed Unitarian theologian William Ellery Channing, Unitarian Abolitionist Samuel J. May, Abolitionist editor Charles Burleigh, Thomas Grimké and his famous sisters Sarah and Angelina. Perhaps the most intriguing instance of this concerns white Abolitionist educator Prudence Crandall - a former Quaker herself - and the Black students attending the Canterbury Academy where she taught; they had access to chapters from Dymond’s Essays on the Principles of Morality prior to that book’s publication in the United States. This article focuses on the theoretical and practical aspects of Dymond’s contention that Christianity must call forth moral consistency, coupled with his evident respect for women’s intellect. These features of his thought gave to this influential generation of New England Abolitionists a philosophical-religious base. This article expands the understanding of Dymond’s American impact past its obvious relevance in Garrisonian non-resistance to an appreciation of how his moral philosophy fitted the radical ethos of the 1830s.

Double Standards

Parochialism is universally irresistible, and we kid ourselves as well as others regarding the unity and consistency of our own morals. In reality, we cannot escape holding multiple standards depending on both situation and degree of affiliation. There is indeed much delusion and blind oversights regarding what we experience as our own moral consistency, and how we perceive and judge the moral consistency of others, the categorical way we experience our own moral self and the moral self of others. To avoid implosion under the weight of moral inconsistencies and blatant ambiguities, we are forced to operate along multiple, typically well-compartmentalized moral standards. We switch moral codes depending on people and situations, rarely losing the sense of our own moral unity. We grow to become very apt at juggling multiple standards. We are moral acrobats always about to lose balance, while dancing over shaky moral montages and other bricolages: “something constructed or created from a diverse range of available things” (Oxford English Dictionary). Historical evidence abounds, from Ben Franklin to Adolph Hitler.

Is Animal Cruelty or Abolitionist Messaging More Effective: A Reanalysis

This document presents a reanalysis of the data and conclusions reported on September 20, 2015, by Humane League Labs in the blog post titled "Is animal cruelty or abolitionist messaging more effective?" and the accompanying report titled "Report: Is Animal Cruelty, Environmental or Purity (“Abolitionist”) Messaging More Effective At Inspiring People To Change Their Diet?" The study compared the effect of three animal advocacy messages on participants’ self-reported intention to change their animal product consumption. Our reanalysis supports the original report’s conclusion that a message focussing on the cruelty animals endure in factory farming systems is more effective than a message focussing on animal rights and moral consistency. In contrast to the original report, our reanalysis did not find significant differences between the message focussing on cruelty and a message focussing on the environmental impact of meat consumption. Results for the comparison of the environmental message with the animal rights messages were mixed. Overall, we recommend interpreting the findings with caution as there are several serious flaws in the design of the study.

Meta-Characteristics of Islamic Ethics and Moral Consistency in Islamic Banking

This article presents a theory of how the consumption of Islamic products may promote morally consistent behavior over time. We identify and examine three unique meta-characteristics (MCs) of Islamic ethics: ubudiyah (subservience to God), akhirah (focus on the hereafter or the long-term), and tawado (being modest while doing an ethical act). In four experiments, we show that after consumption of an Islamic banking product, MCs produce moral consistency or repeat ethical behavior, which is one major objective of an ethical system. We also show that the absence of MCs results in moral inconsistency, that is, unethical behavior follows earlier consumption of an Islamic banking product due to the mediating psychological mechanism of moral licensing. Hence, it is not only the enactment of general ethical practices, rather the enactment of ethical practices in the specific context set by the MCs through which Islamic ethical system promotes ethical conduct and prevents unethical conduct. The findings have implications for Islamic ethical system and Islamic banking.

Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered

Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar’s naturalistic model for the resolution of inconsistencies between the content of intuitions about particular cases. I argue that reasons similar to those that motivate their model also support a more abstract form of moral reasoning that goes beyond mere resolutions of inconsistencies between case judgments and demands the formulation of more abstract moral norms. Consistency Reasoning Casuistry, it is argued, is a good candidate for a methodology for case-based moral reasoning that is in harmony with paradigms of contemporary moral psychology and that can accommodate the methodology implicit in the work of many contemporary ethicists.

Living One’s Theories: Moral Consistency in the Life of Émile Durkheim

This article investigates the relation between a theorist’s theories and his daily life practices, using Émile Durkheim as an example. That theory and practice should be consistent seems not only scientifically proper but also morally right. Yet the concept of consistency conceals several different standards: consistency with one’s own theoretical arguments, consistency with outsiders’ judgments of oneself, and consistency within one’s arguments (and actions) across time and social space. Analysis of 750 pages of Durkheim’s letters shows that Durkheim lived a life consistent with and informed by his theories for most of his career. In his professional relations, his personal relations, and his political positions, Durkheim’s moral activity usually proceeds from his theoretical commitments. However, the death of his son in combat could not be theorized within the Durkheimian system, and it broke up this long stable pattern. The analysis concludes that under modern conditions, the issue of moral consistency relates closely to the general problem of solidarity and invites more complex theorization.

Paths of Glory and the Tyranny of the Greater Good

In Paths of Glory (Stanley Kubrick, 1957) the individual's moral intent is distorted, compromised, and eventually co-opted by the overriding utilitarian ethic of ensuring the survival of the system – the ultimate ‘greater good’ – at all costs. The individual may challenge the system in a noble quest for justice, like Dax. He may hypocritically seek professional advancement from striving to serve it, like Mireau. Or he may cynically manipulate it for political purposes, like Broulard. In each case, the consequences are ultimately the same – the individual is forced to align his particular moral vision, however noble or ignoble, with the imperative of the greater good. The individual may resist or affirm the system and achieve some level of moral consistency and purity, but only momentarily and with limited success. In the end, whatever the value or relevance of the individual conscience to a particular situation, it is overridden by the demands of the greater good.